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This dissertation reframes the debate about whether Paradise Lost is an allegorical 
poem by focusing on Milton’s assertion that all language is allegorical because it 
reflects the difference-from-Himself that God has in cribed into language and built 
into human ontology. Milton emphasizes this allegorical difference in two ways in 
Paradise Lost. First, he points out the difference between the logic of language and 
the landscape by which we try to describe and apprehend it, even ascribing the fall to 
Eve’s decision to ignore this difference and to embrace the logic of language as if it 
captured truth. Second, he forces the allegorical fgures of Sin and Death to contend 
with and participate in Christian history, thereby destabilizing their figurations as 
representations of abstract ideas, and displaying the impossibility of fusing word and 
thing (i.e., of collapsing allegorical difference) in the historical context of pre-
apocalyptic time. This dissertation argues that Milton uses both of these strategies to 
oppose the universal language ideology of the late sev nteenth century, whose 
proponents promised to speak the world exactly as it is, to fuse word and thing. From 
Milton’s perspective, these proponents threatened to write over God’s truth with a 
language that reflected their desire for intellectual domination of the world more than 
  
it reflected the natural world they supposedly sought to describe. Thus, Paradise Lost 
reminds us that word and thing cannot be fused, that ot er-speaking not only reflects 
human ontology—that is, humankind’s suspension in a state of difference from and 
similarity to God—but also represents the only kind of speaking that refers to God. 
Language that does not admit its difference from truth, in contrast, writes over the 
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 Citing the dissimilarity between Spenserian allegory—which engages the 
(ideal) reader in a sophisticated interpretation of a complex narrative that, according 
to Maureen Quilligan, develops out of the multiple m anings of a single, polysemic 
word—and Enlightenment allegory—which, as Gordon Teskey describes it, functions 
as a “geometric demonstration” of an abstract idea—critics have concluded that 
allegory undergoes a tectonic shift in the seventeenth century.1 And they have noted 
that Paradise Lost lies at the historical cusp between these two forms of allegory. Yet, 
because they have not been able to agree on whether Paradise Lost is an allegory, 
they have not been able to determine whether the poem represents allegory in a 
transitional form, and thus whether it might elucidate precisely how the shift from 
Spenserian to Enlightenment allegory occurs. 
 Much of this disagreement has turned on how individual critics define 
allegory. For example, Maureen Quilligan asserts that all allegory depends on a 
“‘suprarealist’ attitude towards words”—an attitude which takes “abstract names….to 
be as real and as powerful as the things named…to have a potency as solidly 
meaningful as physical fact” (156). She concludes that Milton would have found it 
“virtually impossible” (183) to write an allegorical poem in the late seventeenth 
                                                
1 Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1979); and Gordon Teskey, Allegory and Violence 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 98. 
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century, when “[t]he profound kinship of language with the world was…dissolved” 
(173). In fact, Milton writes Paradise Lost o be “almost designedly unallegorical” 
(179).2  
 Building on Quilligan, Gordon Teskey argues that allegory must be defined 
according to a number of strict requirements, one of which is incoherence: “an 
allegory must be, unlike a parable or a fable, incoherent on the narrative level, forcing 
us to unify the work by imposing meaning on it” (5). This leads Teskey to conclude 
that the figures of Sin and Death—the most overt, and the most hotly debated 
personifications in Paradise Lost—simply cannot be allegorical: because “Sin and 
Death are not signs pointing to forces that are more real than they are,” because “they 
precede and are the causes of what their names tell us they are,” they do not compel 
constant interpretative activity. Because they are accounted agents within the poem’s 
historical narrative, Sin and Death cannot be allegorical figures (42-43), and their 
presentation does not signal that P radise Lost is an allegory.3 
                                                
2 Quilligan here echoes Christopher Ricks and Anne Ferry, who argue that allegory in 
Paradise Lost is a demonic mode, reflecting the fall into arbitrary language from 
which Milton aims poetically to recover. See Christopher Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 110; and Anne Ferry, Milton’s Epic Voice: The 
Narrator in Paradise Lost (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 133.  
3 For Teskey’s other criteria for determining whether a text is an allegory, see pages 
1-4 of Allegory and Violence. It is worth noting that Teskey and Quilligan offer these 
strict criteria in part to amend Angus Fletcher’s 1964 reclamation of allegory as a 
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 These accounts of the poem’s supposedly un-allegorical status have been 
challenged most recently by Kenneth Borris and Catherine Gimelli Martin. Martin, 
who distinguishes Paradise Lost from what she calls “normative allegory,” calls the 
notion of allegory’s disappearance in the late seventeenth century a “barely examined 
cliché.”4 She argues that in Paradise Lost, the sense of the numinous in language, 
which was tied up with a hieratic conception of theuniverse, gets transferred to an 
animated materialism, and a monistic and historical conception of the world: Milton’s 
allegory, she argues, penetrates “into the grounds of a new synthesis of vitalistic 
physics and organic metaphysics that would conserve divine immanence within the 
                                                                                                                                 
“mode” worthy of critical attention.  Instead of offering a precise definition of the 
allegorical mode, he sets out on what he calls a “mpping expedition” (23), outlining 
some of the qualities that he finds common among early modern and twentieth-
century allegories, including the persistence of the daemonic agent in allegorical 
texts, and the suppression of the real or mimetic in favor of the idea, the abstraction, 
out of which allegory is born (105). From Quilligan’s perspective, which Teskey 
endorses, this broad characterization of allegory as a persistent “mode” is not useful 
because it makes almost every text allegorical. See Quilligan, pgs. 14-15, and Angus 
Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1964).  
4 Catherine Gimelli Martin, The Ruins of Allegory: Paradise Lost and the 




largely secular grounds of the new scientific universe” (13), thereby replacing “the 
vertical hierarchies generally governing normative all gory” with natural, historical, 
and materialist processes, where matter is “the plastic medium in which mankind 
discovers and shapes his relation to God, whose vitalism he shares” (36, 87). 
Allegorical difference in Paradise Lost, then, is not negotiated through numinous 
words, but rather through the monistic and active material of the universe. 
 Kenneth Borris, in Allegory and Epic in English Renaissance Literature 
(2000), follows Martin’s excavation of allegory in the new world of empiricism, 
focusing on “the role of allegory in Milton’s repres ntation of heroic identity.”5 
Borris’s monograph develops the argument of his 1991 article, “Allegory in Paradise 
Lost: Satan’s Cosmic Journey,” in which he observes that Raphael must 
accommodate his account of the war in heaven in order to explain it to humankind’s 
“variously limited perspectives” (102). Arguing, contra Teskey, that Paradise Lost is 
indeed an allegorical poem, he makes the simple yet important point that “where there 
is any scope for that approach [i.e., for accommodati n], there is potential for 
allegory.”6 
 As this brief synopsis reveals, critical debates about whether Paradise Lost is 
an allegorical text have been prompted by two contradictory motivations: on the one 
                                                
5 Kenneth Borris, Allegory and Epic in English Renaissance Literature (N w York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 184. 
6 Kenneth Borris, “Allegory in Paradise Lost: Satan’s Cosmic Journey,” Milton 
Studies 26 (1991): p. 102. 
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hand, the desire to establish a specific and useful d finition of the genre of allegory, 
and on the other, the desire to expose the limitations of that definition, and the 
historical shifts that it appears to ignore. Indeed, these opposed drives are perhaps 
best articulated by Teskey, who, in reviewing Martin’s book, alleges that she expands 
the definition of allegory beyond practical bounds: 
...Martin sees Paradise Lost as an allegory because Milton’s material 
universe is described by the angel Raphael as growing upward 
toward its origin in its Creator. It therefore has a tructure broadly 
analogous to the referential one of an allegory, in which all the signs 
are believed, by convention, to point to a transcendental “other,” an 
allo, that gathers them into one ineffable truth.7   
 
This is clearly at odds with Teskey’s own definition f the genre, which states that an 
allegory “contain[s] clear, iconographic instructions for its own interpretation,” and 
“declares the status of everything we encounter in it as belonging to the order of 
signs…. [thus] demand[ing] continual, localized acts of interpretation” (418). In his 
review of Martin, then, Teskey not only rearticulates his position that where 
something is “true and ontologically solid,” that thing cannot be “allegorical” (418), 
but also reasserts his position that the definition of allegory must be more specific 
than Martin (and, for that matter, Borris) allege. 
                                                
7 Gordon Teskey, Review of The Ruins of Allegory: Paradise Lost and the 
Metamorphosis of Epic Convention, Modern Language Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 
2000): p. 417. 
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  I agree with Martin and Borris that such overly stipulative definitions of 
allegory are not helpful for understanding what is happening in Paradise Lost, or 
what is happening to the allegorical genre in the seventeenth century. Thus, I want to 
propose a new framework for understanding the allegorical status of Paradise Lost—
one which, I believe, will not only answer (with a definitive yes) the question of 
whether the poem is allegorical, but perhaps more importantly, will explain how and 
why the poem motivates such contradictory responses on the part of literary critics. I 
will argue that we can understand Milton’s presentation of his accommodating speech 
and his allegorical figures if we take into account what I will call the ethics of 
Milton’s treatment of allegory. These ethics, as I will demonstrate, are expressed in 
Milton’s resolve to uphold allegorical speaking—i.e., speaking that is other to what it 
means—as the only apt linguistic condition for human beings suspended in a state of 
similarity to and difference from God, out of whom they originate. In brief, by 
placing his allegorical figures in conversation with the Christian history in which they 
play a significant role, a history that makes other-speaking a necessary aspect of the 
human condition, Milton at once violates expectations f the genre of allegory—
especially expectations as articulated by Samuel Johnson, Joseph Addison, and even 
Teskey—and upholds the allegorical difference that he akes to be the defining 
characteristic of signification. He does this, I will argue, in order to ensure that the 
difference inscribed into speaking, the necessary difference between word and thing, 
is not lost to verbal idolatry—that idolatry which, in purporting to fuse word and 
thing, writes over the sublime truth that is the original source of all meaning, and 
from which all signification stands in suspended anttenuated difference. 
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 The potential for this verbal idolatry appears in Paradise Lost in two forms: in 
Adam and the serpent’s shared tendency to speak over truth, to submit indecipherable 
truth to the logic of the language they speak, and in Satan’s production of the first 
personification, Sin, who appears at first to fuse word and thing, to be the perfect 
embodiment of the abstraction she represents. By dissolving this supposed 
embodiment, by dividing the abstraction from the figure, and by revealing the 
difference between language and truth, Milton displays his allegorical ethics.  
 Moreover, I will show that Milton’s ethics have aniconoclastic force, and that 
in sustaining allegorical difference throughout Paradise Lost, Milton resisted the very 
ideology of the recovered, perfect language with which Quilligan aligns him. For 
from Milton’s perspective, the proponents of perfect, recovered, universal languages 
threatened to construct their own verbal idols, to project an illusive fusion of word 
and thing onto the world, rather than writing a language that referred to the 
unfathomable world from which language necessarily departs. Thus, as I will 
conclude, they threatened to halt the hermeneutic ac vity, the exercise of right 
reason, which Milton took to be provoked by allegorical difference. By convincing 
readers to forget the difference between word and thing, universal language 
proponents threatened to obscure God from the reade’s vi w.  
 
 As Kenneth Borris notes, in Book 5 of Paradise Lost, the angel Raphael 
provides us with perhaps the clearest and most concise explanation of the 




  High matter thou injoin’st me, O prime of men, 
  Sad task and hard, for how shall I relate 
  To human sense th’ invisible exploits 
  Of warring Spirits; how without remorse 
  The ruin of so many glorious once 
  And perfet while they stood; how last unfold 
  The secrets of another World, perhaps  
  Not lawful to reveal? Yet for thy good 
  This is dispens’t, and what surmounts the reach 
  Of human sense, I shall delineate so, 
  By lik’ning spiritual to corporal forms, 
  As may express them best… 
       (5.563-73)8 
Raphael promises to honor Adam’s request that he explain the war in heaven, but 
with a significant disclaimer. He will have to accommodate truths to human ears and 
understanding. How else can he explain events and ontologies that precede and 
surpass Adam’s understanding? 
 Raphael’s caveat succinctly clarifies the poet’s more gradual characterization 
of his own accommodating speech. For example, in the opening lines to Book 7, the 
poet invokes “Urania,” and claims that with her guidance he has accessed divine 
truths:  
Descend from Heav’n Urania, by that name 
If rightly thou art call’d, whose Voice divine 
                                                
8 This and all subsequent references to Paradise Lost are from the Merritt Hughes 
edition, John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1957). 
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Following, above th’ Olympian Hill I soar, 
Above the flight of Pegasean wing. 
The meaning, not the Name I call: for thou 
Nor of the Muses nine, nor on the top 
Of old Olympus dwell’st, but Heav’nly born, 
Before the Hills appear’d, or Fountain flow’d, 
Thou with Eternal Wisdom didst converse, 
Wisdom thy Sister, and with her didst play 
In presence of th’ Almighty Father, pleas’d 
With thy Celestial Song. 
      (7.1-12) 
The poet here echoes the invocations to the holy muse which appear in Books 1 and 
3, in which he calls on the muse to inspire his prophetic speech: 
Sing Heav’nly Muse, that on the secret top 
Of Oreb, or of Sinai, didst inspire 
That Shepherd, who first taught the chosen Seed, 
In the Beginning how the Heav’ns and Earth 
Rose out of Chaos. 
      (1.6-10) 
 
Hail holy Light, offspring of Heav’n first-born, 
Or of th’ Eternal Coeternal beam 
May I express thee unblam’d? 
      (3.1-3) 
And yet, the invocation of Book 7 differs significantly from these two, for while 
Books 1 and 3 express insecurity about how to place or describe the heavenly muse, 
in Book 7 the poet has made a choice—one about which he is not entirely sure—to 
give the heavenly muse a name, and a pagan one at that. 
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 But why does he need to make such a choice? Becaus she precedes all of his 
knowledge, because she is sublime, “Heav’nly born.” Thus, despite the fact that 
Urania’s voice has brought him above the “Olympian Hill,” the poet’s language is 
insufficient to its “meaning,” grounded in the very pagan register he claims to have 
surpassed. The name, then, is an accommodation of a sublime being who exceeds 
language, just as she dwells above the mountain of the pagan gods. To call the 
heavenly muse by the name of the goddess of astronomy—rather than, say, Gaia, the 
goddess of the earth—is as close to naming her as Milton’s language can get. 
 But the need for accommodation rests not just in the poet’s inability to capture 
verbally a sublime being, to collapse the difference between the meaning and the 
name. The poet’s speech, like Raphael’s, must make accommodations for human 
ontology: 
Up led by thee 
Into the Heav’n of Heav’ns I have presum’d 
An Earthly Guest, and drawn Empyreal Air, 
Thy temp’ring; with like safety guided down 
Return me to my Native Element; 
Lest from this flying Steed unrein’d (as once 
Bellerophon, though from a lower Clime) 
Dismounted, on th’ Aleian Field I fall 
Erroneous there to wander and forlorn. 
Half yet remains unsung, but narrower bound 
Within the visible Diurnal Sphere; 
Standing on Earth, not rapt above the Pole, 
More safe I Sing with mortal voice, unchang’d 
To hoarse or mute, though fall’n on evil days, 
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On evil days though fall’n, and evil tongues; 
In darkness, and with dangers compast round, 
And solitude. 
(7.11-28) 
 Urania hospitably tempers the “Empyreal Air” so that the earthly Milton might 
presume to breathe it, but Milton nevertheless finds a kind of natural safety net in 
singing “with mortal voice,” even though that voice has “fall’n on evil days and evil 
tongues.” Though it speaks in a register that does n t capture the sublime truths he 
aims to tell, the poet’s “mortal voice” is amenable to his mortal ontology. His 
allegorical speaking, then, is necessitated by langu ge’s inability to overcome 
difference and capture the sublime, and by the diffrence that divides humankind, and 
especially a humankind that has fallen “On evil days,” from sublime truth. 
 And yet, as I will demonstrate in the following chapters, Milton attributes this 
allegorical difference, the difference between speaking and the truth to which it 
refers, not only to linguistic insufficiencies and spiritual and ontological 
dissimilarities, but to God’s will, which is expressed in His decision, first, to proclaim 
his Son king, and second, to create humankind. Thatis, when God proclaims the Son, 
He voluntarily submits His infinite, atemporal being to the chronological process of 
signification (a temporal process displayed, for example, in the sequential movement 
from subject to verb to object). And when He creates the earth and humankind, He 
contracts His omnipresent self from the universe He naturally fills, so that human 
beings are individuated from Him, and thus free to xpress their own, individual 
wills. Allegorical difference, in reflecting both te historical difference that God has 
inscribed into signification, and the ontological difference which He has built into 
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creation, is a necessary condition of created being, of living in the historical time that 
is framed by the proclamation of the Son and by God’s assimilation of all being back  
into His omnipresent self, into the unity of the “All in All” (3.341), at the end of days. 
Thus, allegorical language upholds the free will that God accommodates when He 
contracts Himself, when He differentiates Himself from the humans He has created, 
and, more importantly, when He individuates creation fr m Himself.   
 This, I believe, is the foundation of Milton’s allegorical ethics, his stubborn 
insistence that difference is inscribed into all language. Paradoxically, it also explains 
why Milton violates many readers’ expectations of what allegory should be. Take, for 
example, Joseph Addison’s note that the allegorical figures of Paradise Lost do not 
display the aptness of Homer’s allegory. Addison observes that “[w]hen Homer 
makes use of other such Allegorical Persons, it is only in short Expressions, which 
convey an ordinary Thought to the Mind in the most pleasing manner, and may rather 
be looked upon as Poetical Phrases than Allegorical Descriptions.” With Sin and 
Death, however, Milton gives us allegorical figures who, in the end, stop being 
allegorical at all:  
It is plain that these I have mentioned, in which Persons of an 
imaginary Nature are introduced, are such short Allegories as are not 
designed to be taken in the literal Sense, but onlyto convey 
particular Circumstances to the Reader after an unusual and 
entertaining Manner. But when such Persons are introduced as 
principal Actors, and engaged in a Series of Adventures, they take 
too much upon them, and are by no means proper for an Heroick 
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Poem, which ought to appear credible in its principal Parts.9  
 
 Samuel Johnson, in his Life of Milton, expresses a similar discomfort with the 
figures of Sin and Death:  
 Milton’s allegory of Sin and Death is undoubtedly faulty. Sin is 
indeed the mother of Death, and may be allowed to be the portress of 
hell ; but when they stop the journey of Satan, a journey described as 
real, and when Death offers him battle, the allegory is broken. That 
Sin and Death should have shewn the way to hell might have been 
allowed ; but they cannot facilitate the passage by building a bridge, 
because the difficulty of Satan’s passage is described as real and 
sensible, and the bridge ought to be only figurative. The hell assigned 
to the rebellious spirits is described as not less local than the 
residence of man. It is placed in some distant part of space, separated 
from the regions of harmony and order by a chaotick waste and an 
unoccupied vacuity ; but Sin and Death worked up a ‘mole of 
aggregated soil,’ cemented with asphaltus ; a work too bulky for 
ideal architects.  
 This unskilful allegory appears to me one of the gr atest faults of 
the poem ; and to this there was no temptation, but the author’s 
opinion of its beauty.10 
 
                                                
9 Joseph Addison, Spectator, Vol II, no. 357, ed Henry Morley (1891; Project 
Gutenberg), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12030/1230-h/12030-h/SV2/Spectator2 
.html#section357. 
10 Samuel Johnson, “Milton,” in Lives of the English Poets, ed. George Birkbeck Hill, 
vol. 1 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), p. 185-6, sec. 257-8. 
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Attributing all of this aesthetic dismay in part to a neoclassical sense of decorum, 
which required that the Romantic mode of allegory remain separate from the epic 
genre, and in part to an “urbane,” disinterested aesthetic that sought to treat literature 
as an object separate from real life, Steven Knapp argues that Sin and Death perplex 
Addison and Johnson for different, but related, reasons.11 While Addison is offended 
at the mixing of the figurative and the real, which would seem to destabilize “the 
boundary between rhetoric and agency... [so that] figurative language seems more 
violent and opaque, [while] agents may seem more transparent and abstract” (60), 
Johnson takes Sin and Death to “threaten the human credibility which the poem 
already lacks” (65). Milton’s primary offense then, is that he challenges both critics’ 
notions of literary credibility—their “neoclassical” urge to distinguish the figurative 
from the real, and to write an epic poem whose credibility catches the reader’s 
interest, and does not take on the incredible charateristics of an allegorical fiction. 
 However, in addition to complaining that Milton has mixed two discordant 
modes of poetic representation, Addison and Johnson’s ruminations betray a specific 
hermeneutic expectation, one that we can most readily excavate by looking at how 
Johnson, in his Dictionary of the English Language, defines allegory: 
Allegory: A figurative discourse, in which something other is 
intended, than is contained in the words literally taken; as, wealth is 
                                                
11 Steven Knapp, Personification and the Sublime (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985). 
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the daughter of diligence, and the parent of authority.12 
 
As Lisa Berglund points out, “[t]his definition does not distinguish allegory from 
other kinds of non-literal writing; indeed, the term ‘figurative discourse’ suggests that 
an allegory is simply an extended metaphor. Nowhere does the Dictionary state that 
an allegory may resemble what Spenser calls a ‘darke conceit,’ an elaborate system of 
figures, with multiple or hidden significations”13 Moreover, in defining allegory, and 
in offering two tiny examples of what allegory should do—examples that, not 
coincidentally, echo Addison’s description of Homer’s Discord—Johnson defines his 
expectations for the allegorical genre. As Berglund notes, he reads allegories “as 
extended metaphors that focus our thoughts and reinfo ce and secure our 
understanding of abstract subject matter” (148).  
 This, I think, elucidates both Addison and Johnson’s invectives against the 
allegories of Sin and Death, for they reveal a shared concern that the actions of these 
figures do not conform to the logic of allegorical personification as they see it: 
to exalt causes into agents, to invest abstract ideas with form, and 
animate them with activity has always been the right of poetry. But 
                                                
12 “allegory,” Samuel Johnson, A dictionary of the English language: in which the 
words are deduced from their originals, and illustrated in their different 
significations by examples from the best writers, vol. 1 (London: W. Strahan, 1755; 
New York, AMS Press, 1967).  
13 Lisa Berglund, “Allegory in The Rambler,” Papers on Language & Literature 37, 
no. 2 (Spring 2001): 147. 
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such airy beings are for the most part suffered only to do their natural 
office and retire. Thus Fame tells a tale and Victory hovers over a 
general or perches on a standard; but Fame and Victory an do no 
more. To give them any real employment or ascribe to them any 
material agency is to make them allegorical no longer, but to shock 
the mind by ascribing effects to non-entity.     
(Johnson, Life of Milton, 185) 
 
Johnson’s assertion that allegorical figures cannot e gage in “real employment” or 
“material agency” confirms Knapp’s diagnosis of eighteenth-century critical 
aversions to Milton’s personifications, and Teskey’s claim that the allegorical and the 
ontologically real cannot mix. But Johnson’s description of the ideal personification 
as a figure that only does its “natural office,” and both Addison and Johnson’s 
urgings that an allegory must be “short,” also suggest that, as Berglund puts it, 
“Milton's characters are faulty because they alarm readers with their inconsistency 
and, presumably, distract us from the moral lesson they should impart” (149). 
Milton’s personifications, by refusing to uphold what Teskey describes as the 
“geometric” exactness of Johnson’s aesthetic, by engagi g in activities that cannot be 
explained as narrative and psychological manifestations of the abstract notions they 
are supposed to represent, do not confirm the reade’s (or at least Addison and 
Johnson’s) comprehension of what Sin and Death mean. 
 I am not sure whether Milton was aware that such aesthetics were emerging, 
or would emerge, out of the neo-classical age, or that he consciously violated 
expectations aroused by his personifications of Sin and Death. But it is clear to me 
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that Addison and Johnson’s preference for allegorical personifications that behaved in 
full accordance with their status as embodiments, or at least as static and logically 
rigorous representations of abstract idea echo (and perhaps even owe much to) an 
ideology that Milton purposefully resisted: the ideology of the universal language 
schema. 
 Proponents of universal language schemas promised to create a language that 
reflected the world exactly as it is. The most prominent of these proponents was John 
Wilkins, who, in An Essay Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical 
Language, projected that his perfect language could serve as a model for 
understanding the design of all of the things in the natural world, “a frame, as may 
express their natural order, dependence, and relations.”14 His optimism was premised 
on the notion that human thinking about the world was perfectly correspondent with 
truth, and that the only barrier to humankind’s intellectual domination of the world 
was the great variety of expression (i.e., the various languages) which did not 
correspond with truth, and which somehow confused people, convincing them to 
believe in falsehoods. 
                                                
14 John Wilkins, An Essay Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language 
(London: Sa. Gellibrand and John Martin, 1668), in Early English Books Online, 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxyum.researchport.umd edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88 




 Thus, Wilkins and his supporters (namely, Cowley and Sprat) sought to 
establish intellectual “dominion” over the world byconstructing a system of signs 
that corroborated their thinking, their naturally apt notions of how the world really 
is.15 But this corroborating language, as their contemporaries complained (and, as I 
will argue, Milton pointed out) did not capture, or even correspond with, the world, 
for the design of the natural world had not been deciphered, and thus could not be 
coded perfectly into a system of signs. The natural wor d, and truth itself, could not 
be captured by Wilkins’s language because nature, like “Urania,” was 
incomprehensible, and could not be captured verbally, especially not in human terms.  
 Strikingly, Wilkins discounts this challenge to his schema and, in so doing, 
exhibits the very tendency toward violence that Teskey ascribes to allegory, and 
especially to personification. Teskey, who reads allegory as the expression of the 
desire to see the self in the world, and to contain the world within the self, alleges that 
this desire is realized through violence. That is, allegory validates and apparently 
realizes the drive to see the self in the world by “categoriz[ing] bodies as the material 
basis of an order of signs” (16) and violently suppressing the resistance that the 
material world offers to its inscription into verbal order. Moreover, Teskey argues 
                                                
15 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London, For the Improving of 
Natural Knowledge (London: J.R. for J. Martyn and J. Allestry, 1667), in Early 





that this violence reaches its apex in personificaton, which represents “the sine qua 
non of allegorical expression…not because personificat on reveals what is essential to 
allegory but because it hides what is essential so well” (22). Personification is the sine 
qua non because it obscures the violence that is at allegory’s core, because it offers 
readers a material being who seems to correspond exactly with her name, to conform 
perfectly (and naturally) to the logic of the abstrac  noun which it imposed upon her.  
 I want to argue that the analogy between personificat on as Teskey describes it 
and Wilkins’s proposal for a universal language schema as I have read it was not lost 
on Milton.  For this, I think, helps us to understand why Milton’s allegory violates 
Addison, Johnson, and even Teskey’s expectations for what an allegory should do. 
Not, as Knapp alleges, because Milton was indifferent to the distinction between the 
figurative and the real, but rather because in forcing these figures to participate in 
Christian history, Milton splits the abstract idea from the figure with which it is 
verbally (and metonymically) associated. Thus, he refuses to do the violence that 
Teskey describes. Moreover, by this refusal, Milton exposes the impossibility of the 
word-thing fusion, or even the perfect correspondence of word and thing, in the 
context of the historical time, and the ontological difference, that God voluntarily 
initiated when He proclaimed the Son to be king, and when He created humankind 
out of matter that He had individuated from Himself. 
 Thus, by reading Milton’s allegory in light of what I am calling Milton’s 
allegorical ethics, his insistence that difference is inscribed into signification and 
Christian history, we get a clearer understanding of the place of Paradise Lost in the 
history of allegory. Milton’s poem is not so indebtd to Bacon and the linguistic 
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idealists who follow him that he cannot write an allegory: on the contrary, he writes 
an allegorical poem in part to expose the dubiousness of the ideology that they 
support, an ideology which, according to Milton’s figuration, overwrites Christian 
history, and the material complexity of the natural world, in order to construct verbal 
idols of the dominating empirical mind. 
 
 In the first chapter of this dissertation, I explain how the proclamation of the 
Son introduces allegorical difference and historical time into heaven. I read the birth 
of Sin out of Satan’s head as the expression of his desire to collapse the allegorical 
difference that God’s proclamation of the Son has introduced to heaven, and thus to 
claim for himself the absolute power that God relinquishes in making way for this 
difference. Moreover, I show that the fall of the disobedient angels results from their 
assumption that in the figure of Sin they encounter th  fusion of word and thing. I 
close the chapter by following up on Phillip Gallagher’s account of how Sin and 
Death come to be both allegorical and real. 16 According to Gallagher, Sin and Death 
are real figures, but we access them only in the mediat d form of the myth of the birth 
of Sin, which Satan has recounted to Hesiod as a misleading revision of the true story 
of Sin’s birth. I suggest that this revised story reveals more than Satan wants it to—
specifically, the impossibility of fusing word and thing in historical time. 
                                                
16 Phillip Gallagher,“‘Real or Allegoric’: The Ontology of Sin and Death in Paradise 
Lost,” English Literary Renaissance 6 (1976): 317-35. 
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 Chapter 2 turns to Eden, where we find a pre-verbal Eve ably responding to 
and interpreting the Edenic landscape, and beginning to understand her place in it, 
without the mediation of words. This unmediated herm neutics is halted, however, 
when a mysterious voice speaks to her, convinces her to approach Adam, and thus 
initiates her indoctrination into a thinking based in words. This indoctrination, I show, 
constitutes a hermeneutic loss, for it convinces Eve to neglect allegorical difference—
that is, the difference between the dialectical logic of words, which privileges 
categorical difference over similarity, and the truths she was beginning to access 
when she read the landscape without them—that is, the truth of similarity, and even 
potential identity, that God inscribes into the monistic landscape. In fact, Milton 
exposes this difference both in the dissimilarity between the interpositions and inter-
involvements of the natural world and the logic of the language with which the poet 
tries to explain the Edenic landscape, and in the diff rence between Adam and Eve’s 
relatively equal standing in the world, and the strict hierarchy that words impose on 
that relationship.  
 Chapter 3 revisits this tension between identity and difference, and attributes it 
to the generative process in which God engages when He creates the world. 
Following up on John Rumrich and Michael Lieb’s accounts of creation in Paradise 
Lost, I highlight the poem’s references to creation as a procreative process, in which 
God plays the role of the father to the world that m ternal matter brings forth. Thus, I 
explain how the material mother, whom God has left to realize the energies He has 
ascribed to her, becomes the material and ontological foundation of difference, and 
thus of allegorical language, human ontology, histor cal time, and free will.  
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 I close this chapter by returning to the figures of Sin and Death, who are 
figured in the poem as the monstrous remnants of the generative, creative act, the 
blood spilled in the process of creating something like but different from God. This 
figuration, I argue, exposes their paradoxical roles in history, and the paradox at the 
heart of their figurative representation. When Sin and Death appear to be entirely 
antithetical to God, divorced from the ontology of dif erence that makes room for free 
will, Sin and Death appear to meet Samuel Johnson’s expectations for what 
personifications should do: they are static figures, whose names would seem to give 
Johnson and other readers an opportunity to confirm their ideas about what Sin and 
Death are. Paradoxically, however, they only acquire meaning when they violate this 
expectation, when they willfully and actively invade the world of difference from 
which they have been discarded, and thus truly oppose God’s will. That is, as 
allegorical personifications, and as God’s opponents, their meaning lies in difference, 
in their attenuated relationship to the origin of truth, not in illusions of absolute 
identity absolutely divided from God. 
 Finally, Chapter 4 places Milton’s allegorical ethics in the historical, literary, 
and philosophical contexts I have already outlined, and suggests that Milton’s 
iconoclastic drive, and his enthusiasm for hermeneutic activity, bolster his resistance 
to the universal language schema. Returning to Eden, and to Eve’s indoctrination into 
verbally-mediated thinking, I demonstrate that Eve falls because she not only ceases 
to recognize the difference between word and thing, or between the logic of the 
language she uses and the indecipherable logic of the sublime, but more pointedly 
because she privileges the former over the latter, because she worships the verbal sign 
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over the indecipherable truth it allegorically reprsents. Eve, following the serpent as 
he echoes John Wilkins and his peers, comes to believe that language defines truth, 
that truth lies in the comparative logic invoked by the name of “the Tree /Of 
Knowledge, knowledge both of good and evil “(9.751-51), and not in her own 
experience of the world. Thus, according to Milton’s account, Eve sins because she 
rejects allegorical difference and the hermeneutic activity it encourages, because she 
thinks that the words presented to her by Adam, by the serpent, and even by the tree, 
capture what is. 
 For Milton, this is the hermeneutic inactivity tha universal language schemas, 
which purport to capture truth in a word, threaten to impose upon the English people. 
And it is a hermeneutic inactivity that is tantamount to a rejection of God’s gift of 
right reason, an ability to choose that is always exercised at the bounds of linguistic 
and logical certainty, when human beings are forced to choose, to navigate the 
difference between human knowledge and divine truth. This is what compels Milton 
to destabilize his allegorical figures, to write personifications whose actions extend 
beyond the bounds of metaphor: because for Milton, representation, including the 
allegorical representation of abstract ideas, must always be placed in its historical and 
ontological context—different from the sublime truth, he origin of all meaning, to 
which it can only refer. 
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Chapter 1: The Begetting of the Son and the Birth of 
Allegory 
 
 Allegory is based in difference or otherness: “an allegory means something 
other than what it says and says something other than what it means” (Teskey, 
Allegory and Violence, 6).  In my introduction, I argued that this allegorical otherness 
is stipulated in Paradise Lost by Raphael’s pondering about how he might possibly 
explain the wars in heaven to Adam: 
High matter thou injoin’st me, O prime of men, 
Sad task and hard, for how shall I relate 
To human sense th’ invisible exploits 
Of warring Spirits. 
     (5.563-66)17 
And I suggested that by fashioning himself as a prophetic poet who, brought by 
Urania “Into the Heav’n of Heav’ns” (7.13), returns to earth to “sing with mortal 
voice” (7.24) about immortal, heavenly things, Milton posits his language to stand in 
an allegorical relationship to the truth it tells. In brief, I argued that Milton’s poetry 
not only reflects its difference from sublime truth, but openly displays it. 
The difference between sublime truth and “mortal voice” in Paradise Lost for 
many of Milton’s readers would have recalled the fall of humankind, which 
supposedly instigated the fall into arbitrary langua e as it unmoored human thinking 
                                                
17 See also Book 7.112-14, when Raphael responds to Adam’s request that he explain 
the act of creation by asking, “to recount Almighty works / What words or tongue 




and speaking from sublime truth. However, in this chapter I will argue that in 
Paradise Lost, the linguistic difference which divides speaking from absolute truth is 
attributed first and foremost to God’s proclamation of the Son in heaven. That is, the 
poem suggests that the first linguistic difference, th  first gap between language and 
truth, can be found in God’s speech to the angels when He proclaims His Sonto be 
king—a speech which represents God’s decision at once to relinquish His power over 
language and to release heaven into a state of histric ty.  
Read in this light, the story of pre-creation history helps us to understand the 
fatal flaw in Satan’s thinking in rhetorical terms and, thus, to understand the Satanic 
intervention which, according to Phillip Gallagher, b ings the allegory of the birth of 
Sin to earth. For Satan births Sin because he believes that he can reclaim the control 
over language that God has relinquished, can close the gap between word and thing, 
between past and future, and thus between his will and the realization of that will in 
heaven. Importantly for our interest in allegory, Satan’s desire for this reclamation 
produces a personification that begins as an apparently perfect embodiment of Satan’s 
thinking. As Milton figures her, then, Sin, the first personification, appears at first to 
realize Satan’s goal, for, even from the angels’ pers ctive, she seems to embody her 
name. Yet, Sin does not withstand the difference or the historicity that God has 
introduced to the heavenly landscape. Sin thus becom s a figure of the false promises 
of personification—promises that Satan delivers to earth by re-telling his own story in 
the allegorical, idolatrous form of the birth of Athena out of Zeus’s head, and that 
Milton demolishes by exposing the historical difference that becomes a necessary 
aspect of signification after the proclamation of the Son. 
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The instability of allegorical language makes it, at le st at first glance, 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions about what much of the poem means to say. 
This is especially true of Raphael’s speech which, as he argues, necessarily 
accommodates heavenly truths to comprehension and speech. For example, as I have 
already pointed out, Raphael is not sure “how [he] should relate” such a history to 
“human sense,” so he explains that he will have to accommodate heavenly history so 
that Adam can understand it: 
                 …what surmounts the reach 
Of sense I shall delineate so 
By lik’ning spiritual to corporeal forms 
As may express them best. 
(5.571-74) 
 
Raphael must speak heavenly history—even heavenly ontology—in a language that is 
bound up with Adam’s epistemological and ontological limitations, his familiarity 
with “corporeal forms” and his alienation from heavnly, “spiritual…forms.” 
I offer this brief analysis of Raphael’s accommodation because, in theory, it 
poses a conundrum for any attempt to glean out of it any decisive, heavenly truth. 
Where in Raphael’s speech—an accommodation of heavenly truths to an Edenic 
language that we, as readers, encounter in the terms set out by the poet’s 
accommodating language—might we find the truth of heaven’s history? How do we 
mine heavenly truth from a narrative that is two allegories removed from the meaning 
it does or does not speak? This question is perhaps impossible to answer, and at times 
it might appear to hinder or redirect my analysis. Yet, because Paradise Lost presents 
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itself as an inspired accommodation of heavenly truth, the allegorical layering that 
seems to complicate any attempt at decisive interpretation does not discount my 
attempt to seek meaning in the text. Rather, as my analysis will show, the poem’s 
layering of modern allegory over Edenic allegory, and the semantic differences that 
are embedded into this allegorical layering, testify to the linguistic history that 
Raphael narrates in his account of the proclamation of the son and the disobedience 
that follows. For (as I will argue in this chapter) Raphael’s account of pre-Edenic 
history and the presence of an ur-truth behind the allegorical veil places the layering 
of accommodations within a Providential history that is initiated by God, and that 
invites us to see God’s proclamation of the son as the primary cause of the semantic 
difference that makes allegory the necessary mode of truthful speaking.18 
In the first lines of Paradise Lost, the poet compares himself to Moses, the 
“Shepherd” (1.7) on “Sinai” (1.9) who “first taught the chosen Seed / In the 
Beginning how the Heav’ns and Earth / Rose out of Chaos” (1.10). The poet thus sets 
out his task of “justify[ing] the ways of God to men” (1.25) according to the Exodus 
story, in which Moses encounters an accommodated version of God, who has 
protected Moses’s vision by cloaking himself in theflame of a burning bush. 
Appointed by God to lead the chosen out of Egypt, Moses asks God how he ought to 
name Him to the people: “And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the 
                                                
18 My use of the term “mode” (as opposed to “genre”) in this context follows Angus 
Fletcher’s in Allegory, the Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1964). See introduction, especially note 4. 
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children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto 
you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what s all I say unto them?” 
(Exodus 3:13).19 God’s response reveals the difference between the eternal being and 
the will that He subjects to the linear temporality of cause and effect: “And God said 
unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of 
Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you” (Exodus 3:14). God expresses to Moses, the
visionary, His ontological essence, but tells Moses, the shepherd, the leader of the 
Israelites, to describe Him as the “I AM [who has] sent” Moses to them, as the one 
who caused Moses to lead them out of Egypt.  
Thus, God accommodates Himself to the linear temporality of human 
understanding, perhaps because He knows that the people will not comprehend the “I 
AM THAT I AM, ” an assertion of divine identity that reduces speech to a tautology, 
that goes against the grain of the linear temporality that is inscribed into speaking. 
God’s “I AM THAT I AM” strains “mortal voice,” for the repetition of God’s 
authoritative assertion of being, “I AM,” on either side of the “that” folds narrative 
progression onto itself. This suggests that the very act of speaking, of explication by 
means of the linear temporal structure of not only the cause-effect narrative, but also 
of grammar (for example, subject-verb-object), conflicts with a sublime ontology that 
contains all historical time within itself.  
                                                




The poet’s description of God’s speech in Book 5 ofParadise Lost picks up 
on the distinction between sublime ontology and the sp ech to which God 
accommodates Himself. “So spake th’ Eternal Father and fulfilled / All justice” 
(5.246-47). At first glance, God’s speech to Raphael displays the difference between 
the mortal voice of the poet and the peculiar kind of speech in which God engages. 
God’s speech, unlike human speech, realizes what it speaks. However, when the poet 
says that God’s speaking fulfills—carries out, brings to consummation, and 
satisfies—the Justice that He wills, he also describes how God accommodates 
Himself to the very process of speaking.20 For the fact that the absolute ens enfolds 
into Himself all events and all historical time means that even the absolutely effective 
speaking in which God here engages conflicts with Hs eternal being. Why would the 
omnipotent need a verbal mediator in order to realiz  his will? And why would this 
will be realized in time, as an effect that follows from an act—especially an act of 
speaking?  
In fact, the special qualities that Raphael attribues to God’s speaking also 
refer to the qualities of God that make this speaking inappropriate to Him. For 
example, the absolute effectiveness of God’s speech is attributed to the absolute 
effectiveness of His will—an omnipotence which, as I have already pointed out, 
makes the verbal intermediary unnecessary. Moreover, Raphael’s use of the 
ambiguous conjunction, “and,” alludes to the temporal difference between God’s 
                                                
20 See Oxford English Dictionary, “fulfill,” 5, 2nd edition 1989: “To carry out or 
bring to consummation (a prophecy, promise, etc.); to satisfy (a desire, prayer).” 
 
30 
eternally and absolutely effective will and His speaking—i.e., the simultaneity (as in, 
the dog went outside and is loud) and the linear temporality (as in, the dog went into 
the bushes and got sprayed by a skunk) to which “and” can refer. Given God’s 
omnipotence, “fulfilling” all justice can be simultaneous with His speech, or it can 
follow (and be an effect of) it. The ambiguous conjunction thus suggests the varying 
degrees to which God might have accommodated His will to the process of 
signification. 
According to the narrative the poet tells, God’s speech effects His will within 
a linear temporal framework. For by telling Raphael to go to Eden and warn Adam 
not to “swerve…too secure” (1.236-37), God provokes Raphael to take the actions 
that will fulfill justice—that will ensure that Adam knows the terms of his stay in 
Paradise. Thus, Raphael’s description of God’s speech alludes to the difference 
between God the ns and the God who engages in the narrative that makes up 
heavenly and human history that is contained within His infinite being: between God 
the omnipresent and eternal, and the speaking, historical synecdoche into which He 
contracts Himself.  
But how do we get to this God who speaks? At what point does God break 
from his own absolute ontology? We find the moment of this break in the very first 
historical event that the poem depicts, when God prclaims His Son to be king. God’s 
speech initiates a momentous shift in heavenly being, o e which Raphael describes 
later in Book 5 of the poem, when he recounts heavenly history to Adam. 




As yet this world was not and chaos wild 
Reigned where these heav’ns now roll, where Earth now rests 
Upon her center poised, when on a day 
(For time, though in eternity, applied 
To motion measures all things durable 
By present, past and future) on such day 
As Heav’n’s Great Year brings forth th’ empyreal host 
Of angels, by imperial summons called, 
Innum’rable before th’ Almighty’s throne, 
Forthwith from all the ends of Heav’n appeared 
Under their hierarchs in orders bright, 
Ten thousand thousand ensigns high advanced, 
Standards and gonfalons ‘twist van and rear 
Stream in the air and for distinction serve 
Of hierarchies, of orders and degrees 
Or in their flittering tissues bear imblazed 
Holy memorials, acts of zeal and love 
Record eminent. Thus when in orbs 
Of circuit inexpressible they stood, 
Orb within orb, the Father Infinite, 
By whom in bliss embosomed sat the Son, 
Amidst as from a flaming mount whose top 
Brightness had made invisible, thus spake. 
(5.577-600) 
According to Raphael’s account, the angels, who are imp rially summoned, appear 
“from all the ends of Heav’n” “before th’ Almighty’s throne,” and gather in a series 
of concentric circles and surround a perfect center: th  “Orb within Orb, the Father 
Infinite,” the sublime creator who is at once perfectly enveloped by the concentric 
circles and who radiates infinitely outward from that center. This imagination of the 
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order of the angels, and the defining center around which they circulate, depicts an 
absolutely symmetrical and absolutely ordered heaven, whose inhabitants form a 
perfect circle that is defined by its radiating center point. Importantly, this perfect 
form also figures perfect temporal circularity: the avenly spheres of angels who 
orbit the “orb within orb” repeatedly return to a st te, a position, they previously held, 
and which they will repeatedly inhabit in the future. 
 Nonetheless, the angels are free to experience the pleasures of variety, of 
“change delectable” (5.629). As Raphael explains to Adam and Eve, the angels 
engage in “Mystical dance” both “Eccentric” and “intervolv’d”: 
That day, as other solemn days, they spent 
In song and dance about the sacred Hill, 
Mystical dance, which yonder starry Sphere 
Of Planets and of fixt in all her Wheels 
Resembles nearest, mazes intricate, 
Eccentric, intervolv’d, yet regular 
Then most, when most irregular they seem: 
And in thir motions harmony Divine 
So smooths her charming tones, that God’s own ear 
Listens delighted. 
(5.618-27) 
The customary movement of the angels’ “eccentric” dance would seem to contrast 
with the perfection and the order of the concentric cir les into which they have been 
summoned, and to display a choreographic variety that breaks from the repetitive 
movement imagined by the perfectly symmetrical concentric circles. Yet, imagining 
that their eccentric movement “smooths [harmony’s] charming tones,” the poet 
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claims that eccentric angelic dance, and the individuality it expresses, in no way 
strains the spatial and aural congruity of the heavenly spheres: rather, dance is an 
instrument of heavenly harmony, incorporated into the aural expression of heaven’s 
perfectly spherical form. 
 Indeed, the angels’ choreographic activity, even after the proclamation of the 
son, follows the cyclical pattern of the exchange of night for day. Once they have 
practiced their customary “eccentric dance”—that dance with which they spend “That 
day, as other solemn days”—the angels, as “Ev’ning ow approached” (627), gather 
“in Circles” (631) for a copious dinner, which is followed by a sleep “Fann’d with 
cool Winds” (655). Not only the form, but also the activity, of eccentric dance is 
incorporated into heaven’s cyclical temporality. As the summoned angels stand “in 
orbs / of circuit inexpressible” (594-95), they return repeatedly to the same position: 
as individual angelic activity is contained within the repetitive exchange of night for 
day, it becomes part of that habitual, cyclical pattern which is defined and formed by 
the central, radiating “orb within orb.” 
 This pattern of variety and individuality assimilated into cyclical time is 
mirrored in the poet’s description of heavenly semantics, whose conscription into the 
form of the cycle helps to define heaven’s unique form of historicity and 
signification. For example, the “standards and gonfalons” that the angels fly from 
their respective positions simultaneity reify each ngels’ respective place and display 
their own aptness to the hierarchical system into which they are inscribed: that is, the 
“standards and gonfalons” occupy the hierarchical position which they also signify, 
thereby fitting seamlessly into the perfect form of the circle and exhibiting a semantic 
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order that conforms to the perfect social order of the heavens. Moreover, the poet’s 
description of the “glittering tissues” (591) which memorialize individual “acts of 
Zeal and Love” (592) suggests that even the history that is monumentalized by these 
tissues is absorbed into the a-historical from of circular movement. Like the eccentric 
dance, they become part of the smooth, pleasing, and a-historical harmony of the 
perfect spheres. 
 Thus, Raphael paints a picture of a perfect heaven in which God’s command 
incorporates historical time—with all of its eccentrici ies and significant events—into 
a perfect, cyclical whole. But a momentous action shifts the perfect, cyclical form that 
overwrites variety and historical events: God proclaims the Son to be king in what is, 
not coincidentally, the first historical speech described by the poem. A hint of the 
historical/temporal implications of the proclamation in heaven can be found in the 
way Raphael refers to the day on which the proclamation is given: 
As yet this World was not, and Chaos wild 
Reign’d where these Heav’ns now roll, where Earth now rests 
Upon her Centre pois’d, when on a day 
(For time, though in Eternity, appli’d 
To motion, measures all things durable 
By present, past, and future) on such a day 
As Heav’n’s great Year brings forth, th’ Empyreal Host 
Of Angels by Imperial summons call’d… 
      (5.577-84) 
Even in the context of the infinite temporality of heaven, time can be measured 
according to the motion (presumably the circular motion of the heavens) which 
occurs within eternal time, thereby splitting time up into the “past, present, and 
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future” of the event Raphael aims to describe. Thus, when Raphael begins his story 
with “a day,” he defines the present (and past, and future) of his narrative according 
to the position in the heavenly cycle that creates day as opposed to night. Initially, 
this is as temporally specific as Raphael gets. He establishes only that his story begins 
on “a day,” an indistinct unit of time that is determined by (and thus corresponds 
perfectly to) the cyclical motion of the heavens. And yet, as he continues, Raphael 
specifies the year in which the proclamation occurred. His reference indicates that 
while angelic dance and past actions are absorbed into the heavenly circle whose 
perfect form is determined by God the radiating centerpiece, the proclamation 
expands both temporally and metonymically outward toward the “Great Year” in 
which it occurred, thereby transferring meaning to heretofore indistinct units of time. 
This nomenclature, the “Great Year,” thus signals a radical departure from heaven’s 
perfectly a-temporal state: heaven suddenly becomes a place where momentous 
events lend periods of time, even years, a historical significance that is not integrated 
into the perfect, eternal form of the heavenly circle.  
 In fact, the expansion of Raphael’s reference from day to “Great Year” gives 
us a number of ways to think about the effect of the proclamation on heavenly time. 
For example, the verbal shift that occurs within the development of Raphael’s 
narrative echoes, with a significant difference, Eve’s description of her experience of 
time suspended. Eve describes the suspension of time as she experiences it by a 
repeated description of the cycle of day into night, t us prefiguring Raphael’s 




With thee conversing I forget all time, 
All seasons and thir change, all please alike. 
Sweet is the breath of morn, her rising sweet, 
With charm of earliest birds; pleasant the Sun 
When first on this delightful Land he spreads 
His orient Beams, on herb, tree, fruit, and flow’r, 
Glist’ring with dew; fragrant the fertile earth 
After soft showers; and sweet the coming on 
Of grateful Ev’ning mild, then silent Night 
With this her solemn Bird and this fair Moon, 
And these the Gems of Heav’n, her starry train: 
But neither breath of Morn when she ascends 
With charm of earliest Birds, nor rising Sun 
On this delightful land, nor herb, fruit, flow’r, 
Glist’ring with dew, nor fragrance after showers, 
Nor grateful Ev’ning mild, nor silent Night 
With this her solemn Bird, nor walk by Moon, 
Or glittering Star-light without thee is sweet.  
(4.639-56) 
Eve’s speech verbally mirrors the pattern of historcally insignificant variety found in 
Raphael’s description of angelic dance. She asserts tha  all times of the day seem the 
same to her, are “sweet” and “pleasing alike,” because her experience of them is 
determined by her conversation with Adam. 21 Thus, changes in her diction—from 
                                                
21 Presumably in order to clarify that Eve does not refer to the seasonal change that 
occurs over the period of a year, Merritt Hughes notes that Eve’s “seasons and thir 
change” are about “times, period in the day.” I believe Milton expects his readers to 
produce for themselves the same kind of clarification and, in so doing, to take note of 
 
37 
“Sweet is the breath of morn, her rising sweet, / With charm of earliest birds,” to “But 
neither breath of Morn when she ascends / With charm of earliest Birds”—like the 
various forms of angelic dance, are incorporated into a repetitive pattern of speaking, 
and of the cycle of day and night that Eve’s speaking describes. Verbal variety has no 
bearing on the passage of the time, nor does it assign particular significance to one 
day over another. Eve’s shifting words, like the dancing of the angels, are assimilated 
into the a-historicity whose corporeal form is circular movement, and whose evidence 
is the eternally repeating exchange of night for day.  
 Indeed, the fact that for Eve the change of “seasons” is suspended by her 
conversations with Adam suggests that we ought to imag ne even this individual 
experience of a-historicity in the same, cyclical terms by which Raphael describes its 
heavenly form. For the English verb, to converse, comes from the Latin conversārī, 
conversāre, and convertère, whose meanings include, respectively, “to turn oneself 
about,” “to turn to and fro,” and “to turn about.”22 Thus, as much as Eve means to 
attribute the suspension of time to speech and intercourse, her narrative also alludes to 
the cyclical motion which subjects her verbal variety to a state of historical 
insignificance: it is because of conversation, of the repetitive cycle of day and night, 
                                                                                                                                 
the absence of seasons in Adam and Eve’s prelapsarin world. For attending to this 
absence reinforces the suspension of time that Eve wants to describe. Time, in Eden, 
is not marked by seasonal change, but rather by the repeated cycle of day and night.  
22 Oxford English Dictionary, “converse,” v. 2nd ed. 1989. 
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that one day seems like any other—or at least, doesn t eem to produce any 
significant change. 
 After the fall, however, the repeated revolution of day and night, and the 
eternally enduring spring with which Adam and Eve have been gifted, succumb to 
seasonal change. Milton offers two cosmological explanations for how this change 
was effected: 
Some say he bid his Angels turn askance 
The Poles of Earth twice ten degrees and more 
From the Sun’s Axle; they with labor push’d 
Oblique the Centric Globe: Some say the Sun 
Was bid turn Reins from th’ Equinoctial Road 
Like distant breadth to Taurus with the Sev’n 
Atlantic Sisters, and the Spartan Twins 
Up to the Tropic Crab; thence down amain 
By Leo and the Virgin and the Scales, 
As deep as Capricon, to bring in change 
Of Seasons to each Clime;  
(10.669-78) 
The momentous event of the fall provokes a change i the historical status of creation 
itself, for it subjects the ever-repeating cycle of day and night to the unprecedented 
and overarching variety that occurs over the period of a year.23 Importantly, Milton 
                                                
23 In chapter 3 I will argue that even before the fall, the overgrowth of Edenic fauna 
exceeds the repetitive cycle and grants linear temporality to even prelapsarian 
earth. However, this temporality is distinct from the fallen temporality in which 
seasonal change occurs. 
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imagines this temporal shift in cosmological terms: the earth’s rotation is no longer 
perfectly perpendicular to the path of its orbit of the sun, either because the sun has 
changed its path, or because the angels have tilted the earth. 
 This is where Raphael’s reference to “Heaven’s Great Year” is particularly 
striking. For, according to Hughes and Teskey “Great Year” refers to the year when 
all of the heavens return to their original positions, a year that would, according to 
Plato’s account, repeat every 36,000 earth years.24 But how are we to imagine this 
original state? Significantly, the notion of the Great Year is a product of a gradual 
shift in the earth’s axis of rotation: that is, 36,000 years (according to Plato’s 
calculation) is the measure of the time it takes for the axis of the rotation of the North 
Pole to complete a full precession. What Plato saw as a product of this precession was 
that the stars in the sky appeared to shift position over time—and that they would, 
every 36,000 years, return to an apparently original place in the sky. 
 Milton, in assigning the proclamation of the son t “Heaven’s Great Year,” 
could be referring to the heavenly shift that Plato perceived, and that he took to be a 
result of the movement of the heavens around the earth. However, in 1543, 
Copernicus discovered (or, as Martin Ekman tells us, rediscovered) that the perceived 
heavenly shift was actually an effect of the rotatin of the earth.25 Thus, we can take 
                                                
24 See John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. Gordon Teskey (New York: Norton, 2005) and 
Merritt Hughes, John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose.  
25 Ekman argues that the Greek astronomer Hiparchos, who was apparently the first to 
discover precession, attributed it to the movement of the earth, but his work was 
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Milton’s use of the possessive “Heaven’s” in his refe nce to suggest that this “Great 
Year” is a product of heaven’s own rotational wobble, so to speak. In fact, read in this 
light, and read prospectively rather than retrospectiv ly, we find “Heaven’s Great 
Year” to be a cosmological metaphor for the beginning of a new form of heavenly 
movement and heavenly temporality. As the angels push the earth out of sync with 
the celestial equinox and thus instigate earth’s precession and the seasonal changes 
therein effected, so “Heav’n’s Great Year” implies that heavenly movement has 
somehow come unhinged from its perfect (and un-wobbly) spherical form, and that a 
new kind of heavenly temporality has begun.  
 Indeed, God’s own proclamatory words refer to one particular cosmological 
shift which would distinguish pre- from post-proclam tion heaven: 
“Here all ye angels, progeny of light, 
Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers, 
Hear My decree, which unrevoked shall stand! 
This day I have begot whom I declare 
My only Son and on this holy hill 
Him have anointed whom ye now behold 
At My right hand. Your head I Him appoint 
And by Myself have sworn to Him shall bow 
                                                                                                                                 
lost, and Klaudios Ptolemaios, the mathematician and astronomer who quoted 
him, revised the discovery to assert that precession was the result of the 
movement of the stars. See Martin Ekman, “A Concise Hi tory of the Theories of 
Tides, Precession-Nutation and Polar Motion (From Antiquity to 1950),” Surveys 
in Geophysics 14 (1993): pp. 585-617, esp. pp. 596-9. 
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All knees in Heav’n and shall confess Him Lord. 
Under His great vicegerent reign abide 
United as one individual soul 
For ever happy. Him who disobeys 
Me disobeys, breaks union, and that day, 
Cast out from God and blessed vision, falls 
Into utter darkness, deep engulfed, his place 
Ordained without redemption, without end.” 
(my italics, 5.600-15) 
With God’s proclamation, the concentric circles of angels give way to a new form, for 
the side-by-side positioning of the father and Son forces the angels to reorient and 
shift their concentric arrangements, to arrange themselves not around a “Father 
Infinite” whose omnipotence radiates from a sublimey centered center, an “Orb 
within orb,” but rather around a kingship that is positioned at the right-hand side of 
the creator father. That is, the angels must circle around two foci. With this shift, 
eccentricity comes to imagine not only the individual dances of the angels, but also 
the new, elliptical shape of heaven itself.26  Whereas the fall tilted the earth’s axis, 
and thus precipitated the seasonal changes that make up earth’s year, so the 
proclamation stretched heaven into an elliptical shpe by forcing the angels to follow 
a path that no longer outlined a perfectly symmetrical sphere, thus precipitating a 
                                                
26 See Oxford English Dictionary, “eccentric,” adj., 5, 1989 edition:  “ Of orbital 
motion: Not referable to a fixed centre of revolution; not circular. Of a curve, an 




change in the way that the angels experience time. Angelic orbit after the 
proclamation no longer incorporates historical events i to a pattern of perfect 
repetition over time: instead, the angels orbit the son and father in a pattern whose 
eccentricity implies the choreographic variety of their “eccentric” dance. 
Indeed, the proclamation effects an analogous change in angelic thinking: like 
seventeenth-century astronomers who encountered Kepler’s discovery that the planets 
moved in an elliptical, eccentric shape, the angels have to make room for a radical 
new idea.27 In fact, as I will demonstrate, this need to make room is mirrored in the 
verbal structure of the proclamation itself, for in speaking the proclamation, God 
places his signifiers at strained, and historical, odds with His will. 
Of course, it may be objected that if the poet is writing God’s speech in 
“mortal voice,” then this act of accommodation itself might be the source of any 
difference, any strain, we find in God’s speech. Perhaps the poet’s accommodating 
voice is what differs from the omnipotent will, and the heavenly proclamation, he 
seeks to describe. While this is a reasonable challenge, the text offers a few 
indications that the semantic strain is attributable to God’s speaking, rather than to the 
poet’s accommodation. For example, Raphael, careful to set out God’s speech as a 
quotation, and echoing Biblical rhetoric, encloses thi quotation with the introductory 
“thus spake” (5.599) and the concluding “So spake the Omnipotent” (5.616).  Thus, 
although the poet delivers this story in English, and the angel speaks in the earthly 
                                                
27 See Johannes Kepler, New Astronomy, trans. William H. Donahue (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. chapt. 44. 
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voice comprehensible to Adam and Eve, we can read Raphael’s quotation as an apt 
accommodation of God’s speech.  
If the strain that God’s speech places on semantic order is not due to the 
difference between a “mortal voice” and a sublime sp aking, then it derives from the 
sudden change that God has introduced into heaven’s social order. More specifically, 
by ostentatiously forcing “Him” into a syntactical position that obfuscates meaning 
and places grammatical elements in a confusing, uncustomary order, God forces a 
linguistic shift akin to the formal shift from perfct circle to ellipses. In each of the 
three sentences in which “Him” appears in the proclamation, “Him” is the object of a 
transitive verb, whose case would be most easily defined and understood in the 
context of a subject-object-verb syntax. However, vbally echoing the hierarchical 
status into which He has suddenly placed His Son, Gd puts “Him” in a position of 
emphatic priority. This curiously-placed pronoun, in turn, determines the grammatical 
and semantic roles of the other words in the sentence. Take “Your head I Him appoint 
/ And by Myself have sworn to Him shall bow / All knees in Heav’n and shall confess 
Him Lord.” The meanings of the first independent clauses of this compound sentence 
are resolved only at the appearance of the object/verb combination marked by “Him,” 
whose position in this peculiar syntax emphasizes th  semantic priority of the son. 
That is, the “Your head I,” and “by Myself have sworn,” are defined, retroactively, 
only at the appearance of the object/verb combinatio  whose place is marked by 
“Him.”  
As the proclamation did to the pattern of angelic movement, so God’s 
speaking has initiated a shift in heavenly semantics. Indeed, by the end of God’s 
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sentence, language, like the angels, seems to have accommodated the semantic 
priority of Him: “All knees in Heav’n,” the subject that had appeared at end of the 
sentence that precedes it, becomes the understood subject of a more conventional 
subject-verb-object syntax: “and shall confess him Lord.” The sentence thus closes 
with a grammatical and syntactic resolution, a final st tement that cements and 
clarifies God’s command. 
 And yet, the resolution is fleeting, for syntactical onfusion reappears in 
God’s warning: “Him who disobeys / Me disobeys.” God places the objective “Him” 
into the conventional position of the subject, which, if it were placed here, would 
presumably be the disobedient angel subject, as in “[He] who disobeys.” In fact, 
despite “Him” being an objective pronoun, its semantic content and grammatical role 
are not entirely clear until the second appearance of the transitive “disobeys,” which 
retroactively makes “Me” its object and thus reveals the fact that the “Him who 
disobeys” contains no subject pronoun at all—neither a “he” nor “she” nor even an 
ungrammatical “Him.” Thus, as God shifts syntax, he also goads Satan, flaunting the 
radical change that, especially from Satan’s perspective, is effected by the 
proclamation. For by verbally placing “Him” in the conventional position of the 
grammatical subject of “disobeys”—and so not in the conventional position of the 
object of the definitive clause—God syntactically and grammatically removes the 
highest angel, Lucifer, from his place of syntactical and grammatical priority, and 
places the son where, according to convention and Stanic perspective, Lucifer 
rightfully belongs. Thus, God at once to prophecies Lucifer’s disobedience and makes 
him verbally disappear. 
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 Indeed, it is in this syntactical strain that Raphel’s description of the imperial 
summons, of angelic dance, and especially of the “standards and gonfalons,” become 
particularly apt, for we can read the physical placement of the “glittering tissues” in 
the respective hierarchical positions that they signify as a spatial analogy to the verbal 
syntax I have thus far examined, and thus as a foil to the strain that God places on His 
syntax in proclaiming the Son to be king. That is, whereas God speaks in a new 
syntax, placing “Him” in a syntactical position as foreign to the semantic order as the 
Son’s ascendancy is to the social order, the emblems of angelic stature are placed 
exactly where one might expect them to be—mirroring the respective standing of 
each of the angels in the heavenly hierarchy and, as I h ve already argued, 
incorporated into the timeless form of the circle. The spatial analogy suggests that the  
heavenly syntax that precedes the proclamation does n t bear the strain of historical 
change, but rather verifies the perfect a-historicity, and the order, of pre-proclamation 
heaven. Moreover, it suggests that the new ascendancy of the Son forces a shift in the 
heavenly syntax. That is, the positions of the signifiers must, like the order of the 
angels, make adjustments to accommodate the ascension of the Son, adjustments 
which will appear, at first, to overturn the conventio al order.  
 This is how Paradise Lost historicizes language and contextualizes language’s 
allegorical state—by backdating the birth of linguistic difference to God’s 
proclamation of the Son. For in forcing language to adjust to the new meaning it is 
supposed to convey, God not only changes linguistic form. He also subjects His 
omnipotent will to a historical change which is revealed in the strain of linguistic 
difference. That is, God’s proclamation opens up a semantic fault line, a difference 
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between God’s will that the Son ascend and the customary language that He uses to 
express that will—i.e., the semantic system that is ccustomed to the order of things. 
This fault line reveals the difference between the order God once put in place and the 
order He initiates now. Thus, in His speaking, God c nspicuously subjects the 
expression of His will to historical vicissitudes and forces which do not cohere with 
His infinite, omnipotent, absolute being. God’s contraction of His eternal self into 
historical time, and the linguistic difference it effects, display the concomitance of 
linguistic difference and historicity. God’s speech makes heaven a historical place, 
where variety and change are not seamlessly assimilated into, but rather seem to shift, 
the forms which are part of heaven’s a-historical perfection. The linguistic difference 
which is inscribed into allegory, the difference betw en speaking and truth, then, is 
born out of the difference between God’s speech and His will, and His decision to 
subject Himself and His heavenly reign to historical change. 
 I am not sure whether God’s proclamation provoked Satan’s disobedience, but 
Paradise Lost does suggest that Satan’s violation of the heavenly order was 
occasioned by God’s speech. In fact, Raphael immediat ly follows up his quotation of 
God’s proclamation with a curious description of Satan’s evil thoughts: “So spake the 
Omnipotent and with His words / All seemed well pleas d: all seemed but were not 
all (5.616-7).” There is a verbal innocence to Raphael’s description of heaven’s first 
duplicity, as if Raphael is remiss to signify “lying” to Adam, and instead describes 
lying in terms of the partial negation of a truth. But there is also at work here a 
sophisticated crossing of two different juxtapositions: seeming vs. being and all vs. 
some. This crossing captures the fact that two kinds of difference are made possible 
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by God’s decision to subject His will, and heaven itself, to the vicissitudes of 
linguistic difference and historicity. The first is the difference between representation 
and truth, between Satan’s seeming “well pleas’d” and the fact that he is not. The 
second is the departure of the one, the singular, from the harmonious society of the 
angels themselves, who have adjusted the very shape of heaven in order to 
accommodate the Son. Satan is incorporated into the body of heaven, and into the 
unanimous agreement, only by counterfeit. Thus, read in light of the linguistic history 
I just described, Satan’s dissent, his lying, and indeed his desire to challenge the new 
rule to which he has been subjected, emerge as the hyperbolic realizations of the 
difference that God inscribes into the proclamation, and of the historicity He thereby 
initiates.28 Once Satan observes the semantic system being strained, nd the angels 
adjusting to the ascension of the Son, he seizes the opportunity to effect a similar shift 
in heavenly being—to make the angels adjust again, only this time to his ascendancy. 
 For the remainder of this chapter, I will examine th birth of Sin out of Satan’s 
head, which is recounted in Book 2 of the poem, in light of God’s proclamation of the 
Son and the historicity and linguistic difference that proclamation initiates. I will 
argue that the proclamation of the Son, which appears in Book 5, explains in narrative 
                                                
28 The question arises: does my reading indicate that Satan is the first self-authoring 
subject, the first to choose an identity in contradistinction to the one he was given at 
his creation? How does God’s strained speaking openu  the possibility for choice 




retrospect how this birth came to pass and outlines th  ethical implications of Satan’a 
apparent production of an embodiment of his thoughts. Finally, following Phillip 
Gallagher’s argument that the pagan myth of the birth of Athena represents Satan’s 
misrepresentation of his own history (and specifically his own failure), I will 
investigate how, according to Milton, historicity (into which is inscribed linguistic 
difference) destabilizes personification as a rhetorical figure of embodiment, of an 
abstract truth captured and confirmed in a perfectly named figure. 
 
 Before readers learn of Sin’s birth and know her name (and thus the nature of 
Satan’s ill-pleased state), Satan falls into hell and, eventually, finds a horrible and 
unknown female figure guarding its gates:  
The one seem’d Woman to the waist, and fair, 
But ended foul in many a scaly fold 
Voluminous and vast, a Serpent arm’d 
With mortal sting: about her middle round 
A cry of Hell Hounds never ceasing bark’d 
With wide Cerberean mouths full loud, and rung 
A hideous Peal: yet, when they list, would creep, 
If aught disturb’d thir noise, into her womb, 
And kennel there, yet there still bark’d and howl’d 




This initial description of this ‘seem’d woman’ burdens her with the long-established 
iconographic tradition of, as George Butler calls it, “serpentine women.”29 Her 
ugliness thus presumably mirrors the atrocity of Satan’s rebellion, and is a precursor 
to the hideous figures who will appear later in both Christian and pagan texts.30 
But up until the point at which Sin recounts the angels’ naming of her, Sin is 
presented as an example of the allegorical mode—more specifically, of the 
                                                
29 George F. Butler, "Spenser, Milton, and the Renaissance Campe: Monsters and 
Myths in The Faerie Queene and Paradise Lost," Milton Studies 40 (2001), 27. See 
also Butler’s “Milton’s Pandora: Eve, Sin and the Mythographic Tradition,” Milton 
Studies 44 (2005): 153-78. 
30 Indeed, critics have responded to Sin’s body by gleaning allegorical meaning out of 
Milton’s allusions to, among others, Scylla, Spenser’s Dragon, Spenser’s Error, 
Athena, and Minerva. For instance, John Mulryan cites Athena, Minerva, Scylla, and 
Error as iconographic sources; Catherine Gimelli Martin considers the influence of 
James 1.13-15; and John Steadman considers both Genesis 3 and St. Basil as source 
texts. See John Mulryan, “Satan’s Headache: The Perils and Pains of Giving Birth to 
a Bad Idea,” Milton Quarterly 39, no.1 (March 2005): 16-22.; Catherine Gimelli 
Martin, “The Sources of Milton’s Sin Reconsidered,” Milton Quarterly 35, no. 1 
(March 2001) : 1-8; John Steadman, “‘Sin’ and the Serpent of Genesis 3 Paradise 
Lost, II, 650-53,” Modern Philology 54, no. 4 (May 1957): 217-20; and John 
Steadman, “Milton and St. Basil: The Genesis of Sin and Death,” Modern Languages 
Notes 73, no. 2 (February 1958): 83-83. 
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personifications that pepper allegorical texts—without being named. Thus, until the 
scene of her naming, she is not reified as a personification, an embodiment of the 
thing called sin. In fact, Paradise Lost withholds her name even at its most helpful 
narrative junctures. For example, the name of Sin is conspicuously absent from the 
Argument of Book 2: 
 
He [Satan] passes on his Journey to Hell Gates, finds them shut, and 
who sat there to guard them, by whom at length theyar  op’n’d, and 
discover to him the great Gulf between Hell and Heaven.  
(The Argument, Book 2) 
 
The Argument tells us that we will encounter someone in Book 2, and the poet begins 
to describe that someone in line 650 of the same book. But the poem waits until line 
760 to give us her name. Thus, Sin’s naming, when it occurs, registers as a verbal 
reification of her iconographic and allegorical significance. 
All on a sudden miserable pain 
Surprised thee: dim thine eyes and dizzy swum 
In darkness while thy head flames thick and fast 
Threw forth till on the left side op’ning wide, 
Likest to thee in shape and count’nance bright 
(Then shining Heavn’ly fair) a goddess armed 
Out of thy head I sprung! Amazement seized 
All th’ host of Heav’n. Back they recoiled afraid 
At first and called me “Sin” and for a sign 





 As Maureen Quilligan has noted, “[t]he speech in which Sin describes her 
birth for her forgetful father is remarkable for its persistent punning on the words sin-
sign-sinister” (181). The third term, “sinister,” she describes as “a buried pun”: “Sin 
states that she was born from the ‘left,’ that is, he ‘sinister’ side of Satan’s head” 
(181). According to Quilligan, the sudden burst of p lysemy into the heavenly 
landscape signals a fall into arbitrary, polysemous language, and thus into the 
demonic allegorical mode (181-82).31 Following up on Quilligan’s observation of the 
polysemy inscribed into this passage, I want to argue that the birth of Sin represents 
not a fall into arbitrary language, but rather a bold and willful attempt to collapse 
polysemy into one, to establish a fusion of word anthing that does not stand up to 
the historicity of post-proclamation heaven, or to the linguistic difference that God 
initiated with the proclamation of the Son. 
 We can discern the nature (and the apparent success) of Satan’s attempt to 
collapse polysemy, to fuse word and thing, in the angels’ intuitive naming of her. For 
the pun on “Sin” and “sign” that Quilligan observes is placed within a chiasmus, or 
what George Puttenham, in 1569, called the “cross cupler.” According to 
Puttenham, the cross coupler “takes me two contrary wo ds, and tieth them as it were 
in a pair of couples, and so makes them agree like good fellows, as I saw once in 
                                                
31 See introduction. See also Milton’s Spenser, in which Quilligan places the infection 
of Paradise Lost later, after Sin “has arrived on earth” (Milton’s Spenser: The 
Politics of Reading [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983], p. 87).  
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France a wolf coupled with a mastiffe, and a fox with a hound.”32 While Puttenham’s 
mating metaphor is dubious, we can still infer from it the kind of semantic 
intermingling that occurs within the ABBA structure of the chiasmic crossing of 
terms. When the angels (A) call this woman (B) sin, and as a (B) sign portentous (A) 
hold her, they cross Sin with sign and calling with holding.33 Placing the act of 
naming within a chiasmus, Milton thus figures the angels’ natural and intuitive 
naming of her. According to the angels’ intuitive holding and calling, Sin not only 
names this woman: Sin is what she is and what she is named. Importantly, the angels’ 
naming at once confirms Sin’s status as an embodiment of Satan’s sinful thoughts and 
constitutes Sin’s birth as an apparently successful move to recapture the fusion of 
signifier and signified that God relinquished with the proclamation of the Son. 
 And yet, the angels’ naming of Sin also betrays the difference that is 
necessarily built into heaven’s now-historical temporality, and that is implicit to every 
signification. For the angels find their intuitive naming of Sin, and the identity of the 
word and the thing which their motivated naming captures, eroded by the fact that as 
a “sign,” Sin ominously “portends” historical events they do not know, a history of 
things to come which they, even in their natural deeming and naming of Sin, cannot 
intellectually and verbally capture. The fusion figured by the cross-coupler, then,  
                                                
32 Goerge Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy, ed. Frank Whigham and Wayne E. 
Rebhorn (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 291. 
33 Puttenham’s “cross-coupler” is discussed at length in Joel Fineman, Shakespeare’s 
Perjured Eye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 
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does not stand up to the difference that God has inscribed into language and history. 
Indeed, if Sin did capture the history to which sheref rred, that history would 
collapse into one—into the I am that I am of the woman named Sin. 
 Sin’s sudden, surprising, and violent birth out of Satan’s head thus exposes the 
radical nature of his oppositional thoughts in rhetorical terms. For in generating an 
entirely new being, a neologism, and an apparently perfect embodiment of his 
disobedient thoughts, Satan poses as an omnipotent creator, an author of entirely new 
beings and words. While God has contracted Himself into history, thereby 
relinquishing His absolute identity and the absolute identity of His will, His speech, 
and its effect, and imbuing signification with difference, Satan seems to spawn a new 
fusion of the three—a perfect manifestation of his willful disobedience who is also 
what she is named. Thus, the birth of Sin figures Satan’s disobedient and prideful 
thoughts in terms of rhetoric and heavenly semantics. Satan seeks to restore heaven to 
its prior linguistic, a-historical state, but with a significant change: this time, he will 
climb the hierarchical ladder by producing, as if through godly omnipotence, a fusion 
of will, speech, and effect.  
 A specific kind of verbal iconoclasm emerges out of the way Paradise Lost 
narratively sets up the naming of Sin as a fusion of image and verbal meaning, and 
then watches that meaning disintegrate with time. W can understand this iconoclasm 
by comparison to the iconoclastic strategy of Milton’s response to Eikon Basilike. 
The frontispiece of Eikon Basilike sets out an agenda which is elaborated and 
supported by iconic language – language that spells out in words the way that Charles 
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fits the iconic image that the frontispiece present.34 The idolizing of the king that the 
text thereby encourages inspires Milton to comment sarcastically: 
In one thing I must commend his op’nness who gave the ti le to this 
Book, Εικών Βασιλική, that is to say, The Kings Image; and by the 
Shrine he dresses out for him, certainly would have the people come 
and worship him. (343) 
 
Milton commends the book’s title for constructing a verbal shrine, one which reifies 
the frontispiece’s idolatrous visual figuration of Charles I as the image—i.e., the 
exemplar and embodiment—of kingliness, and thus inspire  the people to idolatrous 
worship of him. 
 Perceiving the force of this verbal reification, Milton responds by dismantling 
it. For example, noting that “the blockish vulgar…through custom, simplicity, or 
want of better teaching, have not more seriously considered kings than in the gaudy 
name of majesty,” Milton not only points out the und e influence that such a “gaudy” 
name has on evaluations of Charles I, but also imagines the name as a kind of 
accessory, as part of an elaborate costume that naïve readers take to signify the man 
                                                
34 See Marshall Grossman, “The Dissemination of the King," in The Theatrical City, 
ed. David Bevinginton, Richard Strier and David Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 261-81, in which he points out the various 
iconoclastic moves that Milton makes in his text, including “disrupting the unity 
first of image and text and then of text and source” (265) and “breaking the link 
between image and inscription” (267). 
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himself. 35 By revealing this rhetoric strategy, Milton sets the name “majesty” apart 
from the man it verbally dresses up: “majesty” is nothing more than a name that has 
been deceptively and inappropriately appended to him.
 Strikingly, Milton’s strategy  of explicitly dividing the referent of the abstract 
name from the referent of the name of majesty, prefigures the verbal iconoclasm that 
he achieves in Paradise Lost. To explain: the first entry for “majesty” in the Oxford 
English Dictionary reads “Greatness, dignity, power, etc.”  Entry 1a pertains to “the 
greatness and glory of God.”  Entry 1b gets a bit more complicated: “the dignity or 
greatness of a monarch; sovereign power; sovereignty.  Also: the person or 
personality of a monarch” (“majesty” OED).  The editors of the OED do not 
distinguish between the use of majesty as a noun referring to the attributes of a king – 
“dignity or greatness” – and a noun referring to the king himself – “the person.”  
Milton’s linguistic intervention, however, insists on a distinction between these two 
uses. He maintains that Charles being named majesty does not mean that Charles 
carries or embodies the attributes associated with kingliness. (In fact, Milton’s point 
is that no one named king lives up to these idealized attributes.) The referent of the 
proper noun, Charles, does not match up with the concept signified by the abstract 
noun, majesty.36  
                                                
35 John Milton, “Eikonoklastes,” in Complete Prose Works of John Milton, v. 3, ed. 
Merritt Hughes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 338. 
36 My analysis of Eikonoklastes is complicated by Milton’s erudite attack on 
Salmasius in A Defence of the People of England, in which he mocks Salmasius’s 
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In the angels’ naming of Sin, and the customary reading of her that follows, 
Paradise Lost stages the need for a similar linguistic intervention. As I have already 
described, when Sin is first born, the angels take her to be the embodiment of sin.  
Hence, they give her a proper name that they believe captures what they naturally 
deem her to be. But when Sin seduces the angels, sh introduces the need for 
linguistic intervention: “but familiar grown / I pleas’d, and with attractive graces won 
/ The most averse, thee chiefly” (71-63).  These lin s can be read as a fairly simple 
allegory: familiar grown, sin can begin to appear attractive. But the poem does not tell 
us that the angels find the act of sin attractive.  Rather, the poem says that “the most 
averse” angels are seduced by the woman named Sin. Hence, the poem implies that 
                                                                                                                                 
conflation, in Latin, of “persona” for “person.” Milton asks, “what is ‘in the person of 
the king’?  When was Latin ever spoken like that? … Unless perhaps you are telling 
us about some pretender like the false-Philip who assumed the guise of king and 
carried out some murder or other among the English: In this you may have spoken 
more truly than you thought, for a tyrant, like a king upon the stage, is but the ghost 
or mark of a king, and not a true king” (310). That Milton distinguishes persona from 
person of a king suggests that he might believe in such a thing as “a true king.” Of 
course, Milton was seizing on an opportunity to attack Salmasius’s lack of learning, 
and in doing so might have pushed this notion of “true king” further than he actually 
believed it.  See “A Defence of the People of Englad,” in Complete Prose Works of 
John Milton, vol. 4, ed. Don M. Wolfe, gen ed. Merritt Hughes (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1966), pp. 283-300. 
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those angels who are seduced by this woman named Sin are led to conclude that the 
act of sin—that is, the disobedience to God to which the common noun, sin, refers—
corresponds to the “attractive graces” of the woman n med Sin. Because they read the 
woman named sin as an embodiment—an abstract notion perfectly projected into the 
material world, and perfectly fused with the name th  angels have appended to her—
they take the act of sinning to be as attractive as the woman who shares its name. 
Where the king dons a gaudy name in order to make his person more attractive, the 
attractiveness of the woman named Sin obscures the ugliness of the abstract referent, 
the act of sinning. 
Thus, in the naming of Sin, and in the emergence of a customary reading of 
her, Paradise Lost ells us a story of metonymic transference precipitated by 
linguistic naiveté. The angels’ evaluation of the act of sinning changes because their 
evaluation of the woman named Sin shifts over time, but the transference from Sin to 
sinning is a product of their customary, a-historical assumptions: the angels, 
accustomed to a heavenly and perfect correspondence betw en signifier and signified, 
do not appreciate that such a correspondence is notsustained after God’s 
proclamation of the Son. Not recognizing the presence of linguistic difference, or the 
possibility of polysemy in the language of their heav nly world, the angels conflate 
the referent of the proper name “Sin,” with the refe nt of the abstract noun “sin.” 
Milton, by pointing out their mistake, unfuses the word from the thing, and challenges 
the very notion of embodiment, of an abstract idea p rfectly realized by a named (or 




Why would Milton use the same strategy to destabilize Charles majestic 
figuration and Sin’s status as an apparent embodiment of the act (or thought) of 
sinning? Because the fusion of word and thing they seem to achieve supports their 
idolatry—their status as graven images that overwrite the difference inscribed into 
signification, and that thereby claim to embody potencies that they only represent.  As 
the rest of this chapter will show, Milton also aims this rhetorical strategy against the 
allegorical genre which, as the poem presents it, follows directly from Sin’s birth. 
Heaven does not make the accommodations for Sin that it once made for the 
ascendancy of the Son. On the contrary, once Sin is born into heaven, and once the 
angels are seduced by her, God purges them all, tossing them into hell. God’s act, 
which rids heaven of the pollution of disobedience, releases Sin, and the rhetorical 
mode she represents, into created history. Thus begins the history that Milton tells 
about how the allegorical mode comes to infect creation. In short, the allegorical 
mode as it appears on earth represents Satan’s repeated attempt to create 
embodiments of his will, to claim omnipotence by overwriting a dynamic world of 
history and linguistic difference with an idolatrous and apparently perfect projection 
of his will onto the world. 
In Authors to Themselves, Marshall Grossman explains Paradise Lost’s 
“assumption that the apocalypse will provide history with a synecdochic narrative 
closure” to the metonymic difference inscribed into human history.37 He argues that 
                                                
37 Marshall Grossman, “Authors to Themselves”: Milton and the Revelation of 
History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 28. See esp. pg. 26 on 
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“the principal theme of Books I and II of Paradise Lost is the exclusion of the fallen 
angels from this dialectic transformation of difference into identity” (28). That is, the 
fallen angels are quarantined from the history that e poem imagines to be the 
foundation of human beings’ ability to become “authors to themselves” by “actively 
participat[ing] in the motion of history toward [the] narrative closure” (28) of 
revelation. Thus, in hell, past and present become conflated in the landscape Satan 
experiences, a landscape which is a product of his own thinking: 
This equation of space and time is ascribed to a subjectivity peculiar 
to the fallen when Satan, awaking to the double torment of present 
pain and the memory of lost pleasure, ‘throws his baleful eyes / That 
witness’d huge affliction and dismay’ (I.56-7). What the reader sees 
through Satan’s eyes is an external world that mirrors in physical 
terms Satan’s internal distress.  (29)  
 
Satan’s world becomes utterly narcissistic, a “pseudoworld projected by internal 
desire” (29). Grossman here describes an a-historical subjectivity which projects, in 
each passing moment, all of Satan’s “internal distress” onto his external world. Thus, 
in hell Satan gets just what he tried for in heaven, a world that corresponds with 
exactly what he is thinking, and is absolutely effected by his will.  
 One result of this absolute projection is the erasure of historical truth: 
To bow and sue for grace 
With suppliant knee, and deify his power 
                                                                                                                                 




Who from the terror of this Arm so late 
Doubted his Empire, that were low indeed, 
That were an ignominy and shame beneath 
This downfall; since by Fate the strength of Gods 
And this Empyreal substance cannot fail, 
Since through experience of this great event 
In Arms not worse, in foresight much advanc’t, 
We may with more successful hope resolve 
To wage by force or guile eternal War 
Irreconcilable to our grand Foe. 
      (1.111-22) 
Satan willfully misinterprets the history he has only recently experienced, 
conveniently forgetting that the Son, with one sweep, demolished the devil forces, 
and dubiously alleging that the Son’s power might be “deif[ied]” by “suppliant knee,” 
rather than being inherently Godly already.  
 The erasure of history becomes a prevalent theme in the poem’s depiction of 
the fall into hell, and, more importantly for us, of the rhetorical infection of creation 
that follows. Much of this is enacted through the erasure of the fallen angels’ names: 
…Godlike shapes and forms 
Excelling human, Princely Dignities, 
And Powers that erst in Heaven sat on Thrones; 
Though of thir Names in heav’nly Records now 
Be no memorial, blotted out and ras’d 
By thir Rebellion, from the Books of Life.   
(1.358-63) 
Echoing Psalms and Revelations, the poet tells us that the devils’ original names have 
been “blotted out” from the book that records heavenly history. The biblical allusion 
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suggests that such blotting prepares the way toward the New Jerusalem, its realization 
as a whole, perfect place: 
Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written 
with the righteous. (Psalm 69:28) 
 
 And there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth, 
neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie: but they 
which are written in the Lamb's book of life. (Revelation 21:27) 
 
God has purged the devils’ names from the heavenly history book, for their sin will 
not be assimilated into the perfect, new world to come. By erasing names, God has let 
heaven forget its history, thereby preparing history itself for its inevitable narrative 
closure. 
 In the interim, however, the blotting out of the dvils’ names from the 
heavenly book is matched, on earth, by a proliferation of arbitrary names that write 
over heavenly history, thereby almost erasing it from the earthly purview and, in so 
doing, becoming the verbal foundations of pagan idolatry: 
Nor had they yet among the Sons of Eve 
Got them new Names, till wand’ring o’er the Earth, 
Through God’s high sufferance for the trial of man, 
By falsities and lies the greatest part 
Of Mankind they corrupted to forsake 
God thir Creator, and th’ invisible  
Glory of him that made them, to transform 
Oft to the Image of a Brute, adorn’d 
With gay Religions full of Pomp and Gold, 
And Devils to adore for Deities: 
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Then were they known to men by various Names, 
And various Idols through the Heathen World. 
(1.364-75) 
As part of their demonic strategy of obscuring God’s glory and posturing as deities, 
the devils take on new names. These names function (like the gaudy name of king) as 
verbal costumes. For example, the devil who called himself “Chemos,” and was “th’ 
obscene dread of Moab’s Sons” (1.406), later took the name of “Peor, [an]other 
Name, when he entic’d / Israel in Sittim in thir march from Nile / To do him wanton 
rites, which cost them woe” (1.412-4). Not only does the erasure of the devils’ 
heavenly names blot out the glorious history from which they have fallen: the 
freedom with which they take on new names obscures, for example, the fact that the 
same demon was worshipped and idolized by the sons of Moab and the Israelites. The 
devils’ new names, like the name of the king, thus verbally support their idolatrous 
performances specifically by erasing the historical evidence of their posturing, of 
their inability to realize the godliness they try to project. New names prompt 
followers to worship before the shrine, and to ignore the sublime power from which 
these idols fell. 
 The pattern by which a new name obscures a past history is essential to the 
story that Paradise Lost ells about the allegorical mode. For example, Phillip 
Gallagher argues that by alluding to the myth of the birth of Athena in his depiction 
of the birth of Sin, Milton gives this myth a back-story, and thus explains how the 
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myth departs from historical truth (Gallagher, 318).38 Gallagher points out that 
because the story of Sin’s birth is not found in the Old Testament but rather in 
Hesiod, Milton is telling a story whose distorted version was delivered to Hesiod by 
Satan himself, who revised his autobiography in order to self-glorify:  
Hesiod is telling a true story; but under the influence of Satan (his 
Muse) he has gotten the details confused. In Paradise Lost, Satan 
refuses to worship the newly exalted Son of God, thereby arrogating 
divine prerogatives to himself (‘swallowing’ wisdom) and 
conceiving Sin. These facts he transforms into Hesiod’  account of 
the seizure of Metis (divine counsel) and the conception and birth of 
Athena (wisdom). The Devil’s motives are not difficult to figure: 
wishing to enhance his own image among the Gentiles, h  transforms 
the account of his own rebellion into a veritable hi rogamy. He 
becomes God (Zeus), Sin becomes wisdom (Athena), and a 
blasphemous but plausible myth emerges.  
(331) 
By giving Sin (and presumably himself) a new name, Satan erases the truth of the 
original, cephalic birth upon which this allegory is based. This, for Gallagher, 
explains why the poem presents the story of Sin (and Death), which he takes to be an 
historical truth, as if it were an allegory: by this presentation, Milton alludes to a 
Satanic, allegorical revision of a historical truth.  
                                                
38 See also page 329, where Gallagher notes that Milton’s “mature opinion of Greek 
myth resembles that of Justin Martyr and numerous other Christian apologists 
from late antiquity to the Renaissance who believed h athen mythology to have 
originated in demonic distortions of Scripture.”  
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 As Gallagher tells us, Hesiod would have taken the s ory of Athena’s birth to 
“[confirm] the principle of patriarchy: the act enables him [Zeus] to give birth to 
Athena, the goddess of wisdom and war, out of his head; that is, wisdom and military 
might are established decisively as male prerogatives” (329). Moreover, swallowing 
Metis “allows the god to release cosmic energy while at the same time harnessing it 
so as to prevent the offspring of his own creativity from rebounding upon himself” 
(329).  In short, Zeus’s appropriation of the process of birth, and the military and 
intellectual prowess born out of that appropriation, confirm Zeus’s godly centrality 
and potency: he is the force by which power is harnessed and released, and thus the 
origin and the central figure of new life, of intellect, and of military power. 
 Following up on Gallagher’s reading of the Athena myth and its Satanic 
attribution, I think we can excavate Milton’s specific intervention into the allegorical 
mode in its Satanic form. For as much as Satan tries to rase historical truth by 
providing history with his “(prevaricated) autobiography” (Gallagher 332), that 
autobiography, when read against the grain of the history that Paradise Lost recounts, 
reveals narcissism and anti-historicity to be at its heart: 
Zeus, being king, first married the goddess of practic l reason, 
Metis, the wisest, most knowledgeable of immortals or mortals. 
But, just as she was about to give birth to gray-eyed Athena, 
Zeus, at that moment misleading her wits by a cunning deception 
And with his flattering arguments, swallowed her into his stomach, 
At the advice of the earth goddess, Gaia, and star-studded heaven. 
For they instructed him thusly, in order that none f the other Gods 
whose race is eternal should get royal power but Zes. 
All too intelligent children were destined to come out of Metis; 
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First was the gray-eyed maiden Athena, called tritogeneia, 
Who, in intelligent counsel and forcefulness, equals her father. 
Afterward, Metis was going to bear him a son of a reckless 
Character, larger than life, future king of the gods and of men, too; 
But Zeus, before she could do so, swallowed her into his belly, 
So that the goddess might teach him the meaning of good and of 
evil.39 
 
Hesiod tells us that Zeus consumes the mother of his children in order to prevent the 
history that has been prophesied, one that promises to bring forth a female competitor 
to his prominent status and, finally, a new “king of g ds and…men.” And yet, after 
she has been assimilated into Zeus’s body, Athena is born: “All by himself, from his 
head, Zeus fathered gray-eyed Athena, / Terrible rouser to battle and leader of armies, 
that tireless / Lady whose pleasure is ever in war cries and warfare and fighting” (ll. 
878-80).40 While the birth of the son appears to have been avrted, and while the 
                                                
39 Hesiod, Theogony, in Works of Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns, trans. Daryl Hine 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), ll. 841-55. lines. 889-900.  
40 Hugh G. Evelyn White’s translation of the Theogony, which appeared originally in 
the Loeb Classical Library edition, differs significantly from Hine’s, for it indicates 
that Athena was born of Metis within Zeus’s body:  
But he seized her with his hands and put her in his belly, for fear that 
she might bring forth something stronger than his tunderbolt: 
therefore did Zeus, who sits on high and dwells in aether, swallow 
her down suddenly. But she straightway conceived Pallas Athene: 
and the gather of men and gods gave her birth by way of his head on 
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poem tells us that Zeus fathered Athena all “on his own”—i.e., as if of his own 
volition—Athena’s birth nevertheless realizes the prophecy that Zeus had tried to 
prevent. She is, as had been prophesied, “All too intell gent.” Thus, when read in light 
of the heavenly story in which Milton alludes to it, the myth of Athena turns out not 
to be a story about omnipotence confirmed, but rather about priority giving way to a 
fated historical change, to the forces of generation  which, even by assimilating them 
within himself, Zeus can neither control nor suspend. Though Zeus has apparently 
                                                                                                                                 
the banks of the river Trito. And she remains hidden b neath the 
inward parts of Zeus, even Metis, Athena’s mother, worker of 
righteousness, who was wiser than gods and mortal men. There the 
goddess (Athena) received that whereby she excelled in strength all 
the deathless ones who dwell in Olympus, she who made the host-
scaring weapon of Athena. And with it (Zeus) gave her birth, arrayed 
in arms of war.  
(line 929) 
White’s translation of this passage, however, appears to be an anomaly, and the 
editors of the Loeb Classical Library, in 2006, published Glenn W. Most’s 
translation, which more closely matches Hines’s. See H siod, Theogony, in 
Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle, Homerica, tr ns. Hugh G. Evelyn White, 
Loeb Classical Library Volume 57 (London: William Heinemann, 1914); and 
Hesiod, Theogony, in Hesiod, Theogony, Works and Days, and Testimonia, ed. 
and trans. Glenn W. Most, Loeb Classical Library Volume 57 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006). See also Hesiod, Theogony and Works and 
Days, trans. M. L. West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
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prevented the birth of the Son, fate and gestation, even the gestation he apparently 
controls, have overpowered his decision to consume and assimilate into himself the 
mother of his fated children. 
 Thus, the myth of Athena becomes an allegory of the futility of the allegorical 
mode. Indeed, it exemplifies in both historical and generative terms the vanity of 
what Gordon Teskey terms the violence of allegory. Teskey argues that “allegory 
categorizes bodies as the material basis of an order f signs” (16) and that the 
idealism backing allegory “submits the world around it to truths it is convinced it 
already knows” (17).41 This submission of the world to idealism, he argues, “is 
transferred to the alien context of gender [i.e., of m ther], where it can appear to be 
solved under the image of sexual congress” (15-16). Teskey finds this transference in 
Plato’s Timaeus, which imagines the mother to be a “featureless…‘receptacle’ 
through which the father propagates his seed in the world of things.” Plato’s account 
exemplifies a “confusion” about generation that “is psychologically resonant and 
politically useful,” for it subdues the mother to a p ssive material medium through 
which the father demonstrates “what, in Platonic terms, we already know” (17). In 
brief, allegory does violence to those elements of the material world that do not 
correspond to the projected desire, the idealism, of the paternal allegorist, in part by 
asserting that this material world is absolutely “subject” (17) to the force of paternal 
form. 
                                                
41 See introduction. 
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 Zeus’s consumption of his sexual partner, Metis, follows Teskey’s paradigm, 
for Zeus, in making Metis part of himself, appropriates her maternal production so 
that it will confirm his idea of his own godly status.42 I want to suggest, moreover, 
that when we read the myth of Athena’s birth in light of the Sin story which alludes to 
it, we find bound up with Zeus’s appropriation of Metis’s body a violent attempt to 
suspend and overwrite history. Specifically, we find a contrast between the priority 
that Zeus wants to maintain, and the generation that, over historical time, begins to 
erode this priority. Athena—who gestated in Metis’s body even after Metis was 
ingested by Zeus—is born, thereby realizing a portion of the fate that Zeus attempts 
to avoid: she becomes “equal to her father in streng h and in wise understanding.” 
The myth of her birth thus turns out to be an allegory—that is, a speaking that is other 
to its referent—about the futility of the allegorical mode—that is, about the vanity of 
an attempt (especially of Satan’s attempt) to submit the world, and history, to a 
preconceived “truth” that is exceeded by generation and historicity. Though they pose 
as gods, Zeus and Satan do not have the power to con ain history, or generation, 
within themselves. 
 The story of the birth of Athena, instead of revising Satan’s history, simply 
retells it in allegorical form. Satan’s attempt to claim the absolute power which God 
had already relinquished to the vicissitudes of history becomes Zeus’s attempt to 
suspend the history that will produce children who vie with his position of priority. 
Moreover, the myth of Athena displays the failure of the allegorical mode within the 
                                                
42 See chapter 3 for how procreation forwards history. 
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historicity of Christian time. That is, Satan’s authoring of an earthly allegorical 
mode—which posits Zeus and Athena to be embodiments of godly power and 
intelligence—contrasts vastly with the historical, Christian truth out of which it is 
produced. Milton reveals that the myth of Athena repeats the birth of Sin out of 
Satan’s head not only because it is a cephalic birth, but also because the idolatrous 
notion it advances—i.e., the notion that Zeus embodies godly power—represents 
Satan’s repeated attempt to deny and overwrite the historicity that initiates (or is 
initiated by) linguistic difference—that is, the historicity that makes embodiment, the 
fusion of word and thing, impossible. As he did with the birth of Sin, Satan in the 
pagan myth attempts to construct verbal and visual idols, and to demonstrate his own 
priority over language and history, but, as with the birth of Sin, Satan’s allegorical 
mode, his violent projection of his idea of himself into the world, erodes under the 
force of historicity, and of the specific, heavenly history that his allegory attempts to 
overwrite. 
 I began this chapter by noting how Milton’s self-fashioning as a prophetic 
poet displays the difference between his earthly voice and the heavenly history he 
tells—that is, the difference between his language nd his truth. And I explained how, 
according to the narrative Paradise Lost ells, this linguistic difference came into 
being at God’s proclamation of the Son, which at once revealed a semantic fault line 
between God’s will and His speech and subjected heaven’s perfect form to historical 
change. This, I believe, tells us the Christian history which is foundational to Milton’s 
allegorical ethics. Milton takes language to speak a story that is other to the truth it 
tells in part because he takes human beings to live between the moment that God 
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relinquished His omnipotent power (and thus initiated both signification and history) 
and His reclamation of that power at the revelation (where history and signification 
will collapse into the absolute identity of the all in all). In other words, Milton takes 
allegory to be the only linguistic condition appropiate to Christian history. 
 But Milton’s ethics of allegory also has a corrective, hermeneutic edge. For 
wrapped up with Milton’s assertion that allegory is the only apt linguistic condition 
for humans living in a historical world is his critique of the allegorical mode, 
especially as it originates with the first personification, Sin, and, following her birth, 
raises expectations of embodiment, of difference collapsed. These expectations, 
Milton suggests, are a product of Satan’s hubris, his denial of history, and his attempt 
to claim that omnipotence which God has temporarily re inquished. Milton counters 
this Satanic mode by demonstrating how Christian reders can glean truth, as he says 
in Areopagitica, even out of bad texts: Christians can find truth in the history that 
exceeds the allegorical presentation, that erodes the notion of embodiment that the 
allegorical mode (as Satan produces it) puts forth. The ethical response to allegory, 
then, is not only to admit and display the differenc  between your language and the 
truth to which it refers, but also to force verbal idols to contend with the historical 
truth, and with the Christian historicity, which they try to deny and suspend. For this 
forced contention will reveal the fact that only when God decides to close human 
history, to assimilate being and time into the ens, will signification and the linguistic 
difference therein inscribed be collapsed into a unified being, into an embodiment of 
the “I AM.” 
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Chapter 2: Allegory and Allegorization: Writing and  
Reading the Sublime in Paradise Lost 
 
 I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation that when God proclaims His 
Son to be king, He contracts Himself into history and submits Himself to a semantic 
system that cannot capture His sublime, omnipotent, and omnipresent being. I also 
demonstrated that by His proclamation, God introduces semantic strain and historicity 
into heaven’s once-perfect semantic order and a-historical milieu. Satan’s disobedient 
thinking, his mutinous plots, thus emerge as eruptions of antithetical difference out of 
semantic strain and historicity. And the birth of Sin, the projection of an entirely new 
signifier out of Satan’s head and into the heavenly semantic landscape, thus becomes 
a verbal figure of Satan’s disobedient thoughts, and his desire to reclaim powers that 
God has already relinquished.  
This projection exhibits two paradoxical qualities. The first: the birth and 
naming of Sin imply that Sin fuses will, word, and thing, that she erases the linguistic 
difference that God has installed into heavenly signification. The second: because Sin 
appears to be captured by her name, to fuse word and thing, and to negate the 
difference that God has inscribed into heaven, her birth and naming threaten to 
unmoor signification from its sublime origin. That is, with the birth of Sin, the 
signifiers that once mediated a de facto, sublime truth become themselves the basis of 
truth claims, the node around which “truth” circulates. For example, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter 1, Sin is the signifying figure upon whom evaluations of the 
horror or the attractiveness of sin itself depend: when the woman named Sin “with 
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attractive graces” (2.762) wins over the angels, she effects a change in their 
evaluation of sinful rebellion against God. With the birth of Sin, then, meaning 
becomes contingent. For naïve readers especially, Stan’s language becomes 
determinant: words mean what they mean depending on the context in which Satan 
speaks them, depending on the Satanic will that projects those words onto the world. 
The most ostentatious example of this contingency is in hell, in Satan’s 
abominable abuse of rhetoric: 
We may with more successful hope resolve 
To wage by force or guile eternal War 
Irreconcilable to our Grand Foe, 
Who now triumphs, and in th’ excess of joy 
Sole reigning holds the Tyranny of Heav’n. 
(1.120-24) 
When the angels are purged out of heaven and thrown into the “infinite Abyss” of 
hell (2.405), they detach from the sublime order, and their words follow suit. Thus, 
even though God’s speaking, by introducing difference into the semiotic system, 
makes Satan’s rebellious act possible, Satan accuses God of exerting absolute control 
over the angels in a “Tyranny of Heaven.” In addition, though in Christian theology, 
hope and despair are spiritually antithetical, Satan pl ces them in rebellious alliance. 
Because we are “Irreconcilable” to God—that is, because of our despair—Satan says, 
we ought to hope for war. Though Satan does not initially refer to despair by name, as 
he continues speaking (perhaps because of the fallen angels’ rhetorical complacence) 
he eventually names despair and hope as primary and complementary motivators of 
violent rebellion:  “What reinforcement we may gain from Hope, / If not what 
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resolution from despair” (1.190-91). 43 In hell, words mean what Satan wills them to 
mean. Their significance derives from their position within Satan’s rhetorical 
constructions. 
In this chapter, I will argue that Milton imagines Edenic and earthly language 
to occupy a space somewhere between heavenly order an  hellish disorder, to be 
imbued with the kind of semantic difference that the fallen angels overlook, and yet 
also guided by its connection, albeit attenuated, to sublime truth. Thus, Milton 
imagines both prelapsarian and postlapsarian language as medievalists, early 
modernists, and even twentieth-century critics imagine allegory: as a veil that both 
accommodates and potentially covers over or alters the sublime.44 Focusing on Book 
                                                
43 It is just such a signifying and hermeneutic complacency that leads Milton to 
complain, in Eikonoklastes, that the English people “through custom, simplicity, 
or want of better teaching, have not more seriously considered kings than in the 
gaudy name of majesty” (337). 
44 For example, George Puttenham is characteristically non-commital regarding his 
evaluation of allegory: 
And ye shall know that we may dissemble, I mean speak otherwise 
than we think, in earnest as well as in sport; under covert and dark 
terms, and in learned and apparent speeches; in short sentences, and 
by long ambage and circumstance of words; and finally, s well 
when we lie as when we tell the truth. To be short, every speech 
wrested from his own natural signification to another not altogether 
so natural is a kind of dissimulation, because the words bear contrary 
countenance to the intent. But properly, and in his principal virtue, 
 
74 
4 of Paradise Lost, I will explore the tension between language’s careful mediation of 
sublime truth and its imposition of a particular, linguistic logic onto that truth. I will 
investigate the way Book 4 repeats a hermeneutic patern of describing the monistic, 
sublime, material landscape written by God—that is, of writing a (relatively) 
transparent verbal allegory of God’s material allegory—and of subsequently 
interrupting that allegory with an interpretation tha  breaks up the landscape into 
taxonomies that reflect the structural logic of language. Thus, I will consider how 
words imbue the Edenic world of Paradise Lost with a meaning which it might not, 
without language, necessarily contain, and how Milton exposes the tension between 
this verbally-inflected meaning and the meaning of G d’s created world. I will close 
this chapter by examining in detail how such a tension affects the way Eve reads 
                                                                                                                                 
allegoria is when we do speak in sense translative and wrested from 
the own signification, nevertheless applied to another not altogether 
contrary, but having much conveniency with it, as before said of the 
metaphor. As, for example, if we should call the commonwealth  
ship, the prince a pilot, the counselors mariners, the storm wars, and 
calm and haven peace, this is spoken all in allegory. (271) 
 
For a modern claim that allegory obfuscates as much as it reveals, see Angus 
Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode, esp. p. 23. For an elucidating 
analysis of the figure of the allegorical veil, see Annabel Patterson’s parsing of 
Simone Martin’s frontispiece to Petrarch’s manuscript of Virgil, in Pastoral and 




herself in the world: specifically, how the mysterious voice that interrupts Eve’s 
reading of her mirror image convinces Eve to relinqu sh her identification with the 
idyllic landscape in favor of an experience of the world as adjudicated by Adam’s 
words. 
Seventeenth-century theologians imagined God to write into the material of 
the natural world an allegory of himself, a Book of Nature. John Calvin, for example, 
insisted that God wrote himself into the material text of the world so that even the 
illiterate might see and know him: 
Moreouer because the furthest ende of blessed life standeth in the 
knowledge of God: that the way to felicite should be stopped to none, 
therefore God hath not onely planted in the mindes of men that sede 
of religion which we haue spoken of, but also hath so disclosed him 
selfe in the whole workmanship of ye world, and daily so manifestly 
presenteth himselfe, that men cannot open their eies but they must 
nedes beholde him. His substance in dede is incomprehensible, so 
that his diuine maiestie farre surmounteth all mens senses: but he 
hath in al his workes grauen certain marks of his glory, and those so 
plaine and notably discernable, that the excuse of ign rance is taken 
away from men, be they neuer so grosse and dull witted.45 
 
                                                
45 John Calvin, The Institution of Christian Religion, trans. Thomas Norton (London: 
Reinolde Wolfe and Richarde Harrison, 1561), Book 1, Chap. 5:That the knowledge 
of God doeth shiningly appeare in the makyng of the world and in the continual 




Milton, following this tradition, presents nature as  material text “written” for Adam 
and Eve’s delight and edification, an allegory of his love. Thus, after Raphael 
explains to Adam nature’s material connection to God—that creation is all made of 
“one first matter” (V.472)—and that the gift of right reason makes the contemplation 
of nature possible, Adam gratefully replies:46  
 
O favorable Spirit, propitious guest, 
Well hast thou taught the way that might direct 
Our knowledge, and the scale of Nature set 
From centre to circumference, whereon 
In contemplation of created things 
By steps we may ascend to God. 
(5.508-13) 
 
Aided by the gift of right reason, which protects them from the ungrounded vortex of 
fallen signification, Adam and Eve are given a materi l text that is imbued with “first 
matter” and God’s love. Their “contemplation” of the natural order, the material 
allegory God has given them, will deliver them to the heavens.47 
Notably, when Adam reads this world, he names it: 
                                                
46 Raphael is explaining how he, an incorporeal angel, benefits from corporeal food, 
by digesting it into something insubstantial and spiritual. 
47 My analysis of Adam’s speech will elucidate why Adam recognizes nature as a 
sublime text only after Raphael explains it to him: that is, why Adam requires a 
verbal hermeneutic lesson. 
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As thus he spake, each Bird and Beast beheld 
With blandishment, each Bird stoop’d on his wing. 
I nam’d them, as they pass’d, and understood 
Thir Nature, with such knowledge God endu’d  
My sudden apprehension. 
      (8.349-53) 
When Adam sees the animals, he names them and understands them. What grants him 
this ability is right reason, a sublime gift that, s Calvin describes it, is “a certaine 
vnderstanding of his diuine maiestie.”48 But Milton does not loosely define reason. 
Rather, Milton defines reason as that gift which gives us interpretive options. As he 
asserts famously in Areopagitica, “reason is but choosing.” 49 Or, as Lee Jacobus 
points out, reason can be found in “the active joining or disjoining what is 
perceived”:50 
…But know that in the Soul 
Are many lesser Faculties that serve 
Reason as chief; among these Fancy next 
Her office holds; of all external things, 
Which the five watchful Senses represent, 
                                                
48 Calvin, The Institutions, Book 1, chap. 3: That the knowledge of God is naturally 
planted in the myndes of men. 
49 John Milton, “Areopagitica,” in Complete Prose Works of John Milton, Vol II., ed. 
Ernest Sirluck, general editor Don M. Wolfe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1959), p. 527. 
50 Lee A. Jacobus, Sudden Apprehension: Aspects of Knowledge in Paradise Lost 
(Paris: Mouton, 1976), p. 46. 
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She forms Imaginations, Aery shapes, 
Which Reason joining or disjoining, frames 
All that we affirm or what deny, and call 
Our knowledge or opinion. 
(5.100-108)  
I find Jacobus’s analysis of this passage helpful, b t disagree with his insistence that 
Adam’s naming of the animals represents an “intuitive” response distinct from this 
act of joining or disjoining (46). For, as John Leonard’s reading tells us, God 
“endow[s] Adam and Eve with the reason to form an accurate language for 
themselves.”51 In fact, given the “word-order” of this passage, in which apprehension 
follows naming, Leonard concludes that “the name is a means whereby Adam 
apprehends the nature; it is not an inevitable consequence of the nature. ‘Sudden 
apprehension’ suggests something other than the passive receiving of an idea: it 
implies an act of ‘grasping with the intellect; the forming of an idea’ (OED 
‘apprehension’ 7)” (12). 
 Thus, Adam’s naming of the animals constitutes an interpretation of nature 
which then mediates his understanding. The nature and implications of this verbal 
interpretation for the exercise of right reason I can lay out in perhaps a trite example. 
Adam names each animal in a particular way, attaching certain appellations to certain 
animals.52 “Tiger” (as opposed to, for example “cockroach”) is made to refer to the 
                                                
51 John Leonard, Naming in Paradise, p. 13. 
52 See also page 6 of Naming in Paradise, where Leonard insists that in the 
seventeenth century, “arbitrary”—as in “arbitrary language”—qualified not 
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animal we now call tiger. This choice to name the anim l “tiger” writes over and 
discounts a variety of hermeneutic possibilities: for example, the possibility of 
emphasizing the cockroachiness of a tiger. That is, by placing a particular four-legged 
furry animal under the nomenclature, tiger, Adam’s naming of the animals 
distinguishes and separates this furry animal from a six-legged insect and, by 
extension, emphasizes the difference between the animal and the bug, even as both 
are created out of “first matter all.” Thus, languae, which is a verbal accommodation 
of God’s material text, is also an allegorization—an interpretation of that text, a 
choice to read matter in a particular way.53 This chapter will demonstrate that as an 
                                                                                                                                 
random events or actions, but rather those that were “dependent on the discretion 
of an arbiter.” Also informing my reading is Victoria Kahn’s argument that 
language requires choice: “signs..are not simply a consequence of the fall but the 
precondition of any genuine ethical choice” (150). I agree with her entirely on this 
point, but also want to suggest that making choices first results in (or begets) the 
signs that then become opportunities for more ethical choices. See Victoria Kahn, 
“Allegory, the Sublime, and the Rhetoric of Things Indifferent in Paradise Lost,” 
in Creative Imitation: New Essays on Renaissance Literature in Honor of Thomas 
M. Greene, ed. David Quint, Margaret Ferguson, et al. (Binghamton, NY: 
Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1992), pp. 127-52 
53 I use this term, allegorization, to signal the continuous line that we can draw 
between God, who writes an allegory of Himself in the material text of the world, 
and Adam, who interprets that world and, in so doing, produces a new text that is 
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allegorization of a prelapsarian world created out of God’s material, such a 
categorizing language distances Adam and Eve from the sublime. 
The trouble with language is that it takes on a semantic and interpretive force 
of its own. Once it is spoken and released into the world, language forms its own 
logic and accumulates meanings that are at odds with their original. Milton teasingly 
lays out this accumulation of meanings in postlapsarian retrospect: 
 
  Southward through Eden went a River large, 
  Nor chang’d his course, but through the shaggy hill 
  Pass’d underneath ingulft, for God had thrown 
  That Mountain as his Garden mould high rais’d 
  Upon the rapid current, which through veins 
  Of porous Earth with kindly thirst up-drawn, 
  Rose a fresh Fountain, and with many a rill 
  Water’d the Garden; thence united fell 
  Down the steep glade, and met the nether Flood, 
  Which from his darksome passage now appears, 
  And now divided into four main Streams, 
  Runs diverse, wand’ring many a famous Realm  
  And Country whereof here needs no account, 
  But rather to tell how, if Art could tell, 
  How from that Sapphire Fount the crisped Brooks, 
  Rolling on Orient Pearl and sands of Gold, 
  With mazy error under pendant shades 
  Ran Nectar, visiting each plant, and fed  
                                                                                                                                 
allegorical different from God’s and that, as I will show, gets allegorized (i.e., 
interpreted) by subsequent readers. 
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  Flow’rs worthy of Paradise which not nice Art 
  In Beds and curious Knot, but Nature boon 
  Pour’d forth prouse on Hill and Dale and Plain, 
  Both where the morning Sun first warmly smote 
  The open field, and where the unpierc’t shade 
  Imbrown’d the noontide Bow’rs. 
         (4.222-45) 
 
In the beginning of this passage, the poet describes a “River large” that passes 
through the topography of Paradise and, rising out of the earth as “a fresh Fountain,” 
waters the Edenic “Garden” until it is, again, “united” into the form of a moving 
stream. As this stream joins the “nether Flood,” it is broken up into wandering 
streams which irrigate the kingdom into which postlapsarian history has divided the 
earth. The original, Edenic body of water is no longer whole, and no longer in service 
of Eden or its Garden. This depiction of an Edenic wholeness broken up as it passes 
through a “nether Flood” figures in topographical terms the disconnect from the 
absolute sublime that is suffered after the fall. The topographical break leads the poet 
to reflect on his anxieties about his own poetic project in terms that refer to his 
historical, rhetorical, and conceptual distance from Eden, and from its perfect 
topography. By what “art” can the poet describe Edenic flowers that are fed by “the 
crisped Brooks,” if such mortal, “nice Art” willfully malforms the natural landscape 
into “Beds and curious Knots?” How to speak of Eden’s singular water if it has been 
broken up into unrecognizable streams, and if the language in which you speak is tied 
up with that historical and ontological break? 
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This passage, so deeply concerned with the disconnet between postlapsarian 
and prelapsarian language, also includes one of the most famous puns in Paradise 
Lost, in which the poet refers to the wandering of the “crisped Brooks” with that 
loaded term, “error.” This pun has become the crux of a number of different 
investigations of Paradise Lost’s language, including its approach to allegory. For 
example, in The Language of Allegory, Maureen Quilligan asserts that “error” in 
Paradise means only wandering, ot erring, and that “By suppressing the multiple 
meaning of words, Milton makes his language participate in a pristine purity and 
precision much like that desired by scientists of the Royal Society.”54 Given her 
insistence that allegory is based in polysemy, this reading supports her argument that 
Paradise Lost “is only the most obvious testimony to the increasing unviability of 
allegory as a genre in the seventeenth century” (179). Yet, she is forced to conclude 
with a concession, introduced by a conditional clause: “if he did not choose to write 
allegory, he wrote a poem which, with a theological neatness, most economically 
explains the necessity of allegory’s existence” (182).55 
I am troubled by Quilligan’s notion of “suppression” and her cautious 
concession that Milton was writing about allegory, rather than writing an allegory. If 
                                                
54 Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory, p. 180.  
55 Quilligan cites Christopher Ricks’s equally ambiguous assertion that “Error here is 
not exactly a pun, since it means only ‘wandering’—but ‘only’ is a different thing 
from an absolutely simple use of the word, since the evil meaning is consciously 
and ominously excluded.” See Christopher Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style, p. 110. 
 
83 
Milton somehow “suppressed” the polysemy of the word “error,” then readers would 
not notice its polysemy. On the contrary, Milton exposes the fact that he is writing in 
an allegorical language that cannot capture the innoce ce, the unfallenness, of a 
natural language not infected with polysemy. In fact, Milton’s use of this word, 
“error,” recalls its appearance in earlier books of Paradise Lost. In his depiction of 
Sin in Book II, he alludes overtly to Spenser’s Error in the Faeirie Queene. In Book I, 
the poet insists that the Greeks gave an erroneous account of the history of Mulciber, 
who was not thunderstruck by Jove, but who “Fell long before” when he was tossed 
out of heaven: “thus they relate, / Erring; for he with this rebellious rout / Fell long 
before” (1.746-48). When Milton uses “err” to refer to a stream that wanders through 
the Edenic landscape, he does not “suppress” its poly emy, but rather confronts his 
readers with its accumulation of referents and connotations, an accumulating process 
which he displays by his own multiple uses of the word. For a stream to err is a 
metaphor for the contours of its movement through the natural landscape, but when 
Milton burdens this metaphor with the meaning that e word “err” has accumulated, 
he separates his readers from a more immediate, or a more transparently mediated, 
experience of Paradise, and exposes the allegorical nature, the allos, of his language. 
Milton’s erring stream contrasts the material text of he book of nature with 
the verbal medium through which he presents it: erring takes on multiple meanings 
only for the fallen, and only through the medium of a language burdened by the 
disasters of postlapsarian history. The juxtapositin of the innocent material and the 
allegorical language becomes even clearer if we compare the stream to that 




…close the Serpent sly 
Insinuating, wove with Gordian twine 
His braided train, and of his fatal guile 
Gave proof unheeded; 
 (4.347-50) 
 
In this word, “insinuating,” we find something akin to the “verbal ambidextrousness” 
(26) that Quilligan sees in the polysemy that is so prevalent in allegory: the serpent’s 
“insinuating” form gives “proof” of its essentially nefarious character, and predicts 
the role of it, and of its insinuating language, in the fall of humankind. God has 
written the serpent’s nefariousness into its materil form.56 In contrast, no such 
concordance of form and historical role is to be found in Milton’s reference to the 
erring stream: the stream that wanders through the landscape never actually makes a 
mistake. This distinction reveals not that allegory is impossible in the seventeenth 
                                                
56 Milton is responding to Genesis 3:1, which asserts, “Now the serpent was more 
subtil than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made;” and to Genesis 
3:14, in which God inveighs, "Because you have done this, Cursed are you above 
all the livestock and all the wild animals! You will crawl on your belly and you 
will eat dust all the days of your life.” In the King James Bible, and in Paradise 
Lost, the role of the serpent in the fall is oddly predetermined by its form, and the 




century; rather, is insists that language as a mediator of sublime truth, or of truths 
from which we have been separated by postlapsarian history, is burdened with that 
history. Milton’s language, then, is allegorical, both because it takes on multiple 
meanings (as Quilligan takes allegorical language to do) and because it points to an 
other, unrepresentable truth. 
In fact, it is the difference between Milton’s language and the sublime truth he 
aims to tell that effects the Miltonic sublime. Edmund Burke was infamously 
impressed with the Miltonic sublime, which, he avowed, was an effect of “judicious 
obscurity”: “No person seems [better] to have understood the secret of heightening, or 
of setting terrible things, if I may use the expression in their strongest light by the 
force of a judicious obscurity, than Milton.”57 Burke continues by distinguishing 
architecturally exact description from evocative poetry: 
 
It is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting to the 
imagination. If I make a drawing of a palace or a temple, or a landscape, I present 
a very clear idea of those objects; but then (allowing for the effect of imitation 
which is something) my picture can at most affect only as the palace, temple, or 
landscape would have affected in the reality. On the ot er hand, the most lively 
and spirited verbal description I can give, raises a very obscure and imperfect idea 
                                                
57 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful (London, 1757; Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healey, 1999), 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&xri:pqil: 




of such objects; but then it is in my power to raise a stronger emotion by the 
description than I could do by the best painting.58 
 
Following Burke’s line of thinking, we can align the distinction he makes between 
logical description and poetic affect with the distinc ion between the logic of 
language—the categorizing, the taxonomizing force of names and words—and 
Milton’s evocation of something beyond that logic, something that neither Burke nor 
I can accurately name precisely because it surpasses words. With this in mind, we can 
consider in more formal detail one of the ways thatMil on achieves the affect of the 
sublime. For example, Satan’s experience of Zephon, who chastises him for entering 
Paradise: 
 
  …abasht the Devil stood, 
  And felt how awful goodness is, and saw 
  Virtue in her shape how lovely, saw, and pin’d 
  His loss; but chiefly to find here observ’d 
  His luster visibly impair’d; 
         (4.845-9) 
 
The “goodness” which infuses, and has always infused, the heavenly world Satan 
once inhabited, now strikes him with reverence and fear. The poem explains that part 
of this fearful reverence is wrapped up with Satan’s sudden self-exposure: the beauty 
                                                




of goodness and virtue exposes to Satan his own aesthetic degradation. In addition, 
“awful goodness” demonstrates the aesthetic response that is characteristic of Satan’s 
fallen state: the awful feeling that emerges when the fallen comes in contact with a 
sublime goodness that overwhelms his hermeneutic capabilities.  
Satan’s experience of the sublime effect results, then, from his distance from 
the theological sublime. Moreover, “awful goodness” exposes both the limitations 
and the potential power of fallen language, for by “awful goodness” Milton 
grammatically forces two signifiers of seemingly discordant qualities to refer to the 
same quality of sublimity. Thus, he suggests that te origin of the sublime effect 
surpasses the verbal logic that would, in most cases, separate the fearful from the 
beautiful and the good.  
Of course, for such discordance to evoke a feeling, a  imagination, of a 
sublime that surpasses the sum of its discordant verbal parts requires on the part of 
the reader a level of poetic indulgence. That is, the Miltonic sublime as Burke and I 
describe it requires that the reader ignore the logic f the language, the either/or that 
is marked by the discordant fusion of terms. To experience the sublime effect, then, 
the reader must rely not on what his terms mean individually, or how they compare 
with one another, but rather allow them to evoke something beyond the scope of 
language, to imagine, against the logic of language, “The dark unbottom’d infinite 
Abyss / And…the palpable obscure” (2.405-6). To read these terms comparatively, to 
consider their taxonomic relationship, is to read too literally. It is to limit our reading 
 
88 
to the logic of the verbal medium itself. It is, as Milton argues in Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce, to indulge in an “obstinate literality” that obscures the divine.59 
In short, Milton shows that the sublime is beyond his words. So too, is the 
Edenic landscape: 
 
  …Thus was this place, 
  A happy rural seat of various view: 
  Groves whose rich Trees wept odorous Gums and Balm, 
  Others whose fruit burnisht with Golden Rind 
  Hung amiable, Hesperian Fables true, 
  If true, here only, and of delicious taste: 
  Betwixt them Lawns, or level Downs, and Flocks 
  Brazing the gender herb, were interpos’d, 
  Or palmy hillock, or the flow’re lap 
  Of some irriguous Valley spread her store, 
  Flow’rs of all hue, and without Thorn the Rose: 
  Another side, umbrageous Grots and Caves 
  Of cool recess, o’er which the mantling Vine 
  Lays forth her purple Grape, and gently creeps 
  Luxuriant; meanwhile murmuring waters fall 
                                                
59 John Milton, “Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce,” in Compete Prose Works of 
John Milton, Vol. II, Chap. XIV, p. 279. For an analysis that connects Milton’s 
political tracts and his poetry, see Marshall Grossman, “The Dissemination of the 
King,” in which he considers “the ambiguities, contradictions, and 
agrammaticalities of evil conceived of as negations” i  Paradise Lost, and their 
iconoclastic force in political discourse and narrative (278-81). 
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  Down the slope hills, disperst, or in a Lake, 
  That to the fringed Bank with Myrtle crown’d, 
  Her crystal mirror holds, unite thir streams. 
  The Birds thir choir apply; airs, vernal airs, 
  Breathing the smell of field and grove, attune 
  The trembling leaves, while Universal Pan 
  Knit with the Graces and the Hours in dance 
  Led on th’ Eternal Spring.  
         (4.246-69) 
 
Fluidity and interposition dominate this topography, making verbal distinctions both 
unnecessary and impossible. Thus, this ambitious description of Paradise, spoken 
apparently from Adam’s “happy rural seat of various view,” is overwhelmed by a 
lack of specificity and distinction. Insistently ambiguous adjectives undercut 
topographic specificity: “the flow’re lap” belongs only to “some irriguous Valley,” 
while the “Grots and Caves” are placed not in any specific direction, but only on 
“Another side” of the “Groves [of] rich Trees.” Further, the poet is unable to 
determine which category of landscape he witnesses a  he surveys Paradise: “Lawns, 
or level Downs,” “Or palmy hillock, or the flow’re lap / Of some irriguous Valley.” 
Paradise eludes mapping, its slopes and valleys elude categorical distinction, so that 
the poet is forced to concede, to offer categorizing options that are each singularly 
inadequate to the task of accommodating the material of Paradise. 
The indecipherable overlapping and crossing of topographic categories 
reflects the interposing and indecipherable pattern of the Edenic landscape. In fact, as 
the “mantling vines..gently creeps / Luxuriant” over the “Grots and Caves,” they 
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recall the conglomeration of vines that together make up the impassible (though, 
given Satan’s leap, not insurmountable) shrubbery that guards Paradise: 
 
  So thick entwin’d, 
  As one continu’d brake, the undergrowth 
  Of shrubs and tangling bushes had perplext 
  All path of Man or Beast that pass’d that way: 
         (4.174-7) 
 
Like this wall of “tangling bushes,” Eden exists as an absolute cooperation of the 
things of nature, a collaboration that perplexes and overwhelms the possibility of 
distinguishing each element, of each plant standing apart on its own. 
In addition to this pervasive material cooperation, there is in Eden both an 
absolute temporal stasis—a universal always-happening—and an aural cooperation 
that knits singular sounds into an idyllic textual whole. The songs of birds and the 
trembling leaves are attuned, while Pan, the Graces, and the Hours practice a 
simultaneous choreographic knitting, a celebratory always-dance that weaves time 
and motion together and announces a spring that, as e ernal, is always there. 
Meanwhile, the poet has knit pagan mythology, and pagan figures of universality 
(Pan), weaving (Graces), and time and fecund spring (Hours) into his Christian vision 
of an idyllic landscape. By this weaving of pagan figures into his Christian landscape, 
the poet allegorizes the absolute present of Paradise. If the poet in some moments 
suggests that his language is too burdened with hisory to capture the sublime, he also 
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implies that the absolute sublime knits postlapsarian history, even pagan myth, into its 
absolute temporal, material, and aural fabric. 
But as the poet begins to incorporate pagan myth into his presentation of 
Paradise, he ends up also confronting the history that cannot be incorporated into the 
sublime, prelapsarian past. The poet interrupts his description with a series of 
disclaimers: 
 
  …Not that fair field 
  Of Enna, where Proserpin gath’ring flow’rs 
  Herself a fairer Flow’r by gloomy Dis 
  Was gather’d, which cost Ceres all that pain 
  To seek her through the world; nor that sweet Grove 
  Of Daphne by Orontes, and th’ inspir’d 
  Castalian Spring might with this Paradise 
  Of Eden strive; 
        (4.267-74) 
 
By establishing Eden’s difference from other idyllic andscape and, by extension, its 
difference from the pagan traditions it previously incorporated, these disclaimers 
undercut the irrevocable indistinction—the differenc -erasing absoluteness—that 
infuses the poet’s description of the Edenic landscape. What is interesting here, 
though, is that the poet offers no material evidence for this distinction. He asserts, 
rather, the evaluative authority of his words: “Not” and “nor,” and the conditional 
“might with this Paradise / Of Eden strive” indicate a comparative evaluation that is 
carried by language, not by matter or aural texture, and that limits and directs our 
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reading of the Edenic landscape. Not coincidentally, the joining of meaning and 
words that occurs in this disclaimer also posits a hierarchical, comparative distinction 
that overrides the topos of similarity and incorporation that made up the initial 
depiction of Eden and that placed the Garden sublimely beyond the reach of the 
taxonomizing force of language. The poet’s allegorical accommodation of the 
prelapsarian landscape becomes a postlapsarian allegorization, an interpretation that 
overwrites and subdues God’s original, material text. 
Though in his description of the landscape, the poet sets verbal allegory apart 
from allegorization, in his description of the first parents, he seems more ably to 
combine the two: 
 
  Two of far nobler shape erect and tall, 
  Godlike erect with native honor clad 
  In naked majesty, seemed lords of all. 
  And worthy seemed for in their looks divine 
  The image of their glorious Maker shone: 
  Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure, 
  Severe, but in true filial freedom placed, 
  Whence true authority in men.  
         (4.288-95) 
 
The combination of physical description—“of far nobler shape erect and tall”—and 
interpretative evaluation—“seemed lords of all”—suggests that the poet in this 
instance sews up the seam between allegory and allegorization. Combining 
description with interpretation, he balances the topos of similarity with the topos of 
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distinction: the insistence that Adam and Eve are both “Godlike erect” with the 
implication that they are, thereby, different from the rest of the animals. Yet, despite 
this apparent balance, the poet is quick to clarify what might have been so far a 
misleading implication:  
 
  …Though both 
  Not equal as their sex not equal seemed: 
  For contemplation he and valor formed, 
  For softness she and sweet attractive grace: 
  He for God only, she for God in him.  
        (4.295-9) 
 
Concerned that the reader might have taken Adam and Eve’s similarities to be signs 
of their equal states, the poet sets out to establih a hierarchy between them. Notably, 
the poet offers no clear material description of Adam and Eve in support of this 
hierarchy. Rather, he offers a subjective response—“not equal seemed”—which he 
presents as the material basis for his conclusion that they are “Not equal.” Further, the 
poet relies on suppositions (apt or not) about Adam and Eve’s respective final causes 
to cement his claim that Adam and Eve are unequal, and to qualify the implications of 
their described formal likeness.60  
                                                
60 The passage I cite here is presented as a description of what Satan sees when he 
spies on Adam and Eve, so the particular subject, the agent to whom this 
evaluation can be attributed, is not clear. However, it is clear that this response is 
subjective, that it effects a hermeneutic shift, and that it is spoken in a fallen 
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 When the poet interrupts his own description of Adam and Eve, he repeats the 
shift that he made in his description of the landscape: from a descriptive allegory of 
an idyllic state of interposition and difference-erasing cooperation, to an evaluative 
allegorization that places the elements of creation into distinct, hierarchized positions 
and categories. The repetition of this hermeneutic sh ft is important because of the 
repercussions it has for Eve. Upon awakening, Eve reads the landscape according to 
the terms displayed by the poet’s descriptive allegory: she sees in Eden an 
overwhelming similarity, an incorporating material into which she might fit. But the 
verbal allegorizations asserted by the mysterious voice and by Adam interrupt that 
reading, and induct Eve into a verbally mediated experience of Paradise. This 
verbally mediated experience sets her apart from the landscape, sets Adam and Eve 
apart from one another in hierarchical relations, ad sees meaning in a structural logic 
that is at odds with the sublime cooperation of the idyllic landscape. 
Upon her initial awakening into Paradise, Eve ponders h r origin and being: 
“much wond’ring where / And what I was, whence thither brought, and how” (4.451-
52). Eve’s “whence thither brought” demonstrates her intuitive sense that a force 
beyond her “brought” her here by mysterious means, while “what” indicates Eve’s 
unique sense of selfhood. Displaying Eve’s unique sense of self, this “what” contrasts 
directly with the terms of Adam’s initial self-questioning: 
 
                                                                                                                                 
language—that is, a language that follows either Satan’s fall from heaven or 
humans’ fall out of Paradise. 
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 But who I was, or where, or from what cause, 
 Knew not; to speak I tri’d, and forthwith spake, 
 My Tongue obey’d and readily could name 
 What’er I saw. 
    (8.270-73) 
Adam conceives of himself as a subject who aptly names the objects—the 
“Whate’r”—he sees around him, and he thinks of himself as the potential referent of a 
uniquely identifying proper noun, an answer to the int rrogative pronoun, “who.” In 
contrast, Eve refers to herself by the pronoun “what,” indicating that she conceives of 
herself not as the unique referent of a proper name, but rather as the referent of a 
common noun.  
If we back up to the awakening experience that preced s Eve’s question, we 
see how such a self-conception emerged: 
That day I oft remember, when from sleep 
I first awak’t, and found myself repos’d 
Under a shade on flow’rs, much wond’ring where 
And what I was, whence thither brought, and how. 
 (4.449-52) 
 
Eve begins life burdened with a self-splitting self-consciousness. Her discovery of her 
reposing “self” places her in a subject/object dialectic in which an awakened “I” 
(subject) finds a physical reposing “self” (object). But, combined by the grammatical 
ambiguity of the third line in this passage—“much wond’ring where / And what I 
was”—the “I” and “self” quickly unite into a whole, a thinking and a physical “I” that 
is the united subject of the verb phrase “[was] wond’ri g.” That is, we might read the 
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grammatical subject who does this wondering to be either the “I” who awakes to find 
her “self repos’d,” or the reposed “self” discovered by that “I.” But to respond to this 
ambiguity with such an either/or proposition incongruously splits the thinking and the 
physical Eve, which are, in the experience of wonderment, united. This unison is 
indicated by the way Eve describes the actions that succeed her wondering: 
Not distant far from thence a murmuring sound 
Of waters issu’d from a Cave and spread 
Into a liquid Plain, then stood unmov’d 
Pure as th’ expanse of Heav’n; I thither went 
With unexperienc’t thought, and laid me down 
On the green bank, to look into the clear 
Smooth Lake, that to me seem’d another Sky. 
(4.453-59) 
Instead of observing her reposed body, Eve now refers to the movement of that body 
as the movement of “I”: the subject Eve, who once awakened to find its reposed 
body, is now incorporated into that body. Thus, the subject/object dialectic with 
which Eve begins resolves into an Eve incorporated into the material body she 
initially finds, a corporeal Eve who, as a result, does not conceive of herself as set 
apart from the world into which she awakes. Eve is an integrated “what”—an 
embodied, placed thing—rather than a conscious self, a singular subject, abstractly 
pondering “who” she is, or authoritatively naming the whatever’s around her. 
This self-incorporating self-conception explains the even-handed way Eve 
turns from considerations of herself to explorations f the landscape. Eve is not 
compelled to continue asking questions about her origins. Instead, she responds to the 
sound of the moving water and the expanse of the liquid plain, and she turns (abruptly 
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from our perspective) from questions of origins—“whence thither”—to an active 
exploration of the landscape—“I thither went.” The repetition of “thither” in different 
contexts—the first referring to an abstract question about origin, the second to an 
active, physical exploration of the world—marks theeasy transfer of Eve’s attention, 
from wonderment to engagement, from the abstract to the physical, from origin to 
location. Eve’s first moments, then, do not display the kind of self-involvement of 
which she is often accused, but rather an apt sense that she has been placed, and a 
feeling that she ought to explore the matter with which she has been united, into 
which she has been incorporated. 
It is in this context that Eve views her image in the lake: 
As I bent down to look, just opposite, 
A Shape within the wat’ry gleam appear’d 
Bending to look on me, I started back, 
It started back, but pleas’d I soon return’d, 
Pleas’d it return’d as soon with answering looks 
Of sympathy and love; 
(4.460-65) 
James Earl has read Eve as stuck in a primary narcissism that she must overcome in 
order to achieve adulthood, and that she can overcome only by having a baby.61 Since 
its publication in 1985, critics have challenged Earl’s account, directly and indirectly, 
on textual, psychoanalytic, and phenomenological terms.62 
                                                
61 James W. Earl, “Eve’s Narcissism,” Milton Quarterly 19 (1985): 13-16. 
62 For example, Marshall Grossman offers an alternative explanation for Eve’s 
putative projection of herself onto the world around her. Because Adam and God do 
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For my part, I believe that Earl’s account not only does not attend to the self-
conception that emerges out of Eve’s first moments. It also neglects the specific 
textual analysis that Milton’s allusion invites, and the specific, Edenic context in 
which this vision of the mirror image occurs. For if we consider the Narcissus myth 
as presented in Arthur Golding’s 1567 translation of the Metamorphoses, we find 
clear distinctions between Narcissus’s experience of his image and Eve’s response to 
hers. Narcissus encounters his image in the water and falls in passionate love, and 
tries repeatedly to embrace his image:  
O Lord how often did he kisse that false deceitfull thing?  
How often did he thrust his armes midway into the spring?  
To haue embraste the necke he saw and could not catch himselfe?  
He knowes not what it was he sawe. And yet the foolish elfe  
                                                                                                                                 
not have mothers, they see themselves in “an other w om they recognize as different 
from themselves.” Eve (and Jesus Christ for that mat er) do have mothers, so they 
“know themselves as combining parts of two” (154). See Marshall Grossman, 
“Servile/Sterile/Style: Milton and the Question of Woman,” in Milton and the Idea of 
Woman, ed. Julia Walker (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988): 148-68. In 
“Resisting Representation: All About Milton’s ‘Eve,’” Karen L. Edwards argues that 
it is Adam whom we might accuse of narcissism. She also helpfully reviews the 
critical debate about Eve’s putative narcissism. See Karen L. Edwards, “Resisting 
Representation: All About Milton’s “Eve,” Exemplaria: A Journal of Theory in 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies 9, no. 1 (1997): 231-53.  
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Doth burne in ardent loue thereof.63 
 
At first, Narcissus is not aware that he has fallen in love with himself and, in 
retribution for the pain he has caused his forsaken lovers, suffers the pangs of unmet 
                                                
63 Ovid, The. xv. bookes of P. Ouidius Naso, entytuled Metamorphosis, translated 
oute of Latin into English meeter, by Arthur Golding Gentleman, a worke very 
pleasaunt and delectable, trans. Arthur Golding (London: Willyam Seres, 1567). 
Early English Books Online, 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99845834. Golding obviously 
takes poetic license in his translation from latin to English verse. Here he replaces 
the trope of the erring eyes for a metaphor of ardent, burning love. The 
corresponding Latin text reads: 
inrita fallaci quotiens dedit oscula fonti! 
In mediis quotiens uisum captantia collum 
Brachia mersit aquis nec se deprendit in illis! 
Quid uideat nescit, sed quod uidet uritur illo 
Atque oculos idem quie decipit incitat error.  
(3.426-30) 
Though the metaphor of burning love does not appear in this passage in the original 
Latin, Golding does take it directly from Ovid’s tex , as can be seen in the 
passages that follow.  
This and all subsequent Latin quotations are from the R. J. Tarrant edition, 
Metamorphoses (New York: Oxford University press, 2004).  
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desire.  After complaining at length of his torments, Narcissus discovers, “It is my 
selfe I well perceyue, it is mine Image sure, / That in this sort deluding me, this furie 
doth procure.”64 Though part of Narcissus’s torment lies in his unrequited love and 
desire, a great part is caused by the impossibility of self-love within the context of the 
subject/object dialectic. Narcissus, so long an object of desire, remains both that 
object and also the subject who suffers from desire: “I am enamored of my selfe, I 
doe both set on fire, / And am the same that swelteth too, through impotent desire.” 
When he takes on the roles of both the desiring subject and the desired object, he self-
consumes with a burning desire that, like a fire eternally supplied by its own fuel, 
constantly re-ignites. Thus, uncharacteristic of romantic lovers, Narcissus does not 
ask to be united with his beloved. Rather, he wishes (so he says) he could separate his 
desiring self from his desired self: “O would to God I for a while might from my 
bodie part. / This wish is straunge to heare a Louer wrapped all in smart, / To wish 
away the thing the which he loueth as his heart.” But Narcissus is by now enraptured 
and trapped by his own self-love, so he returns to the water, and melts into the image 
in which he sees himself: “Euen so by piecemale being spent and wasted through 
desire, / Did he consume and melt away with Cupids secret fire.”65 This image of 
Narcissus, who painfully fuses the desiring I and the desired object, and who dies and 
melts from the heat of that fusion, is fundamentally distinct from Eve, who sees in her 
                                                
64 “iste ego sum! sensi, nec me mea fallit imago. / uror amore mei, flammas 
moueoque feroque” (3.463-64). 
65 “…sic attenuatus amore / liquitur et tecto paulatim carpitur igni.” (3.489-90) 
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mirror image the mutual pleasure of “sympathy and love.” The Metamorphoses takes 
Narcissus’s attraction to his image in the lake to be motivated by passionate desire, 
but Eve’s attraction might be better described as akind of exploratory intrigue, an 
interest in the possibility of symbiosis. 
Eve’s sense of this possibility develops out of her unique hermeneutic of the 
landscape, her proclivity for seeing sameness and unity in accidental similarities. Eve 
explains that when she looked “into the clear / Smooth Lake,” it “to me seem’d 
another Sky.” Of course, there is no other sky, for the sky is a singular thing not to be 
repeated on earth, just as Eve is a singular thing not to be repeated in the water. The 
difference between Eve’s and the reader’s responses to the lake opens up the 
possibility that Eve—so unaware of difference—might conceive of sameness in 
radical terms. For if Eve takes creation to include the possibility of two, mutually 
identifiable skies, it is also possible, indeed probable, that Eve sees in this other sky a 
potential sameness: according to Eve, these two skies not only mutually identify, but 
also are, in fact, iterations of the same sky, different only in place but in essence the 
same. Such a reading would not only realize Eve’s proclivity for reading similarity 
and ignoring difference. It also follows Eve’s first experience of her self. Eve initially 
finds a reposed body which she identifies as her “slf,” a material body whose 
selfhood and experience of the landscape correspond with the intellectual and 
ontological perspective of the “I.” This corresponde ce leads the “I” and the reposed 
body to the fusion that I have already described, to a mutual identification that 
collapses difference into the same beingness. This experience makes it possible for 
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Eve to see the lake as the sky’s “self,” a material being whose seeming sky suggests 
that the lake and the sky might turn out to be the same thing. 
These complementary readings of the united I/self and sky/lake helpfully 
inform our reading of Eve’s response to her image in the lake. When Eve recounts 
that the shape bends and returns to look at her, that it answers (rather than mirrors) 
her looks of sympathy and love, she does not outline he relationship between an 
agent and its mirror. She describes a symbiosis, a correspondence of movement and 
feeling that, for her, suggests the possibility of mutual identification and, further, 
unity. Thus, Eve’s “vain desire” is that “sympathy and love” might join the 
perceiving “I’ with the perceived image, and that, by this joining, she might discover 
herself written (again) into the landscape she explores. 
Criticism has demonstrated an unrelenting dismissal of Eve’s unique response 
to the landscape and to her image in the water, and further, a surprising inattention to 
the aptness of what she sees. For what Eve sees in the lake is a similarity that 
overwhelms difference, and that corroborates Raphael’s ssertion that creation is 
made up of all the same, sublime stuff: 
O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom 
All things proceed, and up to him return, 
If not deprav’d from good, created all 
Such to perfection, one first matter all, 
Indu’d with various forms, various degrees 




In Milton’s monistic landscape, Eve is, after all, not essentially (or materially) 
different from the image she sees reflected in the lak . Thus, we might want to take 
seriously the implications of the sameness she perceives here. When Eve views the 
image of herself in the lake, which she takes to be another sky, what she sees is an 
image of herself in heaven. Eve reads that her earthly self and her future, heavenly 
self might potentially be united by “sympathy and love” and thereby identifies (and 
identifies with) her future heavenly existence. This apt identification occurs, notably, 
without the intervention of language. 
Milton’s inclusion of the Narcissus myth in Eve’s aw kening suggests, at first, 
that we ought to see something potentially narcissistic in Eve’s response to her image, 
something threateningly prideful of which seventeenh-century (and contemporary) 
thinkers might accuse her. But while Milton offers such a possibility to his readers, he 
also exposes the irrelevancy of the Narcissus myth to Eve’s hermeneutic, and to the 
Edenic world in which she lives. Thus, his allusion t  the Narcissus myth displays the 
threat that textual history poses for his project. The Narcissus myth is revealed to be a 
pagan text whose appearance in Milton’s Christian text potentially writes over the 
aptness of Eve’s reading with the tormented subject/object dialectic that characterizes 
Narcissus’s response to the image in the fountain and, for that matter, post-lapsarian 
experience as Paradise Lost imagines it. The Narcissus myth, then, inhabits the 
dubious position of the word “error”: its presence in Milton’s poem demonstrates the 
trouble of writing Paradise through the medium of pstlapsarian allusions and words. 
But if Eve’s reading of the landscape is apt, what do we do with the voice that 
supposedly corrects it? Critics have conjectured that t is is the voice of God, or of 
 
104 
Eve’s intuition, or that this voice constitutes thebeginning of Eve’s symbolic stage. 
Rather than trying to corroborate any of these positions, I will argue that this voice 
both blends into the idyllic landscape of Paradise and stands apart from it. I will show 
that its unique verbal authority, rather than the source of its speaking, initiates a shift 
in Eve’s thinking and reading. 
We can consider the position of this voice in Paradise by looking at the place 
of voice in the idyllic landscape of Milton’s poem, Lycidas, which, as a pastoral poem 
depicting an idyllic landscape, shares with Paradise the topos of indistinction and 
indecipherability. Part of this topos in Lycidas is developed through an 
indecipherability of voice. The poem contradicts itself regarding the identity of its 
speaker(s) and the authorial origin of its song. This is especially true in the 1645 
reprinted edition, which includes the following introduction:  
 
In this Monody the author bewails a learned Friend, unfortunately 
drown’d in his Passage from Chester on the Irish Seas, 1637. And by 
occasion foretells the ruin of our corrupted Clergy then in their 
height.66 
 
The poem begins with an invocation to the muses, and describes the pastoral 
childhood that the assumed “author” has shared with his friend. Yet, in an abrupt turn 
in the last stanza of the poem, a new voice offers a narrative interjection: “Thus sang 
                                                




the uncouth Swain to th’ Oaks and rills, / While thstill morn went out with Sandals 
gray” (185-6). This interjection suddenly defines the great majority of the poem as the 
song of a poetic character, a swain, who sings of his friend. Thus, it retroactively 
distinguishes between the singer of the pastoral song and the author who pens the 
poem. But this distinction does not stand, for the introductory lines attribute the song, 
and the bewailing tone of the poem, specifically to “the Author,” and this author (and 
perhaps Milton), according to the introduction, takes the drowned man to be a 
“Friend.” A reader concerned with specifying voice and point of view would have to 
try to sort out these coincidences of tone and perspective and to reconcile the 
introduction—which leads her initially to take the entire poem as the Author’s 
mournful song—with the closing lines of the poem—which take the mournful song to 
be the shepherd’s. In addition, such a reader would have to make the introduction’s 
claim that this poem is a “Monody,”—“A lyric ode sung by a single voice”67—
somehow coincide with the two voices that emerge out of the poet’s last-stanza 
interjection. 
But such a reading, such a sorting out, I think, would miss the poem’s 
privileging of sound over origin, its emphasizing of the texture of the landscape over 
the individuals who participate in it. The poem’s prevailing interest in aural texture is 
touched on, in different terms than mine, by Lauren Shohet, who argues that there are 
                                                
67 Oxford English Dictionary, “monody,” 1a, draft revision 2008. 
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“two distinct models of subjectivity” offered by Lycidas (102).68 One, which she calls 
the transcendent model, is concerned with the “autonomously human voice” (102) 
that critics continue to see emerging out of the last third of the poem, when St. Peter 
begins to speak. The other “is entangled with objects—with inanimate, nonhuman 
‘things’—to such an extent that objects actually seem to cosponsor poetic utterance” 
(102). This she calls “collective subjectivity”: the collective model “take[s] pastoral 
to show poetic subjectivity in constant negotiation with objects” (103). Shohet’s 
analysis of the mournful echoes that sound in Lycidas makes this point especially 
clear:  
But O the heavy change, now thou art gone, 
Now thou art gone, and never must return! 
Thee Shepherd, thee the Woods, and desert Caves, 
With wild Thyme and the gadding Vine o’ergrown, 
And all their echoes mourn. 
(37-41) 
Contradicting Paul Alpers, Shohet asserts that the poem gives the agency of mourning 
to the woods and caves, not to the singing shepherd himself (110).69 
Shohet’s intervention is helpful in some ways because it offers an alternative 
reading of the subject in Lycidas, but I believe she has unhelpfully disregarded the 
multiple ambiguities of reference (and multiple grammatical shifts and logical 
dissonances) built into this passage, especially the ambiguation, and the departure 
                                                
68 Lauren Shohet, “Objects and Subjects in Lycidas,” Texas Studies in Literature and 
Language, 47.2 (summer 2005): 101-18.  
69 Paul Alpers, “Lycidas and Modern Criticism,” ELH 49 (1982): 468-96. 
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from origin, achieved by this noun, “echoes.” 70 The poem does not clearly set out 
what is being echoed here, the mournful call of the s pherd/poet, or the natural 
sounds emanating from the landscape. What it does assert is that a resonating tone of 
mournfulness fills the natural landscape: caves do not mourn, echoes do. Thus, the 
echo does not present subjectivity as a product of self/landscape negotiation: rather, it 
weaves an affecting sound into its idyllic aural fabric, dismissing subjectivity in favor 
of textual and aural tone. The mourning echo rises out of the choir of natural 
mourners—the shepherd, woods, caves, thyme, and vine—a d becomes like the ever-
echoing song of a choir in a Gothic church—seemingly without origin, filling the air 
with an aural texture and tone that sacrifices individuality in favor of aural breadth. 
Poetry is not cosponsored by nature, as Shohet argues; idyllic poetry is defined by its 
incorporation into the idyllic landscape it describes. 
This indistinguishable, pathetic sound is an essential part of the idyllic 
landscape of Lycidas. Thus, it is no surprise that a sound with similarly vague origins 
speaks to Eve: 
…there I had fixt 
Mine eyes till now, and pin’d with vain desire, 
Had not a voice thus warn’d me, What thou seest, 
What there thou seest fair Creature is thyself, 
With thee it came and goes: but follow me, 
And I will bring thee where no shadow stays 
                                                
70 Clearly, Shohet’s reading is in conversation with my reading of Eve, but as my 
reading of the voice will show, Shohet does not see th  subject/object dialect 
dissolving into the idyllic landscape. 
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Thy coming, and thy soft imbraces, hee 
Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy 
Inseparably thine, to him shalt bear 
Multitudes like thyself, And thence be call’d 
Mother of human Race. 
 (4.465-75) 
The poem’s ambiguity about the source of this “a voice” coincides with the way Eve 
has experienced the Edenic landscape so far, as a pl ce where similarity, createdness, 
and materiality overcome distinctions, and incorporate the thinking “I” into a sensory 
and corporeal beingness. Yet, this voice is not like the water’s “murmuring sound” 
which we heard earlier in Eve’s description of the landscape, nor is it the kind of 
vaguely mournful echo that fills the air of Lycidas. Rather, this is a singularly verbal 
sound, a voice that injects verbal meaning into a landscape that for Eve, thus far, has 
been unmediated by words. What makes this voice fit into the idyllic landscape is its 
ambiguous origin. What makes it stand out, what gives it a role in prelapsarian 
history, is that is mediates and signifies. 
Eve’s “vain desire” threatens an interminable stasi that could have “fixt” her 
before her image in the lake. What stops her is the voice, an intermediary that 
ascribes to her an experience she never mentions, and in fact that her account of her 
image disputes.71 According to the voice, Eve’s shadow “staies [her] coming.” We 
can glean from this claim that when Eve bends over th  water to see her reflection, 
                                                
71 We can read verbal mediation in Paradise as I read God’s speaking in Chapter 1, as 
instigating historicity by pulling Eve out of the otherwise static and interminable 
identity with her image. See also chapter 3. 
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when her head comes between her image and the sun, she eclipses that reflection, so 
that a shadow replaces her image and seems to block Eve’s access to her other self. 
Eve, of course, never mentions this intermediating chaperone, and her claim that the 
image responds with answering looks when she approaches would seem to dispute it. 
Thus, by positing that Eve is unsatisfied with her image because of the intervening, 
blocking shadow, the voice imagines its own role: th  voice intervenes in and 
mediates Eve’s experience of the world. The voice poses as a verbal allegory of what 
Eve has experienced—a retelling of her experience i v rbal terms—but it asserts a 
new allegorization of that experience, a new interpr tation of her experience that is 
based on evidence she does not herself mention, not even in the context of 
retrospectively narrating the event.72  
Further, the voice strikes its allegorical pose by taking advantage of verbal 
ambiguity: by using terms that seem to restate what Eve has already intuited, but that 
expose her to the contingency and difference of which she is unaware. “What thou 
seest, / What there thou seest fair Creature is thyself.” Critics have oddly concluded 
that the voice here informs Eve that she sees only her reflection in the lake.73 But this 
                                                
72 It also contrasts with the Latin version of the story, in which the Narcissus 
complains “exigua prohibemur aqua” (III.450). Water, not a shadow, keeps 
Narcissus from his image. 
73 Perhaps this conclusion can be described as a case of ov r-reading the allusion. In 
Golding’s translation of the Metamorphoses, the voice of the poet specifically 
outlines the contingent relationship between Narcissus and his mirror image:  
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is not at all what the voice says, and because Eve conceives of the mirror image as 
another iteration of herself, because she does not conceptualize the contingency of the 
mirror image, it is more likely the case that the voice verifies Eve’s reading of her 
image. The voice affirms that this image is, indeed, (an)other Eve, just as the lake is 
(an)other sky. Thus, the voice does not prepare or t ach Eve to read the contingent 
relationship suggested by its reference to Adam as “hee / Whose image thou art.” By 
this assertion, the voice places Eve structurally into the contingent position of the 
image in the lake: Eve, as an image of Adam, is contingent upon her originating 
image.74 But because the voice has been remiss in its interruption of her reading of 
her image in the lake, because it has not clarified that the mirror image is contingent 
on her, Eve does not infer from the voice’s reference to her as an image that she is 
contingent on Adam, the like being she is about to encounter. 
The difference between the voice’s accommodating pose and its assertive 
interpretation is exposed in Eve’s comical response to, and rejection of, Adam. 
Though the voice promises Eve a self which will be “inseparably” hers, what she 
encounters in Adam is a shocking difference which, to her, seems to discount such an 
inseparability: 
                                                                                                                                 
The thing thou louest straight is gone. It is none ther matter  
That thou doest sée, than of thy selfe the shadow in the water.  
The thing is nothing of it selfe: with thée it doth abide,  
With thee it would departe if thou withdrew thy selfe aside. 
 
74 As Karen Edwards puts it, “Eve’s reflection is to Eve as Eve is to Adam” (249). 
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Till I espi’d thee, fair indeed and tall, 
Under a Platan, yet methought less fair, 
Less winning soft, less amiably mild, 
Than that smooth wat’ry image; back I turn’d. 
(4.477-80) 
 
Eve initially finds herself invited by the soft, horizontal plains of her reposed body 
and of the still lake. But with Adam, Eve not only encounters someone who is 
strikingly different from herself. She also encounters someone whose vertical 
structure and hardness do not lead her to imagine a possible unification, an inviting 
incorporation, as she found in the soft fluidity of her image in the water. Thus, it is no 
surprise that she finds the erect Adam to be less inviting. Nor is it surprising that the 
ambiguous voice has not prepared her for this encounter with difference. 
 When Adam calls to Eve, and intervenes in her intuitive rejection of him, he 
sets out terms and allegorizations that establish Eve’s singularity: 
…Return fair Eve, 
Whom fli’st thou? Whom thou fli’st, of him thou art, 
His flesh, his bone; to give thee being I lent 
Out of my side to thee, nearest my heart 
Substantial Life, to have thee by my side 
Henceforth an individual solace dear; 
Part of my Soul I seek thee, and thee claim 
My other half: with that thy gentle hand 
Seiz’d mine, I yielded, and from that time see 
How beauty is excell’d by manly grace 
And wisdom, which alone is truly fair. 
     (4.481-91) 
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Adam refers to Eve by her proper name, thereby establi hing her identity as a 
singular, unique “who” set apart from the “what’s” of the Edenic landscape. In a 
vertiginous whirlwind of personal pronouns, Adam proceeds by explaining Eve’s 
contingency. His explanation is obviously based in the matter of her creation. She is 
indeed made of material that in its first created form was part of his body. But 
Adam’s claims extend beyond this material cause. Adam reports not that the rib was 
taken from him in his sleep, but that he “lent” hisrib in order that she be created. 
Thus, in addition to being Eve’s material and final c use, Adam claims to contribute 
willfully to the specific process of her making. He prompts Eve to read her being as a 
sign of the past—as a sign of Adam’s agency in forming her—and of the present and 
future—as the basis of their heretofore hierarchical interactions. He asserts the 
authority of his words over the authority of material history and creation. 
 Eve apparently takes this reading lesson to heart. Once taking Adam to be less 
than her “wat’ry image,” she now claims that “beauty is excelled by manly grace / 
And wisdom alone is truly fair.” She now interprets the world, not as imbued with 
similarity that invites incorporation, but as a world of hierarchical structure: 
O thou for whom 
And from whom I was form’d flesh of thy flesh, 
And without whom am to no end, my Guide 
And Head, what thou hast said is just and right. 
For wee to him indeed all praises owe, 
And daily thanks, I chiefly who enjoy 
So far the happier Lot, enjoying thee 
Preeminent by so much odds, while thou 




Eve’s tendency to experience the landscape as a fluid, reposed body into which her 
“I” might be incorporated is replaced by the distancing, self-isolating experience of 
reading this landscape through Adam’s verbal mediation. As words mediate her 
reading of the world, and as they convince her to take on the subservient role in 
which they place her, so Eve’s experience of the sublime ends up being mediated by 
Adam—the “Guide,” the “Head,” the right namer of things.   
 The effect of this mediation on Eve is profound, and lmost instantaneous. It 
returns her to the subject/object dialectic she lost with her initial incorporation into 
her reposed body: “with that thy gentle hand / Seiz’d mine.” Now experiencing her 
“I” as an observer of her body, Eve returns to the out-of-body experience into which 
she first awoke. Redefined in this way, separated in this way from her corporeal self, 
Eve now lets Adam interject into her experience of her corporeal self, and allows him 
to define, verbally, their relationship: “I yielded, and from that time see / How beauty 
is excell’d by manly grace / And wisdom, which alone is truly fair.” Instead of 
focusing on similarity, and on the potential for mutual identity, Eve now sees 
difference in the world, and experiences the materil world as different from her 
thinking and perceiving “I.” In these moments, she also seems to forget that she, too, 
is “Godlike erect,” and that she is meant to be Adam’s other, his companion, his help 
mate, that she was created specifically so that he would not be without “Like 
consort.” 
 I have tried to expose in this chapter the way that verbal mediations, even 
within the prelapsarian context of Paradise, emphasize difference and, by this 
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emphasis, write over what Milton presents an ineffable sublime, an idyllic lack of 
distinction, and a landscape whose monistic matter nd absolute cooperation erase the 
boundaries between thing and thing, between individual and world. The 
differentiating force of language reveals itself when the poet, seeking to write an 
allegory of this landscape, gives into the taxonomic logic of words, when description 
gives way to evaluation and allegory gives way to allegorization. The effect of this 
allegorizing force also reveals itself in Eve’s new hermeneutic of herself in the world. 
Once Eve’s experience is mediated by words, she relinquishes her potential identity 
with the “what’s” around her, her self-effacing cooperation and incorporation into the 
landscape, for a singular identification. Eve becomes “Eve,” a “who,” an “I” separate 
from her body, distinct from Adam, and set into the hi rarchical structure that Adam 
verbally asserts. She becomes, so she claims, what Adam says. 
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Chapter 3: Maternal Matter and the Ontological Basis of 
Allegorical Ethics 
 In Book 4 of Paradise Lost, Eve recounts to Adam the story of her awakening 
into the world. She explains that as she looked into a lake that “seem’d another Sky” 
(4.459), she saw a “Shape” that responded to her with “answering looks / Of 
sympathy and love” (4.461, 4.464-5). She turns from this shape only after a voice 
interjects: “What thou seest / What there thou seest fair Creature is thyself” (4.467-8, 
my italics). In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I argued that because Eve takes likeness 
to be a sign of mutual identity, she does not recognize that the shape she sees in the 
water is her mirror image, and that as her mirror image, it is different from and 
dependent on her. Eve, uninformed by any experience of difference—or, in her 
words, “With unexperienc’t thought” (4.457)—takes literally the voice’s verbal 
equating of “what thou seest” with “thyself.”  
I also asserted in chapter 2 that by its misleading validation of Eve’s belief in 
absolute identity, the voice convinces Eve to approach Adam, and hence leads her 
(potentially) to accept the alleged material and spiritual basis of the subservient role 
he offers her. Here I want to consider the importance of the voice’s apparent verbal 
laxity for the poem’s understanding of history and free will, especially in light of the 
contrast between the voice’s reference to Eve’s mirror mage and its more accurate 
description of Eve’s progeny: 
…but follow me, 
And I will bring thee where no shadow stays 
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Thy coming, and thy soft embraces, hee 
Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy 
Inseparably thine, to him shalt bear 
Multitudes like thyself, and thence be call’d 
Mother of human Race. 
(my italics, 4.470-75) 
When the voice refers to Eve’s mirror image, it omits the comparative “like” that 
would have clarified the relationship between Eve and her reflection. But the voice 
includes “like” when describing Eve’s future progeny—who will be “like,” and hence 
not exactly the same as, Eve. This verbal shift from implied identity to implied 
difference offers us a microscopic verbal demonstration of the historical paradigm 
that informs the entire poem. In Paradise Lost, the difference inherent in comparative 
likeness distinguishes the linear history recounted in the poem from the a-historical 
stagnation threatened by Eve’s belief that she can ide tify absolutely with her mirror 
image. In fact, Eve’s speculation on what might have happened if she had continued 
to gaze on her image confirms the distinction betwen a-historical identity and 
historical difference: “…there had I fixt / Mine eys till now, and pin’d with vain 
desire, / Had not a voice thus warn’d me…” (4.465-7). By breaking free from the 
fixation threatened by an illusion of absolute identity, and by participating in the 
linear history that is figured in terms of difference, Eve not only takes on her specific, 
maternal role as mother of the human race. She also engages with the very possibility 
of history itself: once she turns away from the lake, Eve ensures that her future will 
be different from her present and past. 
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Why is this important for an investigation of allegory? My premise so far has 
been that allegory exists because there is a difference between the sublime ur-referent 
and the accommodating language that refers to it. That is, foundational to allegory is 
the impossibility of achieving absolute identification between the signifier and the 
sublime ur-referent. In this chapter, I will suggest that the difference between signifier 
and referent, and the difference between Eve and her future offspring, are born in part 
of the generative (or reproductive) process by which Paradise Lost imagines creation 
to occur—specifically, out of the difference between the spirit that infuses the matter 
of creation with “vital warmth” (7.238) and the matter that receives and responds to 
this infusion. That is, allegorical and historical difference on earth which, as I will 
argue, are fundamental to free will, are born of the generative process by which God 
creates.  
Beginning with the poem’s depiction of creation as a reproductive process, I will 
propose a new, ontologically-informed reading of Milton’s allegorical ethics. I will 
argue that language is necessarily allegorical because it follows and reflects 
humankind’s inborn difference from God, a differenc which humankind inherits 
from the maternal mater out of which creation is formed, matter that is itself (or 
herself) created when God individuates it (or her) from His omnipresent being. That 
is, humankind’s ontological state—of being like God but different from Him—begins 
with God’s decision to individuate matter from Himself, to send His spirit to converse 
with “her” as the mother of humankind, and thus to all w the form of the material 
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mother to mediate God’s paternal imprint on the forms and being of his children.75 
Moreover, I will show that this mediated state is reflected and even sustained by 
allegorical language, which expresses and negotiates the dialectical difference 
between God and the maternal material which he commands into fruition, i.e., the 
difference between the father and the child born out of the womb of the mother.76 
                                                
75 In setting God’s spirit and the material substratum against one another in 
cooperative and dialectical conversation, I do not think Milton was invoking a 
Platonic distinction between matter and spirit, between Godliness and materiality. 
Rather, in Paradise Lost, God’s retirement from the material substratum 
constitutes a creative move that makes chaos, the mat rnal source of human 
being, into an individual, a formless form that exists outside of God’s control. 
That is, God releases the material substratum into its ( r her) own, individuated 
beingness, and thus grants it (or her) formal properties not determined by 
providential order and rule. He makes her into the mother of humankind. 
76 In using this term, “dialectical,” to refer to the difference implicit to the creative 
process, I borrow from Michael Lieb, who takes dialectic to be the basis of 
Milton’s conception of historical progression toward t uth. Citing Areopagitica, 
he argues that Milton takes knowledge to be “foreve arising dynamically out of 
the contention of opposing views” (4). Thus, “disputation will be the constructive 
means of uniting opposition in a superior perspectiv ” (4-5). In fact, as I will do 
in this chapter, Lieb connects this dialectic to the generative process imagined in 
the poem. Though I will follow Lieb in attending to the “dialectics of  creation,” I 
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In fact, Milton not only explains allegorical differ nce in terms of the creative 
process, but also imagines unallegorical language—i. ., that verbal idol which 
purports to collapse difference, to fuse word and thing—in terms of its isolation from 
the creative dialectic. Milton figures this language most prominently in the character 
named Sin, who descends into a state of anti-allegory, n t coincidentally, when she 
descends into a state of a-historicity, absoluteness, and what I will call anti-
maternality. 
God’s creation of the earth begins with his initial withdrawal from the reign of 
chaos, which God describes when He sends His Son and “overshadowing Spirit” out 
to command chaos into “appointed bounds”: 
My overshadowing Spirit and might with thee 
I send along, ride forth, and bid the Deep 
Within appointed bounds by Heav’n and earth, 
Boundless the Deep, because I am who fill 
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space. 
Though I uncircumscrib’d myself retire, 
And put not forth my goodness, which is free 
To act or not, Necessity and Change 
Approach not mee, and what I will is Fate. 
(7.165-72) 
                                                                                                                                 
will argue against the framework of creation and uncreation he proposes, and 
attend more closely to the oppositional and cooperativ  relationship between the 
spirit and matter that emerges out of the generative creative process. See Michael 
Lieb, The Dialectics of Creation: Patterns of Birth & Regeneration in Paradise 
Lost (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970). 
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Criticism over the past four decades has established that when God “retire[s]” (7.170) 
from a portion of the infinitude He fills, He leaves behind a chaotic part of Himself 
that is not subject to His goodness or His ordering a d creating power. Critics have 
alleged that the chaotic matter that God leaves behind exists in a state of pure 
potentiality, activated only when God sends His Sonand Spirit to inspire matter into 
created form. Thus, in 1970 Michael Lieb notes thatchaos is “nothing more than part 
of [God] from which he has withdrawn his influence…imbued with the potentiality 
for glorious production” (17); in 1987 John Rumrich asserts that the matter of chaos 
becomes the  “substratum proper” of creation and exists in an “in-between state” of 
being neither individuated nor identifiable with God (63); and in 2006 Gordon Teskey 
refers to chaos as the “neutral” (106), “alienated substance of God” (99), ready to 
respond obediently to God’s decision to create (102).77 These analyses helpfully posit 
God as the original and universal origin of all Being. However, the characterization of 
the material substratum that they offer stands at odds with the poem’s description of 
chaos and the matter unruled by God: the “dark / Illimitable Ocean” (2.892) “where  
eldest Night / And Chaos, Ancestors of Nature, hold Eternal Anarchy, amidst the 
noise / Of endless wars, and by confusion stand” (2.894-6). This is not a region of 
                                                
77 Michael Lieb, Dialectics of Creation; John Rumrich, Matter of Glory: A New 
Preface to Paradise Lost (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987); 
and Gordon Teskey, Delirious Milton: The Fate of the Poet in Modernity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).  
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perfectly passive, neutral stuff awaiting God’s activation: the stuff of chaos has an 
energy of its own.  
In fact, the neutrality and passivity critics have ascribed to the matter of 
creation conform to the material substratum of Christian Doctrine rather than that of 
Paradise Lost. For example, Rumrich cites the following passage of Christian 
Doctrine to bolster his assertion that the matter of chaos is necessarily passive: 
 It is clear, then that the world was made out of some sort of matter. 
For since “action” and “passivity” are relative terms, and since no 
agent can act externally unless there is something and something 
material, which can be acted upon, it is apparent that God could not 
have created this world out of nothing….It was necessary that 
something should have existed previously, so that i could be acted 
upon. (CP 6, 307) 78 
 
Referring to this passage, Rumrich asserts Milton’s allegiance to the Aristotelian 
concept of passive prime matter and argues that the “Aristotelian interaction between 
active and passive principles appears on every level of Milton’s universe” (55). He 
mentions the energy and discord of the prime matter of Paradise Lost only in an 
aside, when he describes chaos as “passive, if stormy” (55). Gordon Teskey similarly 
accounts for his description of the material substratum by reference to theological, 
rather than poetic, and philosophical considerations: “God has alienated his substance 
                                                
78 As cited in Rumrich, p. 55. See John Milton, Christian Doctrine, trans. John Carey, 
in Complete Prose Works of John Milton, vol 6., ed. Maurice Kelley, gen. ed. Don 
Wolfe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 307. 
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from himself so that it is matter; and it has here at last become as neutral as any 
proponent of creation ex nihilo could wish. Matter is now ruled only by necessity and 
chance, ‘outrageous as the sea,’ until the Father sends forth his ‘goodness,’ the Son, 
to subdue it by Creation” (106).  Teskey argues here that Milton synthesized the 
traditional theology of creation ex nihilo (and its implication that God is not subject to 
necessity or change) with the Lucretian assertion that creation ex nihilo was 
impossible for God (and its implication that God must have changed part of Himself 
in order to create). But I am left wondering: if this is purely neutral stuff, defined only 
by the absence of God’s goodness, whence the outrageousness, the forces of necessity 
and change which dominate chaos? And why does this purely potential stuff need to 
be subdued? 
Though it is tempting to treat these questions as tangential to the poem’s 
imagination of the creative process, I want to bring them to the foreground of my 
analysis. For I believe that the energy manifested in the pre-creation material 
substratum re-appears after creation as the structural and ontological basis of 
humankind’s difference from God, and that we find it both in the “adverse” (7.239) 
residue discarded during the creative process, and in the overabundant growth that 
emerges uncontrollably out of mother earth. To overl ok these signals of matter’s 
individuated state, and the proprietary power that lies in potentia materiae, is to miss 
the dialectical negotiation implicit to the creative process, and the ontological basis of 
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humankind’s difference from God.79 In short, it is to overlook the poem’s 
presentation of creation as a reproductive or generativ  process, in which two 
                                                
79 The term potentia materiae appears in Christian Doctrine, in which Milton asserts 
that “Nearly everyone agrees that all form—and the human soul is a kind of 
form—is produced by the power of matter [ex potentia materiae]” (322). Arguing 
that DDC is not necessarily penned by Milton, William B. Hunter alleges that 
potentia materiae, an Aristotelian concept, refers not to material power, but rather 
to its potential, and that in the Aristotelian system, matter “[i]n itself is 
completely powerless, inert.” Thus, when Raphael suggests that matter “aspire[s]” 
(5.484) to its created form, he ascribes to matter  providential energy absent from 
DDC. While I agree with Hunter that the matter of Paradise Lost is distinct from 
that of Milton’s prose tracts, my reading of the generative process of creation, and 
of Raphael’s language, will show that the potentia materiae of Paradise Lost is 
not necessarily passive or aspiring, but is at times resistant to the forms of 
creation. See William B. Hunter, Visitation Unimplor’d: Milton and the 
Authorship of De Doctrina Christiana (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1998), p. 132-3. See also Marshall Grossman’s observation of the resistance of 
matter to God’s will: in order for God to have his will reflected back at him, “it is 
necessary to impute to matter a certain recalcitrance, a counter-will comprising a 
resistance to fate. This resistance, which is consistently figured as feminine, is, for 
Milton’s texts, the hard kernel of Christian liberty” (Marshall Grossman, “The 
genders of God and the redemption of the flesh in Paradise Lost,” in Milton and 
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individuated beings cooperate to form a new being—specifically, in which the 
material ur-mother of creation contributes to the various, and imperfect, form(s) of 
her children. 
 God creates, as Teskey alleges, by subduing chaos: e sends his son to submit 
the “dark, wasteful, wild” (7.213) abyss of chaotic matter to providential peace and 
order: “Silence, ye troubl'd waves, and thou Deep, p ace, / Said then th’ Omnific 
Word, your discord end” (7.216-17). In achieving God’s plan, the son draws a distinct 
line between order and disorder, and thus clearly distinguishes between matter that 
will be translated into created form and matter that will be left external to creation: 
Then stay’d the fervid Wheels, and in his hand 
He took the golden Compasses, prepar’d 
In God’s Eternal store, to circumscribe 
This Universe, and all created things: 
One foot he centred, and the other turn’d 
Round through the vast profundity obscure, 
And said, Thus far extend, thus far thy bounds, 
This be thy just Circumference, O World. 
Thus God the Heav’n created, thus the Earth, 
Matter unform’d and void: 
(7.224-33) 
As tools used to draw precise measurements and perfect circles, the golden 
compasses display the ordering power of the divine in geometric terms. As an 
astronomer subjects his vision of the heavens to the representational organizations of 
                                                                                                                                 
Gender, ed. Catherine Gimelli Martin [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2004], p. 202). See also pp. 95-114. 
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a map, so the son inserts boundaries and divisions into the amorphic ambience of pre-
creation chaos. In doing so, he relegates the energtic discord of chaos to exteriority, 
and calms and neutralizes that matter culled from chaos’s reign. Once part of the war 
of chaos, the matter out of which the earth will be formed is now, simply “unform’d 
and void.” A blank slate, this neutralized matter is eady to bear the creative imprint 
of the spirit. 
 This preparation suggests that matter is now ready to receive and take on the 
forms that the son will command, that creation is not the dialectical process I want to 
suggest. However, what follows reveals that the son has not prepared the matter 
selected for creation to accept passively its own formation into created beingness:  
…Darkness profound 
Cover’d th’ Abyss: but on the wat’ry calm 
His brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread, 
And vital virtue infus’d, and vital warmth 
Throughout the fluid Mass, but downward purg’d 
The black tartareous cold Infernal dregs 
Adverse to life: then founded, then conglob’d 
Like things to like, the rest to several place 
Disparted, and between spun out the Air, 
And Earth self-balanc’t on her Centre hung. 
(7.233-42) 
The spirit here does not command passive, neutral matter into new form so much as it 
responds to the formal properties that matter displays after its infusion with “vital 
warmth,” casting creation out of those portions of the substratum that are “like” 
enough to be amenable to conglobing. Furthermore, the spirit purges that stuff of 
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creation that reveals itself to be “adverse to life,” that resists the spirit’s creative 
imprint. Even the portion of the material substratum that has been chosen and 
prepared for creation exhibits its own formal properties—displayed either in its 
amenity, or its adversity, to being formed into something new.  
Not coincidentally, these formal properties emerge in the context of a 
generative creative process. The spirit, spreading his “brooding wings” infuses matter 
with “vital warmth.” In short, the material substratum, is, like a human mother, 
impregnated by the warm ejaculate of the father.80  By further examining this 
representation of creation, and the adversity that i  exposes, we can see how Milton 
backdates the reproductive (i.e., human) model of creation and procreation into 
creation itself, and how the material substratum becomes the model of the human 
mother, whose own formal properties actively engage with the generative process and 
effect and mark the final form and being of the child.  
                                                
80 Thomas Laqueur observes that for Hippocrates and the early moderns who 
followed him, part of what established and verified the hierarchy of gender was 
temperature: women’s ejaculate during sex was cold, while man’s was hot. 
Furthermore, orgasm and conception were effected by the heat of friction during 
intercourse. Thus, we can take “vital warmth” to refe  to early modern perceptions 
of what happens when people make new people. See Laqueur, Making Sex: Body 
and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), esp. p. 100-1.  
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In fact, returning to the “adverse” dregs of creation, we see that human 
motherhood is relevant to a new reading of the material substratum. This is a 
relevance Gordon Teskey has already outlined. For though Teskey attempts to 
distinguish creation from human reproduction, in so doing he connects the presence 
of residual matter with the “madeness” of the maternal parent who engages in a 
generative production of offspring. Teskey takes “translative or, better, reproductive 
making, in which both the substance and the life are c ptured from something 
previously made” (111) to be represented by Eve’s formation out of Adam’s rib, and 
marked specifically by the blood that is spilled in the process of this making. This 
spilled blood effects “an inadvertent disclosure of Milton’s relationship with the 
body, the corpus, of heroic poems made in the past” (114) and reveals “the violent 
energy of assimilation that has gone into the making of Milton’s epic” (118). That is, 
despite his claim to be directly inspired by the heavenly muse, Milton actually 
constructs Paradise Lost out of pieces—indeed, whole lines—of already made, 
already formed classical poetry (and has apparently discarded the rest). 
 The spirit’s discarding of the “black tartareous cold Infernal dregs” suggests 
that human beings are made of something already made as well, and that we can read 
creation as Teskey reads Paradise Lost. As Paradise Lost is revealed to be mediated 
by (and thus bearing some resemblance to) the poems that precede it, so human 
beings are marked by the madeness of the material substratum which, like the 
classical poetry out of which Milton makes a new poem, has its own formal 
properties. Creation, then, emerges as the original model of the “reproductive” or 
“translative” making Teskey describes. Indeed, we can imagine the “black tartareous 
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cold Infernal dregs” to materialize the remnants of the generative process in which 
God engages, to represent the ur-placenta of creation, the cold maternal matter 
unassimilated into human form and discarded at birth. This ur-placenta reveals the 
difference between Teskey’s description of how Milton authored his poem and God’s 
creation of the world: while Milton might have violently assimilated classical poetry 
into the form of his own poem and tried to erase the poetic residues he left behind, 
God restrains His will in order to play the father of creation, and openly reveals the 
difference between the creation of the earth as He instigates it, and the material matter 
out of which creation is formed.81 That is, He leaves the material substratum to fulfill 
her maternal role in the begetting of humankind. Importantly, this process, like the 
human reproductive process, produces children who are like, but different from, each 
of their parents, who are made in God’s image, and yet not exact iterations of Him.  
 In fact, this reproductive basis for understanding creation and human ontology 
also recontextualizes in macrocosmic terms the Christian ideal of love and the ideal 
love and union expressed by Adam and Eve in the garden.82 As individuals who were 
                                                
81 I am not convinced that Milton attempted the violent assimilation that Teskey 
describes. Milton borrows from texts with which many of his readers would have 
been readily familiar, thus exposing the fact that his poem is made, in great part, 
out of the poetic pieces he has gathered up. However, I do find Teskey’s paradigm 
for deciphering madeness helpful. 
82 Michael Lieb also posits love, intercourse, and sexual union to be key to the 
recovery of heavenly wholeness, which he takes to be the promise of “re-
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at one time encompassed and united in Adam’s singular being and body, Adam and 
Eve are modeled after God and the material substratum: as Eve is extrapolated from 
Adam’s body and becomes through conversation the mother f his children, so the 
material substratum is individuated from the divine and becomes the mother of 
humankind. Thus, Adam and Eve’s conversations approximate the conversation out 
of which they are born, and the absolute union that will be achieved at the end of 
days—when God’s paternal and maternal providences re-unite into the absolute 
one.83 
                                                                                                                                 
creation.” He describes this intercourse in more hierarchical terms than I: “sexual 
union in the unfallen world is not mere dalliance but has the higher and more 
creative purpose of the submission of disorder or wantonness to the temperance of 
a higher or superior order” (72). See also pg. 85, in which Lieb describes the 
“pattern” of Paradise Lost as “one in which union proceeds through destruction to 
reunion.”  
83 We can see this unity as God’s proprietary recovery of what Rumrich calls his 
“secret possession of a distinctly feminine and incorrigibly unruly source of 
power—an inexhaustible womb” (7-8). Chaos and matter can be taken to be the 
feminine aspect of a hermaphroditic or omni-gendere God, who divides himself 
into genders when He retires from that aspect. In fact, Marshall Grossman takes 
chaos to relate to God as Eve does to Adam. As Eve, made out of Adam’s rib, 
“appears before [Adam] not as the thing [phallus] itself, which he has surrendered 
to and for her, but rather as the embodiment of its lack” (97), so chaos, that realm 
 
130 
Perhaps this explains the ironic twinge of Adam’s as ertion that God, an 
absolute and perfect being, does not need a companion: “…No need that thou / 
Shouldst propagate, already infinite; / And through all numbers absolute, though 
One” (8.419-21). The irony of Adam’s rather bold analysis is that God has indeed 
propagated, created someone like Himself and, despite Adam’s speculation, has 
sought “social communication” (8.429). Though God has not created His equal or His 
helpmate, and does not need a helpmate in order to r alize His perfection, per se, He 
has made out of a part of Himself an individual with whom His spirit converses, and 
who will one day return to Him in love. At once eternal and omnipresent, God has 
installed love into the historical process which He instigates, and will realize the end 
of that process when that love is absolutely returned. 
Of course, this absolute return of love is only an anticipated, ineffable ideal. 
Adam and Eve are different beings of different genders, whose sexual union only 
approximates the love and unity that they will find at the end of days. Until then, 
Adam and Eve are suspended in a state of difference which distinguishes them from 
the final, eternal selves to which they and God look forward. This suspended state, 
                                                                                                                                 
of darkness ruled by a queen, relates to her creator, the “ens” (96) who withdrew 
Himself from her and left “nothing” behind. Thus, Grossman attests, we can take 
Milton’s repeated feminizing of the nothing that God leaves behind to have 
ontological backing, for in Milton’s cosmography, “sexual difference” is reduced 




and the anticipation of union and identity, is reflected in language, in the difference 
between signifier and referent, in the difference between the human “I” and the self. 
As I have already suggested, it is also the basis of Adam and Eve’s historical 
existence, and their freedom to act and choose. 
And this historicity, this suspended state, is of wman born. In fact, as I will 
now demonstrate, the mediator between the human and the sublime, the mother 
whose difference from God establishes and sustains human difference, is posited in 
Paradise Lost o be the source of linear time, for the overabundant growth that she 
births breaks with the a-historicity of the sublime. In short, the material substratum, 
“the womb of Nature and perhaps her grave” (2.911), gives birth in the first stages of 
creation to a new maternal mother, the earth, the new “womb” of new Edenic forms 
(7.454). This earth carries forward into history the maternal role of her mother, and 
her children—the plants, animals, and human beings of Eden—in turn challenge the 
atemporal and ahistorical design of Edenic life. That is, the fecundity of the mother 
earth, “the overwhelming abundance of unfallen Nature,” requires “Adam and Eve 
constantly to temper its productivity” (Lieb 19), thereby challenging the Edenic status 
quo. 
We can examine the over-productivity of the earth, and its implications for 
creation and historicity, by looking at those moments i  which it is first revealed. God 
designs and creates the Edenic landscape first by organizing and dividing, by telling 
the waters to separate from the earth—“Be gather’d now ye Waters under Heav’n / 
Into one place, and let dry Land appear” (7.284-5). However, the perfect structure of 
this division immediately gives way to generation and fecundity: 
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…Let th’ Earth 
Put forth the verdant Grass, Herb yielding Seed, 
And Fruit Tree yielding Fruit after her kind; 
Whose Seed is in herself upon the earth. 
He scarce had said, when the bare Earth, till then 
Desert and bare, unsightly, unadorn’d, 
Brought forth the verdant Grass, whose verdure clad 
Her Universal Face with pleasant green, 
Then Herbs of every leaf, that sudden flow’r’d 
Op’ning thir various colors, and made gay 
Her bosom smelling sweet: and these scarce blown, 
Forth flourish’d thick the clust’ring Vine, forth crept 
The smelling Gourd, up stood the corny Reed 
Embattl’d in her field: and th’ humble Shrub, 
And Bush with frizzl’d hair implicit… 
(7.310-24) 
The feminized earth in this account produces a “sudden” flowering which 
retroactively defines God’s commanding word as a cat lyst of a growth that continues 
and increases on its own. God “let[s]” the earth “put forth” and commands her to 
display the implicit fertile properties of the natural world—the herb that yields seed 
and the tree that yields fruit. God has activated the earth’s implicit fecundity, what 
critics have called her pure potential, and has allowed (“let”) her to display her 
growth. Moreover, as this feminized landscape takes on the characteristics of a 
potential sexual partner and a fertile woman—adorned, b autiful, unbarren, and 
bringing forth new life—God responds, accordingly, like a father, who anticipates the 
generation of his offspring out of the mother’s womb. He awaits, sees, and then 
responds to the birth of his offspring: “God saw that it was good” (7.337). At the 
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beginning of this process, God wields and exercises his powers in commanding the 
earth to realize herself as mate and mother; by the end of this passage, He observes 
the fecundity of the mother he has made, and whose p w rs He has “let” her reveal.84 
In fact, the spatial metaphor of “bringing forth” imagines growth as birth. As 
the earth brings forth grass, the vine flourishes forth, and the gourd creeps forth, they 
prefigure the more explicit description of birth whic  Milton applies to the animals of 
Eden: 
…The Earth obey’d, and straight 
Op’ning her fertile Womb teem’d at a Birth 
Innumerous living Creatures, perfet forms, 
Limb’d and full grown: 
(7.453-56) 
Here the poem insists that the creatures born out of the earth are already formed and, 
indeed, full grown. Looking back at the growth of the flowers, we can see a similar 
pre-formation, in the blooming herbs that “sudden flow’rd / Op’ning thir various 
color.” Here color, the object of the opening, is not literally opened. Rather, color is, 
by the opening of the flower, displayed: the color of the herbs’ flowers, then, is 
revealed, not formed, through their growth into the world. This display posits color to 
                                                
84 Juliet Cummins also finds signals of the proprietary, feminine role of matter, and of 
the mother earth, in creation. However, she asserts tha  “the masculine agents in 
Milton’s Creation…are dominant and formative,” and even present after the first 
generation occurs (96). See Juliet Lucy Cummins, “Milton’s Gods and the Matter 
of Creation,” Milton Studies 40 (2002): 81-105. 
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be an inherent quality once occluded and, by mirroring the opening and revealing 
process of giving birth, points retroactively to the womb as the space in which the 
qualities of the created are pre-determined. In creation, gestation and formation are 
obscured from view, hidden in the earth’s womb and revealed only in retrospect. 
 This pre-formation and predetermination in the womb is significant for our 
reading of Milton’s representation of creation in part because of its consequences for 
the way seventeenth-century anatomists took reproduction to occur. As Thomas 
Laqueur testifies, many early modern thinkers depart d from the Aristotelian model 
of creation and generation (that model which critics ake Milton to follow). Instead of 
asserting that human form could be attributed only to the father, who printed that 
form onto the matter of mother, early modern anatomists thought it a distinct 
possibility that women, like men, contributed to the form of the child. Thus, Vesalius, 
among others, proposes that both the male and the female produce seed which 
combines to make human form (116), while William Harvey concludes that women 
have within them an egg or “primordium” which is “both a material and efficient 
cause of generation.”85 As much as we take into account the Aristotelian model of 
                                                
85 As Laqueur attests, “Harvey’s account borders on parthenogenesis,” and his 
analysis lends itself in the seventeenth-century to accusations that he has potentially 
discounted men from the generative process at all (144). Sally Shuttleworth, among 
others, argues that Laqueur oversimplifies historical complexities in order to create a 
clean, easy-to-read narrative. Indeed, Jane Cadden, who published Meanings of Sex 
Difference in part as a refutation of Laqueur’s apparent oversimplification of medical 
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creation when we read Paradise Lost, we ought also to consider these accounts of 
generation in our reading of the birth of plants, animals, and humans out of the earth. 
For when the poem locates the formation of the created in the womb of the earth and 
prior to their birth, it raises the possibility tha the earth, like the human mother, made 
some contribution to created form. The form of the cr ated is of the mother as much 
as it is of God’s design. 
The importance of the proprietary role of the mother earth in the creative 
process can hardly be overstated, for her fertility not only makes Eden an idyllic 
space. The earth’s contribution to the creative process also effects a maternally- and 
                                                                                                                                 
history, argues that medieval and early modern notio s of sex were more varied that 
Laqueur suggests, and not reduced to a binary opposition between Aristotelian and 
Galenic models (117-9). However, Cadden seems to bein agreement with Laqueur 
that the “scholastic authors” of the thirteenth andfourteenth centuries were faced with 
a number of questions about the generative process: “How do children come to 
resemble their fathers? their mothers? Has nature made two seeds to serve one 
purpose? Or one seed for no purpose? or similar structures for different purposes?” 
(119) and that William Harvey presented his theory as a “purportedly novel 
formulation” (118)—i.e. as a new way of answering the question. See Sally 
Shuttleworth, review of Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, 
Journal of the History of Sexuality 3, no. 4 (Apr. 1993): 633-5; and Joan Cadden, 
Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science, and Culture (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
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materially-based break from the original unity of God’s omnipresent being, and 
establishes a difference between earthly ontology and existence and the perfect 
cosmological framework that surrounds it.86 We find this break, for example, in 
Adam and Eve’s prayer, in which they enjoin the sun, the moon, and even the circling 
atoms to praise God: 
Thou Sun, of this great World both Eye and Soul, 
Acknowledge him thy Greater, sound his praise 
In thy eternal course, both when thou climb’st, 
And when high Noon hast gain’d, and when thou fall’st. 
Moon, that now meet’st the orient Sun, now fli’st 
With the fixt Stars, fixt in thir Orb that flies, 
And yee five other wand’ring Fires that move 
In mystic Dance not without Song, resound 
His praise, who out of Darkness call’d up Light. 
Air, and ye Elements the eldest birth 
Of Nature’s Womb, that in quaternion run 
Perpetual Circle, multiform, and mix 
And nourish all things, let your ceaseless change 
Vary to our great Maker still new praise. 
(5.171-84) 
 
Here the poem articulates the tension between the historical time which is forwarded 
by generative fecundity, and the a-historicity sustained by the circular, repetitive 
                                                
86 As will become clear by the end of this chapter, I imagine generative creation to 
follow up on the difference and historicity inscribed into language and heavenly 
being at God’s proclamation of the Son. 
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movements of the planets, the heavenly spheres, and the stars. The first nine lines of 
Adam and Eve’s morning orison describe the “eternal” and “fixt” pattern of 
cosmological movement.87 This “eternal course” provides Adam and Eve with a night 
and day which, from their perspective, results from the ascension and decline of the 
sun. Focusing on the elements born of “Nature’s womb,” the last six lines describe 
the microcosmic mirror of the cosmological pattern outlined by the earlier lines: the 
earth, air, fire, and water move in a “Perpetual Circle.” The passage seems to display 
the perfect repetition, a-historicity, and correspondence which rules over prelapsarian 
Edenic life. 
Yet, as the elements “nourish all things,” they support a growth that 
challenges the circular, timeless formal structure he poet initially describes. For the 
nourishers of growth, the “eldest birth[s]” of “Nature’s Womb,” instigate and sustain 
changes over time that are at odds with the repetitive, circular motion they seem to 
mimic microcosmically. That is, nature’s “eldest births” effect and encourage growth 
and floral accumulation which extends beyond the night-and-day boundaries set by 
cosmological circulations: 
Adam, well may we labor still to dress 
This Garden, still to tend Plant, Herb and Flow’r, 
Our pleasant task enjoin’d, but till more hands 
Aid us, the work under our labor grows, 
Luxurious by restraint; what we by day 
Lop overgrown, or prune, or prop, or bind, 
                                                
87 Note the echo in this description of Eve’s own a-historical stagnation before her 
mirror image: “…there had I fixt / Mine eyes till now…” (4.465-66). 
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One night or two with wanton growth derides 
Tending to wild. 
(9.205-12) 
Here, Eve expresses her fear that the overabundance of ature will inevitably change 
the landscape, and make it impossible to sustain Ede  as it is. Arguing that she and 
Adam ought to divide their labors, she asserts that the “wanton growth” of nature 
overhwlems nocturnal boundaries: over a period of one r more nights, the plants 
continue to grow, and thus reject the cosmological order of repetition and return that 
defines the repetitive exchange of night for day. 
Thus, Eve explicitly posits overabundance and growth as the source and mark 
of linear temporality in Eden. Today is different from yesterday because the plants 
born of the earth sustain a trajectory of accumulation that surpasses the cyclical and 
repetitive temporality of the formal framework of earthly being. Obtaining changes 
over time which are at specific odds with the a-histor city of the perfect cosmological 
cycle, overgrowth provides Adam and Eve with the histor cal context in which they 
live. The earth mother, who suddenly brings forth these elements, and these vines and 
plants, also brings forth linear time. 
The historicity that the mother earth births is essential to Milton’s conception 
of the experience of being human—distinct from God, set apart from the sublime, 
gifted with free will, and gifted with the experience of authoring and interpreting 
texts. In fact, according to God’s own self-justifying words, free will, writing, reading 
and historicity are intertwined: 
So without least impulse or shadow of Fate, 
Or aught by me immutably foreseen, 
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They trespass, Authors to themselves in all 
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so 
I form’d them free, and free they must remain, 
Till they enthrall themselves… 
(3.120-5) 
Marshall Grossman has observed that just as Milton becomes and discovers himself 
to be an authorial Milton in the process of reading the poem he has authored, so 
Adam and Eve author themselves into historical roles and retrospectively read 
themselves as the authors of their own acts. Thus, authorship and free will emerge as 
the ability to experience the self over time, according to a series of choices and 
actions taken specifically within a historical context, one in which the present self is 
different from (and yet defined according to) the past self who made choices and 
wrote those choices into the text of history. 88 Notably, this successive and continual 
negotiation defines the human experience, and will close only at the end of linear 
time and difference, when the self is fulfilled and fully realized, when the self 
“already written into the degenerate heart” (Grossman, 8) becomes immediate and, 
indeed, is no longer written. 
 Important for my examination of allegory, God’s metaphor of authorship 
posits a model of signification that is wrapped up with history and difference; for the 
                                                
88 My reading follows Grossman’s “contention that we may take this metaphoric 
association of authoring and acting within time very seriously” and thus “draw[s] 
out its implications until they form a modus operandi for the reading of Paradise 
Lost.” See Marshall Grossman, “Authors to Themselves,” p. 1.  
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retrospective, historically bounded, and mediated identification of the self according 
to past writings is based in the impossibility of absolutely knowing and identifying 
the self, and in the difference between the true self and the self written into history. 
This difference is the allegorical difference between the signifier and the referent, the 
“I” and the self to which it refers. It is only because the “I” that Eve authors by her 
actions does not absolutely identify who she is, does not fix or enthrall her in the a-
historical grasp of absolute identity, that Eve cansuccessively and progressively 
“judge” and “choose” who she is and who she will be. T xtually speaking, because 
the representation that Eve authors only approximates her, because she can depart 
from this fleeting and inexact representation, Eve can make new choices that differ 
from the ones she made before, and can in turn becom  the historically-informed 
author of a newly-inscribed self. That is, differenc , indeed allegorical difference, 
makes it possible for the sinful Eve to be eventually redeemed. She can continue her 
historical negotiation until the end, until the authored Eve and the true Eve fuse, until 
the difference between representation and truth collapse, until the writing on the 
degenerate heart simply is.89 
                                                
89 Thus, though I have argued that Eve’s identification of her future self in heaven is 
apt, the threat of Eve’s identification with her mirror image lies in the possibility 
of bypassing history in favor of the unity and identification which will be 
achieved at the end of days, of Eve never exercising free will or becoming who 
she will decide to be. 
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 Thus, we can conclude that by pointing to the ur-mother earth as the original 
source of historicity, the original break from the cyclical pattern of day and night, 
Paradise Lost also posits the ur-mother to be the material basis of allegory in the 
created world, of language based in difference and written into history. In fact, we 
find traces of creation’s generative history in Book 5 of Paradise Lost, when the 
angel Raphael visits and lunches with Adam and Eve and explains to them why the 
angels eat. In this speech, Raphael implicitly delineates the likeness and difference 
which make allegory both necessary and possible: 
O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom 
All things proceed, and up to him return, 
If not deprav’d from good, created all, 
Indu’d with various forms, various degrees 
Of substance, and in things that live, of life; 
But more refin’d, more spirituous, and pure, 
As nearer to him plac’t or nearer tending 
Each in thir several active Spheres assign’d, 
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds 
Proportion’d to each kind. So from the root 
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves 
More aery, last the bright consummate flow’r 
Spirits odorus breathes: flow’rs and thir fruit 
Man’s nourishment, by gradual scale sublim’d 
To vital spirits aspire, to animal, 
To intellectual, give both life and sense, 
Fancy and understanding, whence the Soul 
Reason receives, and reason is her being, 
Discursive, or Intuitive; discourse 
Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours, 
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Differing but in degree, of kind the same. 
 (5.469-90) 
 
Raphael’s explanation for why angels and humans can dine on the same food 
confirms the poet’s earlier invocation of alchemy as an aspirational process. 
Digestion, it seems, achieves the same kind of puriication, the same climbing up the 
chain of being, attempted by alchemists who “by fire / Of sooty coal…Can turn, or 
holds it possible to turn / Metals of drossiest Oreto perfet Gold / As from the Mine” 
(440-43). Thus, Raphael’s speech validates his later pondering that the earth might 
“be but the shadow of Heav’n, and things therein / Each to other life, more than on 
earth is thought” (5.575-6). Raphael’s optimistic speculation, as Stephen Fallon 
suggests, “minimizes the ontological distance betwen angel and men.”90 
 Indeed, the ontological continuum Raphael describes here seems pre-
emptively to moderate Raphael’s anxiety about his retorical task of relating 
heavenly history to Adam:  
High matter thou injoin’st me, O prime of men, 
Sad task and hard, for how shall I relate 
To human sense th’ invisible exploits 
Of warring Spirits; how without remorse 
The ruin of so many glorious once 
                                                
90 Stephen Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991), p. 143. See also John Leonard, ed. Paradise Lost (New York: Penguin 
Publishers, 2000), note on 5.574-76, p. 362, in which e asserts that Milton 
“stresses the likeness of the two worlds, not their differences.” 
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And perfet while they stood; how last unfold 
The secrets of another World, perhaps  
Not lawful to reveal? Yet for thy good 
This is dispens’t, and what surmounts the reach 
Of human sense, I shall delineate so, 
By lik’ning spiritual to corporal forms, 
As may express them best… 
(5.563-73) 
Though Raphael is worried about fulfilling the rhetorical task assigned to him by 
Adam’s query, he finds a way to accommodate “high matter” to “human sense.” 
Taking human and angelic intellect to be “Differing i  degree, but of kind the same” 
(5.490), Raphael overcomes these quantitative variances by lowering his diction to 
“human sense,” by rhetorically descending the great ch in of being that connects 
humans with the sublime. Raphael has discovered an epistemological basis for 
claiming that his language bridges and accommodates the distance between the 
heavenly and the earthly. 
However, I think we can read in Raphael’s alchemical and digestive 
descriptions some signals that we ought to take his rhetorical anxieties more 
seriously—that, as Gordon Teskey alleges, “the events described entirely exceed 
anything on the level of human senses.”91 For Raphael’s anxiety and his diction 
compromise his insistence on ontological continuity, and betray the ontological 
difference which requires him to accommodate, for example, “spiritual” into 
“corporal forms.”  
                                                
91 Gordon Teskey, ed. Paradise Lost , note to 5.571-73, p. 122. 
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This difference can be traced to the ontological difference which God initiates 
when He retires from the material substratum and gives t individual being, and when 
He makes humans into the children of the dialectical, reproductive processs in which 
God engages when His spirit converses with the material substratum. In fact, Raphael 
refers to this process when he explains that “things that live” inhabit “bounds / 
Proportioned to each kind” (5.478-9). According to the OED, “kind” refers to “birth,” 
and to those characteristics and states of being that can be attributed to one’s 
birthright.92 As the OED notes, Milton’s use of “kind” in Eikonoklastes follows this 
definition, in which Milton alleges that Charles’s “bitter vehemence against his 
Judges and accusers” at the time of his execution imitates “not our Saviour, but his 
Grand-mother Mary Queen of Scots, as also in the most of his other scruples, 
exceptions and evasion: and from whom he seems to heav learnt, as it were by heart, 
or els by kind, that which is thought by his admirers to be the most vetuous, most 
manly, most Christian, and most Martyr-like of his words and speeches heer, and of 
his answers and behaviour at his Tryall” (my italics, 597). Milton complains here that 
Charles I inherited his speech from his grandmother, either by nurture (by heart) or by 
nature (by kind). This emphasis on grand-maternal inheritance supports Milton’s 
repeated accusation that bad kings suffer from too much feminine influence. In 
                                                
92 Oxford English Dictionary, “kind” n. I. abstract sense, Second Edition 1989. 
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addition to his unmanly submission to his Catholic w fe, Charles I has too much of 
his Catholic grandmother in him.93 
 When Raphael asserts that the members of the continuum inhabit “bounds / 
Proportion’d to each kind,” we can hear an echo of Milton’s concern about paternal 
versus maternal influence and inheritance. Read in light of its generative referent, 
“kind” here hints at the parentage which appears to back the hierarchy of humans and 
angels.  The angels, whose existence precedes the generative creation outlined in 
Book 7, are individuated beings, and thus are not etirely unified with God. Yet, their 
relationship with God is a close one, in part because it is not mediated by the 
maternal, material influence. That is, Raphael’s reference to “kind” suggests that the 
difference between humans and angels lies in God’s creative innovation, His 
reproductive creation of humankind and, more specifically, the degree to which He 
gives over to the influence of the maternal matter in the creative process. The 
                                                
93 According to Marshall Grossman, Milton sets Charles’s protests and emulation of 
Mary Queen of Scots in contrast with the sacrificial Son’s refusal to cast 
judgment on his accusers. Inscribing “the relations f king and 
parliament…rhetorically…within the relations of man d creator” (159), 
Eikonoklastes takes Charles I’s emulation of his grandmother to constitute a 
failure to affirm the Parliamentary authority validated by its original creation of 
king, thereby subjecting himself to a “female contrl” which ought to be read only 
as a “signifier” of “providential [i.e., paternal] meaning” (160).  See “Servile / 
Sterile / Style: Milton and the Question of Woman.” 
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respective positions of the humans and the angels on the hierarchical ladder are 
determined by the degree to which matter—i.e., the maternal influence—informs 
their ontology. 
 This possibility is supported by the fact that thegender difference inscribed 
into the generative process is, according to the poem, one of the things that most 
readily distinguishes humans from angels. While Adam and Eve are of different sex, 
the angels cross genders and bodies as easily as they move from the heaven to the 
earth: “….and obstacle find none / Of membrane, joynt, or limb, exclusive barrs” 
(8.624-5).  It also explains how human beings at once have intellectual capacities 
only quantitatively distinct from those of the angels—“Differing in degree, but of 
kind the same”—and find themselves inhabiting distinct “bounds / Proportion’d to 
each kind”: humans are made of the same, monistic stuff as the angels, but they 
nevertheless stand on the rung of the ontological ladder that duly reflects the unique 
influence of the maternal mother on human being, and the gender differentiation that 
precedes and leads to human ontology.  
What overcomes this ontological difference is, as Ihave argued, love. In fact, 
we see in Raphael’s alchemical/digestive process the ideal union I earlier took to be 
inexactly simulated by Adam and Eve, and anticipated s essential to the assimilation 
of the material substratum into God. For as Adam and Eve shed the weight of their 
material being, they do not leave material behind: they shrink their and “her” distance 
from God. Their upward hierarchical movement, which sublimes matter into the 
original ens, re-unites the mother and father in metaphorical consummation, in a 
union which collapses the difference between mother and father. Moving up the great 
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chain of being, then, represents both an idealized alchemical/digestive process and an 
idealized sexual union: the re-incorporation of matter into the sublime omnipresence 
which will bring gendered lovers from a tenuous state of union—“hand in hand” and 
yet “solitary” (12.648-9)—to a state of being all. 
By this union, humankind will also relinquish that mode of reasoning which is 
bound up with difference, historicity, and language. Raphael makes this connection 
clear by his reference to “discursive” reasoning which, so John Leonard tells us, 
involves “the arguing from premises to conclusions.”94 Human thinking, in contrast 
with the immediacy of angelic intuition, occurs as a process unfolding over linear 
time, proceeding from knowns (premises) to heretofore unknowns (conclusions) 
which are the product of historical intellectual acts. Bound up in linear temporality, 
discursive thinking, like talk or discourse, does not reach absolute, timeless truth. 
Thus, discursive thinking will always be metaphorical—inexactly understanding and 
expressing the sublime through approximations which reflect humans’ metaphorical 
relationships to God and their temporal constraints. 95 This is why Raphael must 
accommodate sublime truth to Adam: he must speak to Adam through a series of 
approximate representations which, until the end of ays—until the female and the 
                                                
94 See Leonard, ed., Paradise Lost, note to 5.488, p. 361. 
95 John Rumrich describes humankind’s ontological state as a “suspension between 
God and Satan” (101). He goes on to say that “[h]umanity subsists in a 
progressive, metaphorical version of eternal truth” (103). Humans, he posits, are 
metaphors of God. See pp. 99-103. 
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male, the parent and the child, and the sign and the referent collapse into one—will 
continue to approach, but will never absolutely attain, sublime truth, the first and final 
“conclusion” of all discursive reasoning. And, as I have shown, he attributes this 





 So far I have outlined and emphasized the connections hat Paradise Lost 
makes between generative creation, human ontology, free will, and allegory. I would 
now like to focus on the singular character around whom all of these interconnected 
themes coalesce—the figure of Sin. Sin, as I argued in chapter 1, erupts into the 
strained semiotic order of heaven, figuring at once Satan’s attempt to fuse word and 
thing and the impossibility of sustaining this fusion in the context of the historicity 
that God’s proclamation of the Son initiated. Here I want to revisit the tension 
between Sin’s rhetorical representation as an embodi ent of Satan’s transgressive 
thoughts, and her historical-narrative roles as an allegory of the necessarily allegorical 
state of language. This time, however, I will consider these tensions in light of the 
linguistic and rhetorical distinctions that emerge between Sin’s status as an incestuous 
daughter and mother, and her role as builder of a bridge that connects hell to earth. In 
so doing, I will bring to light the connections tha Milton makes between ontology 
and allegory. More specifically, I will explain the maternal and material basis of 
Milton’s insistence that allegory—i.e., speaking that is other to the truth it tells—is 
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the only apt linguistic condition for humankind, the only linguistic condition that 
allows human beings to negotiate the difference betwe n word and thing, and to 
author themselves within the context of historical time. 
Born out of Satan’s disobedient thoughts, Sin is immediately and intuitively 
named “Sin” (2.260-61). Thus, she appears to achieve rhetorically that identification, 
that unity of sign and self, which God has relinquished through the proclamation of 
the Son: she appears to be not different from the thoughts out of which she is born, 
but rather to be the very thing, sin. This representation betrays what Gordon Teskey 
has called the violence of personification, which suppresses the difference between 
the abstract and the embodiment, the referent of the common versus the referent of 
the proper noun.96 
Importantly, Sin’s rhetorical presentation is at odds with the specific, 
generative process alluded to in her birth: 
All on a sudden miserable pain 
Surprised thee: dim thine eyes and dizzy swum 
In darkness while thy head flames thick and fast 
Threw forth till on the left side op’ning wide, 
Likest to thee in shape and count’nance bright 
(Then shining Heavn’ly fair) a goddess armed 
Out of thy head I sprung! Amazement seized 
All th’ host of Heav’n. Back they recoiled afraid 
At first and called me “Sin” and for a sign 
Portentous held me. 
(2.752-61) 
                                                
96 See introduction and chapter 1. 
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Sin’s literary and even iconic status as an embodiment and pure projection of Satan’s 
thoughts tends to erase the difference between Satan’s abstract idea and Sin’s female 
form—in more specific, generative terms, the difference between the thoughts of the 
father and the female offspring that his intellectual broodings appear to beget. That is, 
though Sin is born without a mediating mother, and thus not out of the dialectical and 
generative context I have been outlining, and thoug Satan views Sin as his “perfect 
image” (764), the biological resonances of the description of her birth suggest a 
difference between Sin and the father who thinks of and identifies with her.97 As John 
Mulryan has noted, Satan’s birth pains inexactly prefigure those to be suffered by 
human mothers:  “Satan is struck down, rendered powerless, by his own idea, an 
unexpecting mother helpless in the throes of womanly pain.”98 Though Mulryan is 
concerned here with Milton’s reworking of the Minerva (i.e., Athena) myth, his 
attention to the pain of birth highlights the mimesis of this representation, and its 
explicit reference to future experiences of motherhood and childbirth. While Eve’s 
like-but-different offspring sustain her historicity and thus reveal her difference from 
God, Sin’s surprising, original, and violent birth ealizes, concomitantly, both 
linguistic and procreative difference, thus requiring Satan to contend with the 
difference he wants to collapse. That is, when Satan gives birth to Sin, his thought is 
                                                
97 See also 5.666, when Satan, instead of sleeping throug  the heavenly night like all 
of the other angels, spends it awake, “Deep malice thence conceiving and disdain” 
(my italics).  
98 John Mulryan, “Satan’s Headache,” pp. 17-18. 
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violently translated at once into a sign and into a new being who only resembles him: 
as Sin explains to Satan, she was born “Likest to thee in shape and count’nance 
bright” (2.726).99 Satan has written himself into the world and, viewing the product of 
his authorship, cannot wholly identify with it. Concomitantly, he has birthed a child 
who is only somewhat like himself. 
 God purges the disobedient, including Sin, out of heaven. Michael Lieb argues 
that Paradise Lost imagines this purging of the disobedient in terms of abortion and 
gastronomical excretion. His argument is based in part on two complementary 
premises: the first, that heaven is “the womb of bliss” (84); the second, that as 
“wasteful” excretions from the heavenly body, the fallen angels are “unnecessary, 
residual, or ultimately excremental” (88). The purged angels are both aborted and shat 
out of the heavenly body, the womb of unity. 
                                                
99 Marshall Grossman, comparing the birth of Eve with the begetting of the Son, 
points out that only the Son “perfectly expresses th  ‘I’ of the Father, whose eye 
cannot be evaded. The incarnation may thus be looked to as the literal inscription 
of the Son’s embodiment of the Father’s ‘head.’” See “Servile / Sterile / Style: 
Milton and the Question of Woman,” p. 153. This distinction also holds for a 
comparison of the Son and Sin. Though Sin, like the Son, is figured as an 
embodiment of the head (i.e., or the thoughts that ges ate within it), and though 
she, like the Son, “lacks a mother” (153), she is born as a sign different from its 
origins and thus threatens to achieve the “autonomous” (153) status granted to 
Eve. See chapter 1. 
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 Lieb argues that when the angels are aborted and shat, they are “uncreated” 
(132), reduced to the divisions and discord that precede creation, and banished from 
the unity of the created heavenly body. However, his alignment of creation with 
unity, and uncreation with division, is difficult to synthesize with the poem’s 
representation of creation as a whole. Lieb notes that the creation of heaven brings the 
discordant and divided existence of chaos into a unified and created being, but he 
misses the division that such a unifying act requires: the fact that God joins the angels 
and heavenly being into a unified whole by building a “crystal wall” (6.860) between 
heaven and chaos, by distinguishing heaven from the chaotic reign which is exterior 
to it. I want to take note here of the division that is concomitant with creation in 
Paradise Lost, the separation of chaos from heaven, and of unlike things that the 
spirit effects when it conglobes “like things to like” (7.240). For this consideration 
will bring us to a broader understanding not only of creation, but also of the role of 
the purged, the residual, in the creative process. 
 Importantly, even as the angels are aborted and excreted out of the body of 
heaven, they are also pushed into the womb out of which a new creation will be born: 
And Crystal wall of Heav’n, which op’ning wide, 
Roll’d inward, and a spacious Gap disclos’d 
Into the wasteful Deep; the monstrous sight 
Struck them with horror backward, but far worse 
Urg’d them behind; headlong themselves they threw 
Down from the verge of Heav’n, Eternal wrath 




The disobedient angels are ejected out of the created, unified space of heaven and into 
the space of creative potential: when the disobedient fall through the opening in the 
“crystal wall” of heaven, they enter not only the “wasteful” space of heavenly 
excrement, but also chaos, the disordered maternal space out of which creation will 
be born.  
Read in this light, Satan’s fall appears to be the first of what Lieb observes to 
be “assaults” of hidden space. For example, Lieb notes that when Satan looks on and 
then “assault[s]” Eden, he seems to be entering “a living organism that takes on 
characteristics of bodily functions” (69): 
So on he fares, and to the border comes 
Of Eden, where delicious Paradise, 
Now nearer, Crowns with her enclosure green, 
As with a rural mound the champaign head 
Of a steep wilderness, whose hairy sides 
With thicket overgrown, grotesque and wild, 
Access deni’d. 
(4.132-7) 
The “living organism” of the Edenic landscape takes on the contradictory qualities of 
the innocent and the hyper-sexualized feminine characte . Eden is innocent, and yet, 
as Lieb attests, implies Chaos: “the implication of Chaos is in the very description: 
‘the “overgrown’ or untempered ‘thicket,’ the ‘grotesque and wild’ ‘wilderness’ are 
integral parts of the scenery” (69). Satan breaches t  verdant walls of Eden and 
enters into its overgrown and chaotic space, repeating willfully the movement he was 
compelled to make when he was purged out of heaven into the original chaotic, and 
yet fertile, space. This suggests that Satan and his followers are not simply shat out of 
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the heavenly body, but that they also enter a new, chaotic, fertile one. Thus, Satan and 
his followers are placed into a paradoxical ontological niche: they are wholly 
different from and antithetical to heavenly being, and yet they will be integral to—or 
at least a necessarily by-product of—the generative process out of which creation will 
be born.  
In fact, I believe that Milton signals the ontological niche of the disobedient 
by use of a generative pun, “monstrous.” As Sara Red argues, “monstrous” in early 
modern parlance commonly functioned as a pun on menstrous which reified early 
modern (and Biblical) associations of menstruation with filth, pollution, and evil. As 
Read attests, this rhetorical tradition and its impl cations for understanding 
menstruation were so strong that Jane Sharp, a sevente nth-century midwife, saw fit 
to refute it in “The Midwives Book.” 100 We see this pun potentially at play in 
Milton’s description of the fallen angels. Once fallen, Beelzebub will be known for 
his “monstrous size” (1.197); Satan will transform into a “monstrous serpent” 
(10.514); and the devils will take on the “monstrous shapes” (1.479) of Egyptian 
                                                
100 Sara Read, “‘Thy Righteousness is but a menstrual clout,’” Early Modern Women: 
An Interdisciplinary Journal, 3 (fall 2008): 1-25.  See especially note 28, in which 
Read cites an excoriation of this rhetorical tradition by the seventeenth-century 
midwife, Jane Sharp. See also Jane Sharp, The Midwives Book, or the Whole Art 




mythology. Read in the simplest terms, Milton’s repeated figuration of the devils as 
“monstrous” lends material weight to the spiritual filth that they represent.  
In fact, this pun helps us to understand how the devils, when they are purged 
out of heaven and thrown into hell, are divorced from the influence of the father 
whose spirit catalyzes the generative process:  
A Universe of death, which God by curse 
Created evil, for evil only good, 
Where all life dies, death lives, and Nature breeds, 
Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things, 
Abominable, inutterable, and worse 
Than Fables yet have feign’d, or fear conceiv’d, 
Gorgons and Hydras and Chimeras dire. 
(2.622-28) 
Part of the horror of the “Universe” in which the dvils are imprisoned is the fact that, 
despite the absence of the paternal influence of the life-giving spirit, hell continues to 
generate new growth. That is, despite the all-encompassing presence of “death,” and 
the fact that the “Nature” of this landscape never participated in the father/mother 
dialectic of creation, it (or she) nevertheless “breeds, / Perverse, all monstrous, all 
prodigious things…” As postlapsarian women produce menses—that filth which at 
once signals postlapsarian spiritual degradation and the absence of the paternal 
imprint—so the mother nature of hell produces unformed “monstrous….things” 
which, frighteningly, seem to take on their own life. Hell is the realm of the purged, 
where the stuff discarded from creation becomes the foundation of “Perverse, all 
monstrous, all prodigious things” and “Abominable, inutterable” being. 
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 But I think there is something more complex going o  here, for Milton’s pun 
on menstrous signals in generative (and gendered) terms the fact that the fallen angels 
are necessary by-products of the procreative process. In fact, the importance of the 
monstrous/menstrous pun to Milton’s understanding of the paradoxical ontological 
and spiritual niche that the fallen angels fill becomes even more clear if we consider 
seventeenth-century notions of just what menses is. As Laqueur describes, early 
modern anatomists took menses to be a surfeit of maternal material which, produced 
in preparation for the formation of children, was shed whether creation did, or did 
not, occur: that is, menses and afterbirth were considered to be the same thing. 
Reading Milton’s representation of creation and his de cription of the devils with this 
in mind, we can understand the integral role that te devils play in created ontology, 
the way that monstrosity is produced out of the dialectic process from which, in hell, 
it is isolated. The “monstrous” devils, it seems, are like the menstrous by-products 
that are necessarily produced (and discarded) out of the dialectic of generative 
creation: they are, like the “tartareous dregs” which they resemble, “adverse” to life. 
 Ur-menses is produced because instead of commanding the creative process, 
the spirit takes on the roll of father, responding to the formal properties of the 
material substratum that He has infused with life. As such, it is the material signal of 
God’s decision to relinquish His absolute power in favor of the creative dialectic—in 
favor of a process in which the spirit and the matter i  infuses converse and, in so 
doing, make their own contributions to the form of the earth. As a necessary result of 
this process, ur-menses thus becomes analogous to the necessary spiritual and 
intellectual by-product of God’s decision to let go the reigns of absolute power, to 
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make room in creation for wills that are counter to His own. More specifically, the 
adverse matter, the ur-menses, produced as a by-product f creation, signals in 
material terms the adversity that God must tolerate in order to create individuals—
i.e., the absolute refusal to love  that God must make possible in order to receive love 
as an expression of free will.101 As some of the matter which has been individuated 
from God can prove adverse to the loving conversation that produces life, so some of 
the individual wills that this conversation creates can prove adverse to God himself. 
 This, I think, is important for our reading of the “monstrous” devils who are 
produced out of the matter of hell, but who eventually invade earth and tempt 
humankind. In brief, while the spirit discards menss from the creative process and 
relegates it to hell, thereby removing from created ontology the matter that is adverse 
to life, once Sin and Death build a bridge, they create a pathway by which adversity 
to God might enter the created context. The devils—those monstrous beings who 
were thrown out of heaven, tossed into hell, and blocked from the creative dialectic 
which produces and is implicit to earthly ontology—enter earth’s realm, and thereby 
manifest the potential adversity to God which is a necessarily by-product of the 
creation of free wills, and of the creative dialectic.  
 Moreover, the “monstrous” presence of the devils on earth demonstrates that 
the dialectic tension between the paternal imprint and the maternal matter which is 
inscribed into each human being’s individual ontology will resolve into absolute unity 
in only one of two antithetical ways: by a Christian’s choice to love God, and to be 
                                                
101 See 3.103-11. 
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assimilated into the sublime ens at the end of days, or by her choice to reject Him, 
which will result in the reduction of her dialectic ontology to absolute death and 
monstrosity. That is, as Milton figures them, the mnstrous monsters who come to 
earth and tempt humankind into disobedience, manifest th  possibility (inherent to 
creation but exaggerated by the fall and the building of Death and Sin’s bridge) of 
choosing absolute difference from God, and of thus being discarded from the 
dialectic, generative process which births new life: banished to a state of eternal 
damnation, those who follow the devils will be confined to a world in which 
generation occurs without the infusion of the spirit, producing only menstrous 
monsters. 
 This is important for our understanding of allegory because, rhetorically 
speaking, the monstrous/menstrous devils represent th  breaking point of metaphor: 
when attenuated resemblance gives way to pure antithesis, to an absolute difference 
which will never converse with or even refer to God again. This absolute difference 
culminates in the figure of Sin—that allegorical character who fuses a rejection of the 
generative dialectic with a collapse of language into tself. 
 In Allegory and  Violence, Teskey argues that allegory is an expression of the 
desire to see the self in the ‘imponderable otherness of nature and our equally 
imponderable embeddedness in nature,” and “to think of the self as the world and the 
world as the self” (107).  This desire, and its potential resolution, is betrayed in the 
topos of “mutual devouring” (8), which, by incorporating the other into the self and 
the self into the other, collapses their  “symmetrical otherness” (8). This mutual 
devouring confirms Teskey’s notion that “[a]llegory oscillates between a project of 
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reference and a project of capture.” As a project of reference, allegory “refers 
upwards, anagogically, toward the absolute other” (8), but as a devouring form of 
rhetoric, allegory also reduces the other to a consumable and consuming whole, an 
all-encompassing “I” (8). This oscillation slows to a snail’s pace in Milton’s depiction 
of Sin. This pace and Sin’s story reveal Milton’s allegorical ethics, and the 
distinctions he makes between allegory, which refers to sublime truth, and idolatry, 
which attempts to capture meaning. 
Though Sin begins, historically, as the eruption of difference, including 
gender difference, into the heavenly realm, in hellshe is reduced to absoluteness, to 
the absence of difference and, indeed, to the collapse of the difference between the 
parent and child. This collapse begins with Satan’s sexual erasure of the difference 
between himself and his daughter, between his thougts and their birth into a visible, 
readable signifier. That is, when Satan sleeps withhis daughter, he collapses her 
different, individuated being into an incestuous sexual union which mimics and 
mocks the idealized union which will fuse Adam and Eve, and God with the 
individuated maternal substratum He has created. Satan, who wants to project himself 
as the new origin of sublime absoluteness, the new defining and unspeakable “I,” 
devours difference by overcoming the distinction between himself and his offspring, 
by uniting with her in sexual intercourse. 
This union produces Death, who, as God foretells, will gorge himself on “the 
draff and filth / Which man’s polluting Sin with taint hath shed” (10.630-1) until the 
Son hurls him into hell, where he will be eternally b ocked from both the created and 
the sublime. Thus, Death forwards historical time, for by assimilating the “draff” or 
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“filth” produced by Sin into his un-being, he purifies creation, preparing it for its final 
assimilation into the ns. Difference-from-God, which is manifested on earth by this 
“filth,” thus becomes the basis of the non-being that, at the end of days, will stand as 
the absolute antithesis to the “All in All,” the Death to God’s life. Thusly dividing 
being from non-being, creation from residual filth, and preparing the way for human 
beings’ and matter’s collapse into the total being of God, Death contributes to human 
beings’ gradual movement out of the reign of difference and metaphor, and into the 
unity of the sublime.102 
In a way, then, Death is always engaging with history. However, in hell, that 
history is overwhelmed by the a-historicity of the discarded, whose hellish ontology 
is defined by its antithetical state, its empty mimicking of the “all in all.” Thus, in hell 
Death suspends the creative dialectic and instead engag s in the very devouring out of 
which he is born, incest. As Sin explains, Death rapes her, and a litter of insatiable 
hellhounds results:  
Mee overtook his mother all dismay’d, 
And in embraces forcible and foul 
Ingend’ring with me, of that rape begot 
These yelling Monsters that with ceasless cry 
                                                
102 It is worth noting the striking similarity between my reading of this scene and 
Steven Knapp’s reading of William Collins’s “Ode to Fear,” in which the 
“incestuous mother…becomes the unwilling leader of a parade of allegorical 
monsters” (93): “Incest here is itself a figure: it stands for the compression of 
ordinary difference into an extreme and essentially reflexive identity” (93). 
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Surround me, as thou saw’st, hourly conceiv’d 
And hourly born, with sorrow infinite 
To me, for when they list, into the womb 
That bred them they return, and howl and gnaw 
My Bowels, thir repast; then bursting forth 
Afresh with conscious terrors vex me round, 
That rest or intermission none I find. 
(2.792-802) 
These hellhounds effect for Sin an entrapment akin to Eve’s fixation before her 
mirror image. With offspring who refuse fully to individuate, to depart permanently 
from the womb, Sin is entrapped in a state of absolute a-historicity: suffering their 
eternal return, she is not offered the historical context in which to retrospectively read 
herself as mother of a new race, as the origin of beings different from herself. Sin 
simply is, and her authorship and experience of time collapse into a vortex of incest 
and identity.  
That is, by returning to the womb of their mother and consuming her insides, 
the hellhounds collapse the difference potentially offered to them by their generative 
(if incestuous) creation, thereby enacting and mimicking the cyclical and absolute 
structure of heavenly cosmology in torturous, hellish form. Everything for them is 
eternal repetition, without change over time. Blocking Sin from the dialectical 
ontology and the historical freedom of the created, he hellhounds aptly fulfill the role 
of the literary children of Cerberus, who guards the river Styx and prevents the dead 
and living from crossing in and out of Hades: their appetites fix Sin in hell, block her 
from the dialectic of generative creation, and entrap her in the absoluteness of the 
anti-sublime. Thus, Sin, overcome by Death the devourer of difference, and suffering 
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the eternal return of the dogs born of her rape, becom s the central figure around 
which hellish a-historicity and a-maternality circulate: while Death, by devouring the 
“pollution” left by Sin on earth, sets up hell to be the absolute anti-thesis of the 
sublime “all in all,” Sin ostentatiously displays the suspension of the creative 
dialectic, and the end of historical motherhood, that is effected when adversity to God 
becomes the defining characteristic of being—or, more aptly, of un-being. That is, in 
hell, there is no motherhood, no creative dialectic marking or sustaining the 
difference between mother and child or the historical progress therein inscribed: there 
is only anti-maternal a-historicity, the absence of historical progress that is effected 
by the devouring of material and maternal difference. 
Not coincidentally, all of this entrapment, this divorce from the sublime, 
figures Sin as a project of “capture” rather than “reference,” and exposes the 
meaninglessness of allegory divorced from the sublime ur-referent. That is, Sin is 
named by an abstract noun which Milton’s readers recognize as having a particular 
meaning. But because she is here captured by identity, entrapped in circumstances 
which divide her from the sublime will according to which she means “Sin,” she 
begins to lose that meaning.103 What does she, a stagnant figure suffering the 
torments of violence, and obsequiously blocking the gates of hell, signify? What does 
                                                
103 The Oxford English Dictionary defines sin as “[a]n ct which is regarded as a 
transgression of the divine law and an offence against God; a violation (esp. 
willful or deliberate) of some religious or moral principle.” OED, “sin” n. 1.a. 
Second Edition 1989. 
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“Sin” mean if she is stuck in a state of identity and a-historicity which is entirely 
separate from the sublime?104 Sin here certainly does not represent a transgression of 
the sublime will. She is difference devoured, nothing except antithesis, the absolute 
end of metaphorical difference, not engaging in an adverse struggle with sublime will, 
but simply banished from it. Thus, she becomes a figure at once anti-maternal and 
unallegorical: she does not experience or reflect the dialectic of creation, or derive 
meaning from her relationship with the sublime. She represents instead verbal 
idolatry: posing as meaningful but meaning nothing. 
However, when Sin disobediently opens the gates of hell and builds a bridge 
to creation, she emerges again as a transgressor of providential design. Samuel 
Johnson’s infamous excoriation of the allegory of Sin and Death, then, misses the 
point: 
 Milton’s allegory of Sin and Death is undoubtedly faulty. Sin is 
indeed the mother of Death, and may be allowed to be the portress of 
hell ; but when they stop the journey of Satan, a journey described as 
real, and when Death offers him battle, the allegory is broken. That 
                                                
104 Knapp similarly notes that the “moment of speculative leisure” described by Sin’s 
description of her time in hell—“Pensive here I sat” (2.777)—“endows her with 
an empirical consciousness wholly inexplicable in allegorical terms” (138). But 
while I take Milton to be consciously distinguishing between Sin’s allegorical 
status and her static, a-historical, hellish existence, Knapp alleges that Sin loses 
and regains her allegorical status because “Milton was simply indifferent to the 
mixing of literal and figurative agency” (136).  
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Sin and Death should have shewn the way to hell might have been 
allowed ; but they cannot facilitate the passage by building a bridge, 
because the difficulty of Satan’s passage is described as real and 
sensible, and the bridge ought to be only figurative. The hell assigned 
to the rebellious spirits is described as not less local than the 
residence of man. It is placed in some distant part of space, separated 
from the regions of harmony and order by a chaotick waste and an 
unoccupied vacuity ; but Sin and Death worked up a ‘mole of 
aggregated soil,’ cemented with asphaltus ; a work too bulky for 
ideal architects.  
 This unskilful allegory appears to me one of the gr atest faults of 
the poem ; and to this there was no temptation, but the author’s 
opinion of its beauty. (185-86) 
 
Johnson complains that Milton’s allegory of Sin and Death, while at first perfectly 
allegorical, becomes too real to sustain its status s an allegory. Inappropriately given 
the tremendous task of constructing a material bridge that crosses a vast, chaotic 
space, Sin and Death stop fulfilling their allegoric roles and instead become agents in 
a “real” narrative story. 
The trouble with the distinction Johnson wants to draw between “figurative” 
and “real and sensible” is that it falsely (and perhaps defensively) divides allegory 
from its ontological base: it posits Sin’s allegorical presentation as a personification 
to contrast with her presentation as an active being (a d especially as a being whose 
birth helped to precipitate difference and history). 105 But to make this distinction 
                                                
105 Steven Knapp suggests that this is a defensive move. Eighteenth-century critics 
were afraid that conflating the figurative and the lit ral would confuse figurative 
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between rhetoric and reality is to overwrite the history that backs and sustains 
language, and to seek in language the kind of finality nd stability made impossible 
by difference and historicity. That is, rhetoric and language for Milton do not achieve 
or establish truth: rather, they are part of a histor cal process in which each individual 
either approaches or departs from the truth that remains ineffable and unattainable 
until the apocalypse. Thus, Milton’s Sin cannot be figured as a resting place for the 
reader, holding meaning so that it may be reliably nd consistently found and 
understood. On the contrary, Sin becomes an allegorical figure, a meaningful figure, 
only when she enters the foray of created difference and historicity, when her 
meaning is understood within a historical context that requires language to negotiate 
its difference from sublime truth. Indeed, the stabilized meaning that Johnson seeks, 
this linguistic and rhetorical stagnancy, is only achieved against the grain of history, 
and against the grain of the dialectical, generative process out of which human beings 
and history are born. The figure of Sin ought not to be divided from her historical 
context for the same reasons that Eve’s mirror image cannot capture Eve: because 
authoring and reading the self occurs over time, because that time is born out of 
maternal, material difference, because reading and knowing are dynamic processes 
reflecting our mediated access to sublime truth, not singular events that establish what 
truth is. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
and realistic genres, thereby potentially reducing being into a merely figurative 
state (2). See introduction. 
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When God creates humankind out of the maternal stuff of the material 
substratum, He voluntarily engages in a dialectical negotiation with the material 
mother of mankind, from whom He has retired His informing presence and will. The 
generative dialectic He initiates produces “adverse” emnants, which, in turn, signal 
humankind’s maternally-inherited otherness to and difference from God, and the 
implicit possibility of rejecting God which accompanies this inborn difference. In 
other words, monstrous matter displays the possibility for absolute difference-from-
God that is built into the material substratum, andthat is bequeathed to human beings. 
Thus, it represents both humankind’s ability to refus  God’s love and, in the end, the 
threat of eternal banishment that accompanies that refusal, for the adverse, the dregs, 
will not be incorporated into the ideal conversation which will bring God and his 
children into the absolute wholeness and union of the “All in All.” Instead, these 
dregs—including the original ur-placenta of creation, the monstrous devils tossed out 
of heaven, and the “filth” produced by Sin on earth—will be devoured by Death, will 
become the stuff of annihilation, and thus the basis of a mimicking and false 
absoluteness which is antithetical to heavenly ontol gy, and which turns out to be 
absolutely nothing. 
Language anti-allegorical, language that “captures” truth outside of the 
generative and historical context which makes languge and allegory necessary, also 
faces this dreadful end: false, idolatrous, rhetorical constructions will be relegated to 
their antithetical reign, lost to the meaningless of an identity not in conversation with 
the sublime.  Readers who follow these rhetorical idols will lose their interpretative 
capabilities, their freedom to negotiate the difference between the signifier and the 
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sublime ur-referent, to choose and discover meaning i  the gap between the text and 
the truth it accommodates. Indeed, as the poem sugge ts, when read outside of the 
context of history and attenuated difference, Sin will be sin not according to her 
transgressive role, but rather because she is so named. Her absolute beingness, her 
rhetorical “capture,” will erase and write over the original and final source of 
meaning and being—the eternal, stable, and determind “I am that I am” (Exodus 
3:14), the father who releases creation into an individuated being, lets fly the 
signifiers that tentatively and progressively refer to Him, and waits for them to 
capture Him again. 
Indeed, Sin’s role as a figure of identity and entrapment, and of anti-
maternality and a-historicity, stand in stark contras  to the human mother with which 
this chapter began. For as Eve leaves her mirror image behind and exchanges an 
illusory identity for a world of difference, she becomes a willing and free participant 
in a history which will be constituted in part by her actions and choices—actions and 
choices that are motivated and informed by the fact that Eve negotiates the difference 
between the “I” and the self. Moreover, by this departure from an illusory identity, 
Eve becomes the mother of mankind, the woman whose mat rnal role sustains the 
generative dialectic, and the gender difference, that was inscribed into history at the 
spirit’s creation of the earth. Eve, an active and willing participant in and reader of 
the world of difference into which she was born, acts and chooses within that history, 
and thus helps to forward the progression toward the sublime “all in all.” In contrast, 
Sin, the anti-maternal, anti-allegorical figure of hell, demonstrates in rhetorical and 
maternal/material terms the erasure of history and the deprivation of life that results, 
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necessarily, from absolute adversity to God, and the absence of meaning that is 
effected when someone other-than-God—namely, Satan—attempts to achieve the 
absolute rhetorical identity that can only be reclaimed at the assimilation of all life 
into the “all in all.” 
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Chapter 4: Allegorical Ethics and Universal Language 
Schemas 
 
Be of good courage, I begin to feel 
Some rousing motions in me which dispose 
To something extraordinary my thoughts. 
(Samson Agonistes)106 
According to Victoria Kahn, Samson Agonistes displays how an aesthetic 
experience—for example, the experience of reading a play—can rouse hermeneutic, 
and indeed political, activity. She locates one of the play’s primary spurs to such 
activity in “the deliberate opacity of [the play’s reference to] Samson’s rousing 
motions” by which “the reader is provoked to a sublime activity of interpretation 
which is itself rousing. In [Walter] Benjamin’s vocabulary, the aesthetic appearance 
of totality is extinguished by a strange and fragmentary ostentation that provokes a 
surplus of interpretation; in Milton’s vocabulary, sight is displaced by reading.”107 
Given Kahn’s description of this provocation to herm neutic activity, what she calls 
“opacity” might be akin to what I have been calling allegorical difference—the 
                                                
106 Milton, John, Samson Agonistes, in John Milton: Complete Poems and Major 
Prose, ed. Merritt Hughes (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1957), pp. 548-93, lines. 
1381-83. 
107 Victoria Kahn, “Aesthetics as critique: Tragedy and Trauerspiel in Samson 
Agonistes,” in Reading Renaissance Ethics, ed. Marshall Grossman (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 104-27, esp. p. 119. 
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difference between language and the truth to which it refers. “[R]ousing motions” 
provokes a “surplus of interpretation” because it so o tentatiously fails to capture 
what it means to say.  
 According to Kahn, the hermeneutic activity provoked by linguistic “opacity” 
is an essential part of Milton’s aesthetic strategy. By provoking hermeneutic activity, 
Samson Agonistes offers an aesthetic alternative to Restoration drama, which arrested 
such interpretation and action by encouraging audience members to wallow in 
“sentiment and pity” (114) for the suffering (and seemingly powerless) characters 
onstage. Contrary to the predominant Restoration aesthetic, Milton’s play aims not to 
incapacitate audiences whose passions have been aroused, but rather to stimulate 
them to take intellectual, hermeneutic, and political action. “The goal of Samson 
Agonistes is to turn such passions into action, to make passion the spur to action, 
through the mediation of dramatic representation or aesthetic form” (114): if nothing 
else, Samson Agonistes provokes its readers to think about what “rousing motions” 
means.108 
                                                
108 Kahn’s assertion that Milton sets out Samson as an exemplar of political activity  
seems to accord with Feisal G. Mohamed’s argument that the play “provides a 
preponderance of evidence pointing to Samson’s heroic status” (329). It must be 
noted, however, that the violent end of Samson Agonistes has historically raised many 
questions about whether the play unequivocally encourages such activity in all of its 
forms. For example, David Norbrook compares Samson’s actions with those of Christ 
in Paradise Regained: “the contrast between [Samson Agonistes] and Paradise 
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 This, I think, is a helpful jumping off point for understanding what I take to be 
the confrontational, polemical status of Paradise Lost in the cultural and intellectual 
milieu of the Restoration. For while Kahn sees linguistic “opacity” in Samson 
Agonistes overturning a dramatic aesthetic that supported Restoration ideology by 
encouraging intellectual, hermeneutic, and political complacency, I see Milton in 
Paradise Lost emphasizing the allegorical nature of his language in order to counter 
and confront a Restoration ideology which itself threatened to subdue, if not halt, 
hermeneutic activity: the idea of a universal language schema. According to its 
proponents, a universal language schema would perfect language by capturing the 
thing in a word, and would, by erasing the differenc  between speaking and truth 
make hermeneutic activity (i.e., interpretation) redundant.  
 As David Cram notes, while the notion of a universal language schema 
circulated in England from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, it gained significant 
support in the years after the Restoration.109 Most notably, John Wilkins, a founding 
                                                                                                                                 
Regained presents us with different responses to the question of action that may have 
been appropriate to each circumstance, rather than a clear contrast between godly 
passivity and ungodly action” (139). See Feisal G. Mohamed, “Confronting Religious 
Violence: Milton’s Samson Agonistes,” PMLA 120, no. 2 (March 2005): 327-40; and 
David Norbrook, “Republican Occasions in Paradise Regained and Samson 
Agonistes,” Milton Studies 42 (2003): 122-48. 
109 David Cram, “Universal Language Schemes in Seventeenth-Century Britain,” 
Histoire Epistémologie Language 7, no. 2 (1985): pp. 35-36. 
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fellow of the Royal Society, published An Essay Towards a Real Character, and  a 
Philosophical Language, in which he promised to design a language that captured 
what is, thereby authoritatively determining what the English people could take to be 
true. This notion, of course, runs counter to the allegorical ethics that are so 
prominent in Paradise Lost. For, as I have already demonstrated, the poem dees 
language to be an inexact mediator of the sublime, and takes reading to be an active 
process of judging and choosing that is provoked by the insufficiency of language to 
tell us exactly what is, to tell us a definitive truth. Thus, whereas proponents of 
universal language schemas promised to eliminate hermeneutic activity, Paradise 
Lost asserts that linguistic “opacity,” and the hermeneutic activity that it inspires, are 
inevitable aspects of the human condition—of being different from God and thus of 
speaking a language that does not capture truth. 
 In this chapter, I want to draw out the contrasts between the universal 
language schema proposed by Wilkins, and the linguistic ethics of Paradise Lost. In 
so doing, I will show that Milton’s poem not only offers an alternative to, but actually 
purposefully challenges, the totalizing linguistics to which Wilkins and other 
proponents of universal language schemas aspired. I will begin by explaining how 
Paradise Lost re-applies a rhetorical strategy that Milton had already used, in the 
mid-seventeenth century, to counter Prelates, Presbyt rians, and Charles I’s various 
attempts to suppress individual hermeneutic activity. More specifically, I will 
demonstrate that Areopagitica, Eikonoklastes, and Paradise Lost all overturn the 
metaphors by which figures of political, theological, and intellectual authority seek to 
establish what is true by pointing out their metaphorical standing—i.e., the fact that 
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truth always exceeds our capacity to know and represent it. By so doing, Milton 
insists that they can never determine definitively what truth is, and, perhaps more 
importantly, that they can never exclude the activity of interpretation from the reading 
(or hearing) process. 
 In fact, in this chapter I will draw a continuous line between the polemics of 
Eikonoklastes and Areopagitica, in which Milton takes aim at the architectural 
metaphor by which Adam Steuart validates church hierarchy, and the polemics of 
Paradise Lost, in which Milton exposes the futility of John Wilkins’s attempt to 
impose his orderly linguistic framework onto the natur l world, of his desire to 
establish the form and content of truth and cease hermeneutic activity. I will show 
that Milton counters this linguistic epistemological model, as he did with Steuart’s 
architectural metaphor, by asserting that truth exce ds it. More specifically, Milton 
emphasizes the difference between the logic that is inscribed into Wilkins’s language 
and the complicated and even ineffable ontology of the created world. Moreover, by 
turning the serpent in the garden of Eden into a sort of Wilkinsonian character who 
articulates the epistemology and echoes the linguistic idealism found in Wilkins’s 
Essay, Milton suggests that the ideology of the universal language schema motivates 
Eve’s decision to eat the forbidden fruit. Eve falls because she, like Wilkins, forgets 
that language stands in an allegorical relationship to truth, because she, like Wilkins, 
privileges the logic of language over her experience of the world, over the material 
text—the natural world—which God Himself left for her to read. She falls because 
instead of engaging in the hermeneutic activity invited by the “opacity” of the 







 In Zerubabbel to Sanballat and Tobiah, Adam Steuart, a Presbyterian and that 
infamous “A.S.” of Milton’s “On the New Forcers of Conscience under the Long 
Parliament,” responds to Congregationalist claims of hermeneutic and theological 
independence and self-determination by contending that only a central authority (i.e., 
the Presbyterian synod) should decide on matters of the logy, and that theological 
tenets ought to be disseminated from this centralized place of authority to the 
congregations spread across England.110 In an introductory letter “To Monsieur 
Buchanan, a Scottish Gentleman at London,” Steuart argues that disrupting this 
hierarchical system will weaken the church: 
And is not this Communion [of a united holy church] extreamly 
weakened by means of the distractions of the severall members of the 
Body, and by reason of the obstruction of the Vessells, which should 
serve her as so many Conduit-pipes? How should this Spirit freely 
passe up and downe from one part of the Body to the t r, for the 
entire aggregation of the Body of the Saints, by its influence if a 
singularity of Discipline, as a thick Hedge, interpose, and choake up 
its way? How should ever this Body grow into a perfect man, 
                                                
110 Steuart, Adam, Zerubbabel to Saballat and Tobiah: or, The first part of the duply 
to M.S. alias Two brethren, 2nd ed. (London: John Field, 1645), in Early English 




according to the measure of that perfect state of Christ in all its 
joints, if so be that the Foot have no need of the Ey ; if the inferiour 
members disjoynt, and loose themselves from the noble parts, and the 
noble despise the lesse honourable, which yet are the more 
necessary? (5-6) 
 
Steuart, hoping that Christians will achieve a “Communion”—a spiritual “Union” that 
emulates the “unity” of the Father and the Son—provides his readers with a 
metaphorical understanding of how Independency, and the free hermeneutic reign to 
which Independents aspire, make such a union impossible. By “choak[ing] up” “the 
Vessels” through which the “Spirit” circulates, the Independents disjoin “inferiour 
members” (such as feet) from the “noble parts” of the church “Body,” a body that 
aspires to “grow into a perfect man.”   
 Steuart’s reference to the “thick Hedge [that] interpose[s], and chaoke[s] up its 
way” invokes two complementary images. The first is of those rows of bushes which 
marked and maintained English property lines in the seventeenth century, thereby 
“interpos[ing]” the movement of animals and people across the countryside, and 
physically, economically, and politically dividing the inferior from the noble, the 
landed from the landless.111 More importantly for our interests, the second image 
                                                
111 See Oxford English Dictionary, “hedge,” n. 1a, 2nd ed. 1989: “ A row of bushes or 
low trees (e.g. hawthorn, or privet) planted closely to form a boundary between 
pieces of land or at the sides of a road: the usual form of fence in England.” On 
how enclosures divided English classes and helped to precipitate social, political, 
and economic chaos in the seventeenth century, see Christopher Hill, The World 
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shows how Steuart aesthetically contrasts Presbyterian hierarchy with egalitarian 
Independency: the “thick Hedge” imagines a botanical body which, unlike the 
circulatory system Steuart describes, appears to bea congeries of branches and leaves 
devoid of system or design—one whose growth, like a par sitic vine suffocating its 
host, potentially “choake[s] up” the church Body.112 Steuart’s metaphor indicates not 
only that Independency disrupts the circulatory system he sketches, but also that, as a 
growing and tangled conglomerate of competing beliefs, t fails to display the 
systematic certainty which Steuart validates church hierarchy—that is, the circulatory 
metaphor by which Steuart explains hierarchy’s importance to spiritual 
“Communion.” The “thick Hedge” is dismissed because it cannot be incorporated into 
the orderly, anatomical system that Steuart uses to conceptualize and commend the 
right form of English society, and because, as a “thick Hedge,” it does not display the 
orderly and definitive truth so beautifully exhibited by the English church’s emulation 
of the “perfect man.”  
                                                                                                                                 
Turned Upside Down (London: Penguin, 1975), esp. chapt. 3, “Masterless Men,” 
and chapt. 7, “Levellers and True Levellers”. See also Mark Kishlansky, A 
Monarchy Transformed: Britain 1603-1714 (London: Penguin Books, 1996), esp. 
pp. 18-19. 
112 See Oxford English Dictionary, “choke,” v. 7, 2nd e. 1989: “ To kill (or 
injuriously affect) a plant, by depriving it of air and light. Often fig. (from the 
parable of the sower).” 
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 Milton directly challenges this kind of evaluation f truth, which takes the 
certainty of a comprehensible system of organization, and the conformity of a body of 
people to a mechanistic metaphor of the circulatory system, to be a sign of right. In 
fact, Milton appears to have taken specific umbrage t the analogous evaluation of 
right that defines and dominates Steuart’s text: 
 
  EZRA 4.1, 2,3. 
The Adversaries of Judah came to Zerubbabel, and to the chiefe of 
the fathers, and said unto them : Let us build with you , for We seek 
your God, as ye do, and we do sacrifice unto him since the dayes of 
Esarhaddon king of Assur, which brought us up hither. But 
Zerubbabel, and Jeshua, and the rest of the chief of the fathers of 
Israel, said unto them, You have nothing to do with us, to build an 
house unto our God, and we ourselves together will build unto the 
Lord God of Israel. 
 
Steuart places this quotation in the frontispiece of his text and draws an analogy 
between the characters in this Biblical story and the antagonists in contemporary 
theological and political debates. He alleges that while the Presbyterian synod, like 
the Jews who had escaped the Babylonian captivity, are set “upon the re-building, or 
the Reforming of the spirituall Temple” the schismatics, like Sanballat and Tobiah, 
are excluded from this project because they “discouraged the Worke-men, and 
retarded the Worke” (6). He then poses a rhetorical question to the schismatics of 
seventeenth-century England:  
How can the Building of the Spirituall Temple be adv nced, if the 
worke-men  will needs doe their worke every one a part, and will not 
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maintaine a close correspondence, and understanding the one with 
the other? (6) 
 
Steuart urges that the building of the spiritual temple requires each Christian to 
understand how his contribution fits into an authorized and agreed-upon design. If 
each determines his role independently, i.e., “every one a part,” then the construction 
of the temple will not “be advanced.” 
 Moreover, Steuart gives his architectural metaphor itself the deterministic force of 
the architectural design he describes. By imagining the ideal English society in 
architectural terms, Steuart alleges that difference is dangerous: like a misplaced 
stone, whatever diverges from his metaphorical archite tural scheme threatens the 
stability of the ideal society he seeks rhetorically to uphold. Thus, Steuart’s 
metaphorical vehicle does not admit its difference from the tenor it seeks to 
accommodate—i.e., the form and structure of an ideal Christian society in touch with 
spiritual truth—but rather asserts itself as the foundation against which the ideal 
Christian society should be measured, and according to which the unity of design and 
purpose ought to be enforced. 
 In Areopagitica, published approximately eight months after the appe rance of 
Zerubabbel to Sanballat and Tobiah, Milton exposes and embraces the difference that 
Steuart seeks to suppress. He opines  that England can become “a Nation of Prophets, 
of Sages, and of Worthies” if the “opinions” born of “arguing…and writing” be let 
free, if men are allowed “to reassume the ill departed care of their Religion into their 
own hands again” (554). Yet, the Prelates, for fear“of sect and schism,” cry out 
against the unfettered, unmappable process of building the house of God: 
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As if, while the Temple of the Lord was building, some cutting, some 
squaring the marble, others hewing the cedars thereshould be a sort 
of irrational men who could not consider there must be many schisms 
and many dissections made in the quarry and in the timber, ere the 
house of God can be built. And when every stone is laid artfully 
together, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be 
contiguous in this world; neither can every peece of the building be 
of one form; nay rather the perfection consists in th s, that out of 
many moderat varieties and brother dissimilitudes that are not vastly 
disproportional arises the goodly and graceful symmetry that 
commands the whole pile and structure. Let us therefore be more 
considerat builders, more wise in spirituall architecture, when great 
reformation is expected. (555) 
 
Perhaps because they do not recognize that the architecture of the church is a kind of 
“spirituall architecture,” or that it stands in a metaphorical relationship to the sublime 
truth—i.e., to the true church that will emerge at the end of days—“irrational men” 
worry that building the house of God does not conform to earthly standards of sound 
architectural construction. Because the constructive metaphor by which they describe 
the ideal Christian society has come, inappropriately, o dominate their understanding 
of how the house of God ought to be built, of how religious truth is discovered, these 
men have lost sight of the difference between the metaphor and the spiritual thing it 
represents—the difference between earthly architectur , which is grounded in human 
experience, and “spirituall architecture,” which reaches toward the incomprehensible.  
 But even this distinction between the earthly and “spirituall” construction does 
not quite situate “spirituall architecture” in the progressive reaching toward truth. 
Milton also alerts his readers to the difference betwe n the spiritual temple they build 
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and the final temple that will be realized at the end of days. The temple to which we 
actively contribute, he urges, “cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be 
contiguous in this world” (my italics).113 The apparent disorder of the construction of 
the temple results not only from the fact that it does not conform to earthly designs, 
but also from the fact that it has not yet realized, or been assimilated into, the perfect 
form of the final church. Instead of treating the house of God as an edifice that must 
conform to the apparent perfection and order of design, we ought to be “more wise in 
spirituall architecture” and wait for the “great reformation [that] is expected,” for the 
revelation of the true church to whose structure we blindly, yet faithfully, contribute. 
Until then, the temple we build will navigate the difference between the earthly and 
the sublime, and will conform absolutely to neither form. 
 By asserting that “spirituall architecture” reflects the difference between earthly 
understanding and sublime truth, Milton implies that true spiritual progress does not 
require the kind of order Steuart embraces. Thus, he challenges Steuart’s threat that 
Independence will dissolve the perfect Christian society, his warning that to allow 
each Christian, or even each congregation, to self-determine, to break from the church 
design authorized by the synod, would be “Anarchie” (27):  
                                                
113 See also p. 550: “There be who perpetually complain of schism and sects, and 
make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their maxims. ‘Tis their own 
pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing, who neither will hear with 




As to that, that they permit any one whatsoever, if he have the ability, 
to Preach publickly in their Assemblies, notwithstanding that he have 
not Orders , This is one of the greatest Disorders, that can possibly 
happen in the world; This, what is it other, but to bring in all kinde of 
Fanatiques, and Enthusiasts, and to expose Christian Religion to be 
made a laughing-stock to the Enemies of Gods Truth ;  And to make 
of the House of God, which is an House of Order, a Babell of 
Disorder; and horrible Confusion? (34) 
 
In contrast, from the start of Areopagitica, Milton places himself in the rhetorical 
position of St. Paul speaking before the Areopagus, thus pronouncing himself to be 
speaking in the kind of disordered speech against which Steuart warns: 
 
Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoicks, 
encountered him. And some said, What will this babbler say? other 
some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods: because he 
preached unto them Jesus, and the resurrection.  
(Acts 17.18) 
 
As Marshall Grossman has noted, by placing himself in this rhetorical position, 
Milton turns the threat of linguistic confusion on its head.114 For while the Epicureans 
and stoics, faced with the strange message he spoke, charged that St. Paul was a 
“babbler,” that he was “utter”[ing] inarticulate orindistinct sounds,” Parliament 
                                                
114 See “Areopagitica,” in Marshall Grossman, The Seventeenth Century Literature 
Handbook (in press, Oxford: Blackwell, 2011).  
 
182 
knows that St. Paul was speaking prophetic, Christian truth. 115 Speech that sounds 
disordered, then, is a sign of spiritual progress. 
 In fact, Milton not only frames his rhetorical task of telling uncomfortable truths 
to Parliament by alluding to St. Paul’s speech before the Areopagus. He also re-
articulates the truth-teller’s rhetorical conundrum in his description of the Roman 
censor’s ignorant response to the polemics of Carneades, Critoluas, and Diogenes, 
placing in Cato’s mouth the very word that had been hurled against St. Paul: 
The Romans also for many ages train’d up only to a military 
roughness, resembling most the Lacedaemonian guise, knew of 
learning little but what their twelve Tables, and thePontifick College 
with their Augurs and Flamins taught them in Religion and Law, so 
unacquainted with other learning, that when Carneades and 
Critolaus, with the Stoick Diogenes coming Embassadors to Rome, 
took thereby occasion to give the City a tast of their Philosophy, they 
were suspected for seducers by no lesse a man than Cato the Censor, 
who mov’d it in the Senat to dismisse them speedily, and to banish 
all such Attick bablers out of Italy. (497) 
 
Echoing the responses of the stoics to St. Paul, Cato responds to the polemicist 
peripatetics who have come to Rome to speak new truths by accusing them of being 
                                                
115 Oxford English Dictionary, “babble,” 1, 2nd edition 1989. While the OED 
plaintively attributes the origin of the word “babble” to “ba, ba, one of the earliest 
articulate sounds made by infants,” and finds “No direct connections with Babel,” 




“bablers.” Thus, Milton subtly recommends to Parliament that they not mimic the 
pagan Greeks or the ignorant Cato, that they not respond to Milton by accusing him 
of talking nonsense. 
 More importantly for our interests, by implying tha  new truths are not amenable 
to the linguistically-limited powers-that-be (i.e., to Romans “train’d up only to a 
military roughness”), Milton carefully places language in his progressive vision of 
reaching toward truth. Confusing language, it seems, is evidence of spiritual and 
intellectual achievement, of a speaker’s verbal delivery of new truths that exceed the 
customary linguistic schema that upholds a stagnant and limited understanding of the 
world. While Milton places spiritual architecture in the space between earthly 
understanding and sublime truth, thereby freeing reli ious belief and worship from 
the bindings of Steuart’s earthly architecture and validating apparent theological 
dissonance as a sign of Christian progress, he also places language in this space, 
thereby recovering verbal dissonance as a sign of spiritual and intellectual growth. 
Language, especially prophetic language, exceeds earthly paradigms. But because it 
is not yet united with the sublime truth to which it can only refer, such prophetic 
language can sound like “horrible Confusion.” 
 In fact, Milton’s treatment of architecture and language not only follow the same 
paradigms. In Eikonoklastes, Milton fuses them, placing the division of both tongues 
and hands at the building of the temple:  
He [Charles] censures, and in censuring seems to hope it will be an 
ill Omen that they who build Jerusalem divide thir ongues and 
hands. But his hope fail’d him with his example; for tha there were 
divisions both of tongues and hands at the building of Jerusalem, the 
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Story would have certifi’d him; and yet the work prosper’d; and if 
God will, so may this; notwithstanding all the craft nd malignant 
wiles of Sanballat and Tobiah, adding what fuell they can to our 
dissentions; or the indignity of his comparison that lik’ns us to those 
seditious Zelots whose intestine fury brought destruction to the last 
Jerusalem. (562-63) 
 
As the emerging form of the earthly temple exceeds human design and exposes the 
difference between earthly architectural form and the final form of the heavenly 
church—i.e., between earthly metaphor and divine truth—so prophetic language 
refers to a truth it cannot capture, and thus challenges the stagnation of human 
thought that is inscribed into language. The prophetic, polemical speech that to 
customary thinkers and speakers sounds like mere babble, and that appears to divide 
tongues in linguistic and theological dissonance, will like the contiguous bricks of 




 As I have already demonstrated, Paradise Lost also insists that language exposes 
and negotiates the difference between human thinking, human expression, and 
sublime truth. For example, as I argued in chapter 2, a vast difference emerges 
between who Eve is and how she is spoken by Adam. And as I argued in chapter 3, 
Raphael tells us that the discursive reasoning to which he must tune his speech is 
merely an accommodation of a sublime truth that exce ds human reason, and that will 
be revealed only at the end of days—when the difference between the ens and the 
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created individual collapses into absolute unity, into the singular “I am” from which 
human beings were divided and out of which they were created. Thus, Milton’s mid-
century linguistic aesthetic—his sense of the difference between absolute truth and 
human capacities for knowing, framing, and speaking truth—is sustained in Paradise 
Lost. Moreover, the poem’s depiction of the creative process—in which God 
individuates maternal matter from Himself, thereby releasing creation into an 
individuated state—and its references to and figuration of the absolute unity that will 
collapse this individuation, give this linguistic and intellectual difference material, 
ontological grounding. That is, Paradise Lost offers an historical and material 
explanation for the difference that emerges between sp aking and truth, and between 
the truth that can be accessed within created historicity, and the truth that will be 
revealed at the end of days.  
 The fact that Paradise Lost exposes and explains linguistic difference, and 
describes the generative process out of which difference emerges suggests that it 
follows those epistemological paradigms by which Milton, in Areopagitica and 
Eikonoklastes, countered the authoritarian texts of the mid-sevente nth century. But 
what does this mean for what I am taking to be the pol mical strain of Paradise Lost 
itself? How might the continuities I have traced between Milton’s polemical prose 
and his epic poem characterize Paradise Lost as a confrontational, or even an 
iconoclastic, text? In order to understand the poem’s polemical stance, it will be 
necessary to consider in some detail the genealogy of the ideology which it 
confronts—specifically, how Wilkins and his fellow Royal Society members, 
Abraham Cowley and Thomas Sprat, came to imagine that language could capture 
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truth, and the epistemological and aesthetic results of he linguistically-bounded 
thinking they supported. 
 Abraham Cowley’s “To the Royal Society,” an encomiu  to Bacon included in 
the introductory text of Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society, provides a 
condensed narrative of how linguistic idealism develop d out of the promising birth 
of empiricism. Postulating Bacon to be the father of scientific inquiry, the poem 
credits him with initiating a new, clear, and transparent style of expression. While the 
“Guardians and Tutors” of Bacon’s age fed “Philosophy” only the malnourishing 
sweets of  discourse, the “Desserts of Poetry,” rather than the “solid meats” of true 
intellectual pursuit—that is, of empirical investigation—Bacon rescued Philosophy 
from this malnourished, “Captive” state by observing things directly: 
From Words, which are but Pictures of the Thought,  
(Though we our Thoughts from them perversly drew)  
To Things, the Minds right Object, he it brought,  
Like foolish Birds to painted Grapes we flew;  
He sought and gather'd for our use the Tru;  
And when on heaps the chosen Bunches lay,  
He prest them wisely the Mechanic way,  
Till all their juyce did in one Vessel joyn,  
Ferment into a Nourishment Divine,  
The thirsty Souls refreshing Wine.116  
                                                
116 Abraham Cowley, “To the Royal Society,” in Sprat, Thomas, The History of the 
Royal-Society of London, For the Improving of Naturl Knowledge (London: J.R. 





Rather than wasting time on a fruitless focus on “Words” or “Pictures of the 
Thought,” Bacon led us to the “Tru” things, observing and testing their mechanical 
properties so that they might reveal themselves, produce their own truths, and nourish 
our Souls. 
 Bacon’s favoring of “Things, the Minds right Object” over the “Pictures of 
Thought” resulted in a new rhetorical style:  
His candid Stile like a clean Stream does slide,  
And his bright Fancy all the way  
Does like the Sun-shine in it play;  
It does like Thames, the best of Rivers, glide,  
Where the God does not rudely overturn,  
But gently pour the Crystal Vrn,  
And with judicious hand does the whole Current guide. 
T’ (sic) has all the Beauties Nature can impart, 
And all the comely dress without the paint of Art. 
 
Infused with Bacon’s “fancy” as is the “clean Stream” with sunlight, Bacon’s “candid 
Stile” openly reveals, rather than clouding over, the products of his imagination. 
Assuring us that these products are, for all their “play,” not simply poetic fantasies or 
sources of rhetorical and intellectual confusion, Cowley metaphorically aligns 
Bacon’s “fancy” with the water that “the God” “gently pour[s]” into the Thames as he 
“judicious[ly]” guides it along its peaceful (or un-overturned) path. Like the smooth 
flowing of the river Thames as it is pushed by “the God” along its path, Bacon’s 
prose is direct, truthful, and transparent. 




 Cowley thus champions the idealistic linguistic ethos of the Royal Society, whose 
members sought to erase the difference between expression and thinking and to 
represent their observations of the natural world in a direct, transparent way. 
Moreover, by stressing the similarity of Bacon’s style to the movement of the 
Thames—a liquid stand-in for the English landscape that Bacon explored—and by 
asserting that Bacon’s language achieves a natural beauty, Cowley insists that 
Bacon’s language (and the writing of the scientists he inspires), fuses thinking, word, 
and thing. Cowley’s metaphor for Bacon’s clear style hus reveals the erasure of 
difference—between thinking, expression, and truth—t at serves as the optimistic 
premise of the universal language schema. 
 The main text of Sprat’s History follows up on this optimism. Sprat promises that 
Wilkins’s Essay will “separate the knowledge of Nature, from the colours of 
Rhetorick, the devices of Fancy, or the delightful deceit of Fables….by settling on 
inviolable correspondence between the [writing] hand d the brain…to render it an 
Instrument, whereby Making may obtain Dominion over Things” (63). Divorced from 
the confusing twists and turns of poets and scholastic rhetoricians, Wilkins’s 
universal language schema will achieve a perfect correspondence between human 
beings’ understanding of the world and their expression of that understanding. This 
correspondence of thinking and expression will achieve “Dominion” because, as 
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Sprat attests, there is an inherent agreement between thinking about the world and the 
world itself: 117  
'Tis true, the mind of Man is a Glass, which is able to represent to it 
self, all the Works of Nature: But it can onely shew those Figures, 
which have been brought before it: (97) 
 
Given that our thoughts about the world are necessarily apt, as soon as we find a way 
to express accurately our intellectual responses to the world, we will find a way to 
write the world exactly as it is, and to disseminate textually the knowledge that we, as 
members of the Royal Society, have accumulated.118 
 This optimism takes a striking turn, for Wilkins and Sprat projected that once the 
exact expression of the world is realized, once the exact correspondence of thinking, 
expression, and thing is set in place, language would no longer be an inexact 
                                                
117 Sidonie Clauss calls this epistemological assumption “univocal thought,” and 
notes, “[c]learly the presumption that all people share the same thoughts is 
prerequisite to the invention and institution of a philosophical language whereby 
they will use uniform signifiers to express universal ideas theory” (546). See 
Sidonie Clauss, “John Wilkins' Essay Towards a Real Character: Its Place in the 
Seventeenth-Century Episteme,” Journal of the History of Ideas 43.4 (Oct. - Dec., 
1982): pp. 531-53. 
118 This appears to be part of the motivation for the Royal Society’s collection of 
descriptions of natural things found all over the world. See p. 61, where Sprat 
describes the “purpose” of the Royal Society: “to make faithful Records, of all the 
works of Nature, or Art, which can come within our reach.” 
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metaphor of the world, one whose tenuous and shifting relationship to truth breeds 
misconceptions and divergences of opinion. Rather, it would serve as an exact verbal 
model of truth, as a linguistic replica according to which our understanding of truth 
would be formed. 
 Indeed, this is part of what Wilkins and Sprat promise, as they anticipate that the 
universal language schema will silence what they take o be the Babylonian confusion 
that had threatened England’s stability during the Civil Wars. By eliminating 
linguistic ambiguity and polysemy, and thus making redundant the individual, 
hermeneutic activity that led to the insolence of the multitudes and the theological 
discord of competing religious sects, the universal language schema will become the 
linguistic foundation of peace and theological agreem nt: 
So that if men should generally consent upon the same way or 
manner of Expression, as they do agree in the same Notion, we 
should then be freed from that Curse in the Confusion of Tongues, 
with all the unhappy consequences of it. (Part I, Chap. V. Sect I.) 
 
The disruption of the true church, and the chaos of the Civil Wars, resulted from 
individual hermeneutic activity, from the willy-nilly reading and interpretation that 
were provoked by variety of expression. By establishing finally and authoritatively 
what words mean, Wilkins’s universal language  “will….contribute much to the 
clearing of some of our Modern difference in Religion, by unmasking many wild 
errors, that shelter themselves under the disguise of affected phrases” (Dedicatory 
Epistle), thereby helping us to recover from the theological dissonance that resulted 
from the “Confusion of Tongues.” 
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 Wilkins is not alone in making this assertion. In fact, Sprat more explicitly maps 
Babylonian confusion onto the English Civil Wars, and promises that by freeing 
England (and eventually the world) from Babylonian co fusion, the Royal Society’s 
universal language schema will also end the sectarian divides as well as political and 
social tumults that led to and characterized the English Civil Wars: 
In the Wars themselves (which is a time, wherein all Languages use, 
if ever, to increase by extraordinary degrees; for in such busie, and 
active times, there arise more new thoughts of men, which must be 
signifi'd, and varied by new expressions) then I say, it receiv'd many 
fantastical terms, which were introduc'd by our Religious Sects; and 
many outlandish phrases, which several Writers, and Translators, in 
that great hurry, brought in, and made free as theypl as'd, and with 
all it was inlarg'd by many sound, and necessary Foms, and Idioms, 
which it before wanted. And now, when mens minds are somewhat 
settled, their Passions allai'd, and the peace of our C untry gives us 
the opportunity of such diversions: if some sober and judicious Men, 
would take the whole Mass of our Language into their ands, as they 
find it, and would set a mark on the ill Words; correct those, which 
are to be retain'd; admit, and establish the good; an  make some 
emendations in the Accent, and Grammar: I dare pronounce, that our 
Speech would quickly arrive at as much plenty, as it is capable to 
receive; and at the  greatest smoothness, which its derivation from 
the rough German will allow it. (42) 
 
The restoration of the king to the English throne, and the intellectual settling it 
effected, marked a propitious occasion to recover from the Civil Wars by correcting 
language and establishing a universal system of clear signification. This new 
language, in its turn, will model and enforce the right kind of thinking about things, 
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and will maintain the peace that Charles II’s kingship has already installed. Thus, 
Wilkins and Sprat not only propose to make individual hermeneutic activity 
redundant. Revisiting the threat of Babylonian disorder that Steuart and his peers had 
leveled against the Independents, they also promise that a universal language will 
establish and ensure the linguistic, hermeneutic, and religious conformity that is key 
to maintaining English peace.  
 Clearly, Milton would have been appalled at this as ertion of linguistic and 
religious authority, and at the notion that a linguistic schema could capture truth, for it 
runs in direct contrasts to his politics, and to his allegorical ethics. In fact, we see the 
ethical opposition between Wilkins and Milton, first and foremost, in their aesthetic 
contrasts, and, indeed, in Wilkins’s rejection of the aesthetics of the Miltonic sublime. 
For example, while in Paradise Lost even angels are unsure of the authority of their 
language, asking “…to recount Almighty works / What words or tongue of Seraph 
can suffice” (7.11203), Wilkins, claiming to ground his language in observation and 
logic, takes the “prophetic strain” (Milton, Lycidas) of religious enthusiasts and 
modern prophets to represent a dangerous form of religious and rhetorical 
charlatanism. 119 He hypothesizes that by grounding our epistemology in the logic of 
words, he will expose the fiction of the sublime aesth tic: 
                                                
119 See Catherine Gimelli Martin on other cues that much of Wilkins’s Essay was 
written in direct response to Milton (“Rewriting the Revolution: Milton, Bacon, 
and the Royal Society Rhetoricians,” in Science, Literature, and Rhetoric in Early 
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To which it will be proper for me to add, That this design will 
likewise contribute much to the clearing of some of our Modern 
differences in Religion, by unmasking many wild errors, that shelter 
themselves under the disguise of affected phrases; which being 
Philosophically unfolded, and rendered according to the genuine and 
natural importance of Words, will appear to be inconsistencies and 
contradictions. And several of those pretended, mysterious, profound 
notions, expressed in great swelling words, whereby some men set up 
for reputation, being this way examined, will appear to be, either 
nonsence, or very flat and jejune.120 
 
Truth, Wilkins insists, should be understood according to the perfectly ordered and 
transparent language he has designed. When we are captivated by linguistic 
paradoxes and the rhetorical flourishes of those sectarian swindlers who claim 
prophetic powers, when we are convinced that truth exceeds the capacities of 
language to decipher or explain it, we become lost in religious confusion, captives of 
the discourse of counterfeit prophets. While Milton achieves the sublime effect by 
asserting the truth of logical contradictions or unimaginable, inconceivable truths—
for example, by calling the space between heaven and hell “the palpable obscure” 
(II.406)—and thus asserts the linguistically and logically impossible status of the 
                                                                                                                                 
Modern England, edited by Janet Cummins and David Birchell [Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2007], pp. 97-124). 
120 “To the Right Honourable WILLIAM LORD VISCOUNT BROUNCKER, 
PRESIDENT; Together with the rest of the COVNCIL and FELLOWS of the 
ROYAL SOCIETY,” in An Essay. 
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referent to be evidence of its overwhelming and sublime character, Wilkins argues 
that the sublime excess of the referent that is implied by a signifier’s supposed 
“opacity” is, in truth, evidence of rhetorical “nonsence,” of the fictionality of the 
referent. 
 Wilkins appears to take aim directly at Milton’s sublime poetics. Milton’s poetics, 
in turn, place Wilkins’s rhetorical grandstanding i the mouth of the serpent, who 
asserts that truth is dominated, even defined, by both language and the human mind. 
This enables the serpent to convince Eve to reject th  sublime experience invited by 
the words of the prohibition.121 In fact, carefully preparing Eve to join him in his 
rejection of the sublime experience, the serpent begins his speech by repositioning the 
putative source of the sublime effect: 
                                                
121 Given Angelica Duran and Catherine Gimelli Martin’s explications of the frequent 
correspondences and interactions between members of the Royal Society and 
Milton, it is possible that Milton might have read Wilkins’s Essay before it was 
published in 1668. However, it is more plausible that t e idea of a universal 
language schema, along with the support of its epist mological premises, was in 
the air, so to speak, in the early years of the Restoration, and that Milton’s 
familiarity with the people and the goings-on in the Royal Society led him to 
respond to what he saw as its flaws and its hubris. See Angelica Duran, Milton 
and the Scientific Revolution (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), esp. 




Wonder not, Sovran Mistress, if perhaps 
Thou canst, who are sole Wonder, much less arm 
Thy looks, the Heav’n of mildness, with disdain, 
Displeas’d that I approach thee thus, and gaze 
Insatiate, I thus single, nor have fear’d 
Thy awful brow, more awful thus retir’d.  
(9.532-37, my italics) 
The serpent’s double use of both “wonder” and “awful” in this brief speech echoes 
the very words that the poet used to describe Satan’s e rlier experience of the 
sublime: 
Such wonder seiz’d, though after Heaven seen, 
The Spirit malign, but much more envy seiz’d 
At sight of all This World beheld so fair.  
(3.552-55) 
 
  …abasht the Devil stood, 
And felt how awful goodness is.  
(4.845-6) 
 
Satan, who now inhabits the body of the serpent, has experienced the sublime before, 
and appears to know the language by which it is described. However, while the poet’s 
description displays the difference between the sublime and Satan, and the shock that 
such a difference arouses, the serpent’s use of these terms is more circumspect. While 
“wonder” in the poet’s diction refers to a state of mind, and “awful” describes an 
abstract quality of overwhelming “goodness” as experienced from the fallen state, the 
serpent makes Eve the cause of these two responses. He tells Eve that rather than 
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“Wonder,” rather than experience and try to contend with a mysterious event, Eve 
ought to consider herself the object of “wonder[ment],” the mystery itself. And while 
the poet describes the “goodness” as “awful,” the serpent takes just one part of Eve, 
her “brow,” to be the awful presence in the garden, the thing that strikes awe. Thus 
theorizing that Eve gives off the sublime effect, the serpent resituates and focuses the 
sublime: he grounds it in the individual, closing off the broader perspective, the 
omnipresent and ineffable ontology, which is the true source of the sublime 
experience.122 
 Eve, perhaps because Adam has indoctrinated her into the authority of language, 
picks up on this contraction of the sublime into the individual, so that where she 
initially only “mark[ed] his play”—the curious movement, and the standing posture 
of the serpent—she now responds to the serpent’s speaking, so she says, with 
“wonder” (9.566). She thus indicates that an ontological-linguistic discrepancy in the 
serpent’s speaking strikes her as the very mystery of her existence once had: “I first 
awak’t, and found myself repos’d / Under a shade on flow’rs, much wond’ring where 
/ And what I was, whence thither brought, and how” (4.450-2, my italics). The 
sublime effect has contracted: at first given off by an existential question about the 
origin of the self, its source is now reduced to a sn ke’s strange capacity to speak. 
 Moreover, Eve’s shifting references to the experience of wonder betray a 
significant change in her epistemology. For while Eve in her first waking moments 
“wonders” at the fundamental question of her being, and, following “ a murmuring 
                                                
122 See chapter 2. 
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sound / Of waters” (4.453), responds openly to the cues that the landscape gives her, 
she responds to the “miracle” (9.562) of the speaking serpent by urging him to 
explain himself:  
 
    …say 
How cam’t thou speakable of mute, and how 
To me so friendly grown above the rest 
Of brutal kind, that daily are in sight? 
Say, for such wonder claims attention due. 
(9.562-66)  
 
Eve’s response to the serpent’s speaking shows that, quite naturally, her mind is no 
longer a sort of blank slate, that she has expectations for what should and should not 
be, and that when those expectations are violated, she sees a “miracle.” This results in 
a different kind of approach to knowledge than Eve had demonstrated in her first 
waking moments: Eve acquires knowledge not by an open and patient exploration of 
what the world has to offer her. Instead, she acts s an an empirical investigator, 
seeking to extract from the serpent (as Bacon did from the fruit), a logical explanation 
for his verbal abilities.  
 More importantly, in pressing the serpent to supply a narrative explanation for his 
abilities, Eve suggests that his mysterious, wonder-full linguistic capacity is 
mysterious only because the serpent has not yet produced the words that will explain 
it. “Wonder” is no longer inspired by a truth perhaps unattainable, a mystery perhaps 
left unexplained, or explained only according to sounds and the sensory experiences 
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that the world has to offer her. On the contrary, “wonder” now lends itself to inquiry 
and to verbal explication. 
 Much of this shift, as I have already indicated, can be attributed to the fact that 
Eve is no longer newly born, that she has accumulated experience. Yet, I think it also 
reflects Eve’s further indoctrination into linguistically-bounded speaking and 
thinking, and the rejection of the sublime that accompanies this indoctrination. For 
Eve does not just cease to admire the object of wonder from the overwhelmed 
perspective of an amazed, humbled, and grateful onlooker. She investigates it, armed, 
so she thinks, with the intellectual and linguistic ability to dominate and define it. 
Following the serpent’s Wilkinsonian cues, Eve has overturned her notion of the 
relationship between the human mind, human speaking, and the sublime object of 
both. 
 The serpent validates this reversal as he describe his own, intellectual experience 
of the forbidden fruit:  
 
Thenceforth to Speculations high or deep 
I turn’d my thoughts, and with capacious mind 
Consider’d all things visible in Heav’n, 
Or Earth, or Middle, all things fair and good; 
But all that fair and good in thy Divine 
Semblance, and in thy Beauty’s heav’nly Ray 
United I behold; no Fair to thine 
Equivalent or second, which compell’d 
Mee thus, though importune perhaps, to come 
And gaze, and worship thee of right declar’d 





By prompting Eve not only to “speculate” on things “high or deep,” but also to 
“consider” them—“To view or contemplate attentively, to survey, examine, inspect, 
scrutinize—”123 the serpent de-elevates the sublime even as he elevat s Eve, and her 
intellectual capacities, to the height of “all things visible in Heav’n.” He thus implies 
that the sublime, which was once the source of an overwhelming aesthetic effect, will 
become an object of Eve’s critical instrument. Eating the forbidden fruit will, as Sprat 
says of empiricism, give her the intellectual perspicacity of a God.124 
 But while the serpent echoes the rhetoric of the sublime, and suggests that for Eve 
there are, at this point, mysterious things about which she can only “speculate,” his 
rhetoric takes a different turn once Eve begins to resist the temptation to eat the fruit. 
Eve repeats the prohibition to the serpent: 
 …Of the Fruit 
Of each Tree in the Garden we may eat, 
                                                
123 Oxford English Dictionary, “consider,” 1,  2nd edition 1989. 
124 See Sprat’s History, in which he imagines the intellectual dominance that
empiricism and a perfect language will enjoy:  
….this is the highest pitch of humane reason; to foll w all the links 
of this chain, till all their secrets are open to our minds; and their 
works advanc’d, or imitated by our hands. This is truly to command 
the world; to rank all the varieties and degrees of things, so orderly 
one upon another; that standing on top of them, we may perfectly 
behold all that are below, and make them all servicable to the quiet, 
peace, and plenty of Man’s life. (110) 
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But of the Fruit of this fair Tree amidst 
The Garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat 
Thereof, nor shall ye touch it, lest ye die.  
(9.659-63) 
 
The serpent, mimicking righteous “indignation” (666) at the words of the prohibition, 
postures as an “old Orator renown’d” (670) and gives an “impassion’d” (678) speech 
against it: 
O Sacred, Wise, and Wisdom-giving Plant, 
Mother of Science, Now I feel thy Power 
Within me clear, not only to discern 
Things in thir Causes, but to trace the ways 
Of highest Agents, deem’d however wise. 
Queen of this Universe, do not believe 
Those rigid threats of Death; ye shall not Die: 
How should ye? by the Fruit? it gives you Life 
To Knowledge: By the Threat’ner? look on mee, 
Mee who have touch’d and tasted, yet both live, 
And life more perfet have attain’d than Fate 
Meant mee, by vent’ring higher than my Lot. 
Shall that be shut to Man, which to the Beast 
Is open? Or will God incense his ire 
For such a petty Tresspass, and not praise 
Rather your dauntless virtue, whom the pain 
Of Death denounct’d, whatever thing Death be, 
Detter’d not from achieving what might lead 
To happier life, knowledge of Good and Evil; 
Of good, how just? Of evil, if what is evil 





The serpent here echoes the empiricist epistemology that undergirds the universal 
language schema: he asserts that truth lies not in the authority of truths passed down, 
but rather in the landscape itself, in the “Wisdom-giving Plant, Mother of Science.” 
Again, this “Science” fosters epistemological dominion, the ability not merely to 
“speculate,” but to “discern” and “trace the ways / Of highest Agents.” More 
importantly, he takes the “Science” granted him by the plant to give him, also, a 
discernment that undercuts the sublime aesthetic. On e the “divine ways” are placed 
under his purview and consideration, they no longer inspire reverence, or give off the 
sublime effect.  
 Even more importantly, the serpent applies the linguistic and epistemological 
paradigm we have already seen articulated by Wilkins in order to raise doubts about 
not only the threat, but even the very existence, of death and evil. We can detect the 
serpent’s epistemology, and his elevation of the logic f language over truth, in the 
contrast between his dismissive reference to death— thing that appears not to fit into 
the logical framework of language—and Adam’s speculation that death, which for 
him remains undefined and unknown, must be a “dreadful thing”: 
 
 …of all the Trees 
In Paradise that bear delicious fruit 
So various, not to taste that only Tree 
Of Knowledge, planted by the Tree of Life, 
So near grows Death to Life, whate’er Death is, 





Adam responds to the prohibition with gratitude andfaith, assuming that its signifiers 
refer to something at once true and, at least for him, incomprehensible, uncaptured by 
words. He avers that “Death” refers to “Some dreadful thing,” thus implying that the 
word invokes dread in great part because it is ambiguous and imprecise, because 
“death” does not tell us what death is. 
 The serpent, in contrast, takes up these signifiers in order to dismiss their 
dreadfulness. With a slight of tongue—“whatever thing Death be”—he not only 
reminds Eve that she does not know what death is, but also cynically implies that 
death is, in fact, not a thing: that the word “death” is without referent and therefore 
ought not detract Eve from tasting the fruit. In fact, the serpent applies the same tactic 
in his treatment of evil, questioning, “if what is evil / Be real.” The word “evil,” like 
the word “death,”  is a word without thing, an empty signifier meant “to awe” and 
“keep ye low and ignorant, / His worshippers.” Whereas Adam responds with wonder 
to the uncaptured referent, the serpent, like Wilkins, nsists that such heightened 
                                                
125 Note that Adam here first acknowledges the proximity of the tree of death to the 
tree of life, and yet does not engage in a comparative nalysis of the two. Death, 
he avers, is a mystery, not to be accounted for by its proximity to the life with 
which he is so familiar. Thus, Adam here appears to esist the dialectical, 
comparative form of thinking which might be invited by the proximity of the two 
trees, and which Eve later embraces. 
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speech is a form of rhetorical trickery meant to keep us in abject awe. Thus, while the 
serpent speaks as if his primary motive were to release Eve from the grasp of God’s 
rhetorical trickery, in truth he convinces Eve to bind her thinking to the logic of 
words: he urges Eve to base her thinking solely on what can be captured by a name, 
to reject the fiction of the allegorical signifier, and, concomitantly, of the referent that 
appears to exist outside of the purview of logic and definition.  
 Unfortunately, embracing this Wilkinsonian epistemology means that Eve’s 
thinking, her access to knowledge, is limited to what words can say. Indeed, the 
serpent’s linguistically-bounded paradigm of thinking places even the experience of 
“knowing” under the provenance of words. For by arguin  that if “evil” is to be 
avoided or “shunn’d,” it must first be “known,” the s rpent subjects knowledge to the 
dialectic, comparative paradigm of definition. Asserting that to prohibit Eve from 
actively pursuing the “Knowledge of Good and Evil” is, on the one hand, 
“[un]just,”—for why should Eve not know good?—and, on the other, impractical—
for how will Eve resist evil (and thus maintain the good) if she does not “know” what 
“evil” is?—the serpent argues that Eve cannot know g od either intuitively or by 
experience. Instead she can only come to know, recognize, and successfully maintain 
good according to the dialectical process of comparatively defining and 
understanding words. She can only know good by knowi g its antonym, evil.  
 Unfortunately, Eve embraces this paradigm. Thus “impregn’d / With Reason, to 
her seeming, and with Truth” (738-39), Eve approaches t e tree, insisting, quite 




Thy praise hee also who forbids thy use, 
Conceals not from us, naming thee the Tree 
Of Knowledge, knowledge both of good and evil; 
Forbids us then to taste, but his forbidding 
Commends thee more, while it infers the good  
By thee communicated, and our want: 
For good unknown, sure is not had, or had 
And yet unknown, is as not had at all.  
      (9.750-58) 
 
Eve looks forward to “the good” (754) that will be “communicated” (755) by the tree, 
and offers a two-fold, and somewhat contradictory, a gument in support of her 
assumption that this communication will occur. She pontificates that if you do not 
know good then you do not acquire it—“For good unknow , sure is not had”—but, 
perhaps realizing that she does indeed have good, resolves that even if she has had 
good, not knowing good nullifies this having—“or had / And yet unknown, is as not 
had at all” (756-7). Eve here stubbornly privileges the dialectical experience of 
knowing good versus evil over the having of good that God has already granted her. 
Despite the fact that she has indeed “had” good, she insists that the comparative 
intellectual experience she currently lacks—the definitive knowledge of good versus 
evil—determines her experience of having.  
 Thus, although Eve, as if following the empiricists, touts the importance of the 
“assay” (747), in reality she rejects experience in favor of the dialectical form of 
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thinking that is inscribed into language.126 Strikingly, Eve’s hypocrisy mirrors both 
the serpent’s and Wilkins’s, who claim to reject the sublime in favor of a direct and 
active testing and observation of things, but who actu lly embrace logical and 
linguistic divisions which run counter to the empirical experience. In fact, Eve’s 
rejection of experience in favor of dialectical logic betrays the very epistemological 
and logical contradiction which, I believe, contributed to Wilkins’s quick fall into 
disrepute.127 We can understand this fall if we consider how Wilkins’s language 
                                                
126 Observing that the serpent offers Eve the “faulty empiricism…of mystified or 
alchemical correspondences” (281), Catherine Gimell Martin remarks that “Eve 
is undone, not by a ‘femininely’ vain desire for the universal adulation promised 
by Satan, but only by her relentless curiosity and desire for experimentation 
without recourse to the more careful checks of abstr ct reason” (280). See Martin, 
Ruins of Allegory. 
127 This fall has been explained by Sidonie Clauss, who, along with David Cram and 
Vivian Salmon, observes that while universal language gained popularity in the 
seventeenth century and received a great deal of intellectual backing, Wilkins’s 
Essay received “a cool reception after its dedication to the Royal Society” 
(Clauss, 532) and was, for years, considered “a famous failure” (Clauss, 531). 
Cram suggests that the Royal Society was trying to meet too many different goals 
simultaneously with the Essay (42). Clauss, for her part, points to the 
philosophical and theological impossibility of attaining intellectual and linguistic 
universalization in the late-seventeenth century, especially given the vast 
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schema diverged from its putatively scientific origins: in other words, if we take into 
account the difference between the science that purportedly inspired the universal 
language schema, and the form in which Wilkins’s proposal finally emerged.  
 In the first decade of the seventeenth century, Galileo was performing 
experiments that he would publish in Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences 
(1638). During his experimentation, Galileo proved that through Euclidian 
mathematics he could produce a parabola that was also a model of how a body moves 
through space, a model that helped him to represent, quantify, and predict the 
behavior of real things in the world.128 Inspired by this and other experiments, 
                                                                                                                                 
theological differences which set nations and religious sects at odds with one 
another. Additionally, she argues that Wilkins’s schema proved to be 
intellectually and politically unfeasible because each person’s experience of the 
world was too distinct, and too particular, for universalization (547). I think, 
however, that the failure of Wilkins’s universal language schema might be found 
in his and his peers’ accounts of the difficulties of subjecting the natural world to 
his structural taxonomies. See Sidonie Clauss, “John Wilkins’ Essay”; David 
Cram, “Universal Language Schemes”; and Vivian Salmon, “John Wilkin’s 
‘Essay’ (1668): Critics and continuators,” in The Study of Language in 17th-
Century England, ed. Vivian Salmon (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 1988), pp. 191-206, esp. p. 191. 
128 Galileo Galilei, Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, ed. and trans. Henry 
Crew and Alfonso de Salvio (New York: MacMillan, 1914), esp. p. 252. For a 
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Galileo, in The Assayer (1628), claimed famously that the universe was written in the 
language of mathematics: 
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands 
continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood 
unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the 
letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of 
mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other 
geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to 
understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a 
dark labyrinth.129 
 
Taking the world to be written in a mathematical language, Galileo hypothesized that 
as mathematicians and astronomers developed new, formulaic systems for modeling 
the world, they could decipher this language and learn to reveal the world as it is. The 
texts and formulae they produced would correspond exactly with the text of creation, 
which, according to Galileo, was written in forms and “geometric figures.”  
 Inspired in part by the success of Galileo’s empirical methods, and his assertion 
that we will know the world once we know its mathematical language, proponents of 
universal language schemas aspired to know the world through their own, natural 
language—one that, like Galileo’s mathematics, would rewrite the world as it is and 
                                                                                                                                 
helpful and clear explanation of Galileo’s discovery, see John Gribbin, Science: A 
History 1543-2001 (New York: Penguin, 2002), p. 84. 
129 Galileo Galilei, “The Assayer,” in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, trans. 
Stillman Drake (New York: Doubleday, 1957): p. 237-8. 
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thus clarify and cement our understanding of it.130 In fact, Wilkins and Sprat propose 
not only that they can find the right names for things, but also that they will develop a 
linguistic system that corroborates and clearly maps the relationship of one thing to 
another, and that will therefore serve as a universal model of what is.131 Sprat, for 
                                                
130 Margreta de Grazia, tracing what she calls the “secularization of language” in the 
seventeenth century, offers a similar account of how Galileo inspired universal 
language proponents to “fashion language on the model of mathematics” (320). 
See Margreta de Grazia, “The Secularization of Langu ge in the Seventeenth 
Century,” Journal of the History of Ideas 41, no. 2 (April – June 1980): 319-29. 
131 Other proponents of universal language schemas moredirectly grafted 
mathematical precision onto language. For example, in The Universal Character 
(1657), Cave Beck recommends assigning numbers to each part of a word, so that 
“honor thy father and mother” would be written as “leb 2314 p2477 and pf2477.” 
See “An Example of writing and speaking the fifth Commandment” at the end of 
The Universal Character (London: Thomas Maxey, 1657), in Early English books 
online, http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/ 
 openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:1168348
2. And in A Universal Characteristic, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher 
who visited the Royal Society and competed with Newton for the title of inventor 
of calculus, proposes that “infinitesimal calculus” will close the gap between 
natural science and geometry. Thus, he attaches numbers to various parts of his 
characters, asserting that arithmetical comparisons of these numbers will reveal 
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example, anticipates that the Royal Society will attain a language of “Mathematical 
plainness” (114), and concludes his tract with a promise that the Royal Society will 
“promote the same rigid way of Conclusion in all other Natural things, which only 
the Mathematics have hitherto maintained” (327). Meanwhile, Wilkins aspires to 
graft the modeling capabilities of mathematical formulae onto common nouns. His 
introduction to Part I, Chap 1, Sect 2 of the Essay gives us a hint of this grafting: 
The second Part shall contein that which is the great foundation of 
the thing here designed, namely a regular enumeration and 
description of all those things and notions, to which marks or names 
ought to be assigned according to their respective natures, which may 
be styled the Scientifical Part, comprehending Vniversal Philosophy. 
It being the proper end and design of the several branches of 
Philosophy to reduce all things and notions unto such a frame, as 
may express their natural order, dependence, and relations. 
                                                                                                                                 
the relationships between members of the natural landscape to which they are 
attached. See New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. Peter Remnant 
and Jonathan Bennett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Book 4, 
chap. 3, sect 389. See also Leibniz’s claim that “number is, as it were, 
metaphysical shape, and arithmetic, in a certain sense, the Static of the Universe, 
that by which the powers of things are investigated” and that we might invent “a 
language whose marks or characters perform the sametask as algebraic marks do 
for magnitudes considered abstractly” (“Preface to a Universal Characteristic,” in 
G.W. Leibniz Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber 




Wilkins and Sprat aspire to achieve a mathematical level of certainty in the realm of 
natural language, so that observations and conclusions about the world will become 
“rigid” and “Scientifical.” In fact, Wilkins’s emphasis on “enumeration,” and his 
interest in establishing a linguistic model that expresses the “natural order, 
dependence, and relations” of the things of the world, reveal that language for him 
will not serve as an inexact means of expressing a world whose organizational 
premises (i.e., design) are unknown to him, but rather as a new model that will 
become itself an object of empirical investigation—a system of signs that maps and 
models created ontology as Galileo had mapped and modeled the parabolic trajectory 
of a body moving through space.  
 Herein lies the rub: as a speaking that does not acknowledge its metaphorical 
distance from truth, that seeks to subject our observations of the world to order and 
exactness, Wilkins’s universal language schema becom s, like Steuart’s architectural 
metaphor, a determinant of what will be considered t ue. In fact, Wilkins’s schema 
turns out to be designed not according to the demands of empiricism—demands 
which compelled Galileo, for example, to admit that because of “resistances” (i.e., 
friction), the object will diverge from a precisely parabolic path (Dialogues, 252). On 
the contrary, Wilkins seems more determined to impose a Ramist system of logical 
categories onto the world, than to design his schema according to observation and 
empirical analysis.  
 Indeed, Wilkins’s interest in logical order posed a problem for him as he sought 
(and promised) to name things in the world exactly as they are. For example, in “To 
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the Reader,” Wilkins promises that John Ray, the person he appointed to write “those 
most difficult tables of Plants,” is up to the task, for he “besides his other general 
Knowledge, hath with great success applyed himself to the Cultivating of that part of 
Learning” (To the Reader). But he is forced later in the Essay, to admit the difficulty, 
perhaps even the impossibility, of such an endeavor: 
The more perfect kind of Vegetables are called by the name of 
Plants, the several kinds of which are so exceeding numerous, as 
must needs render it a very difficult task for any man who is most 
versed in the study of them, either to enumerate them so fully or to 
order them so acurately, as will not be liable to many exceptions; 
especially considering the streining and force thatmust sometimes be 
used, to make things comply with the institution of these tables into 
which they are to be reduced. 
 
Wilkins acknowledges the trouble of submitting the cornucopia of natural plant life to 
the structure of the taxonomy he has outlined, citing heir tendency not to “comply” 
with the logic he seeks to impose upon them. Even Wilkins sees the difference 
between the linguistic schema by which he tries to express and model the world, and 
the world as it is. 
 Yet, according to John Ray, Wilkins insisted that t e tables of plants be designed 
according to his rigorous logic. In a letter to hisfr end Lister, Ray complains about 
the impossibility of subjecting plants to the logical structure of Wilkins’s tables: 
I was constrained in arranging the Tables not to foll w the lead of 
nature, but to accommodate the plants to the author’s prescribed 
system. This demanded that I should divide herbs into three 
squadrons or kinds as nearly equal as possible; then that I should split 
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up each squadron into nine ‘differences’ as he called them, that  is 
subordinate kinds, in such wise that the plants ordere  under each 
‘difference’ should not exceed a fixed number; finally that I should 
join pairs of plants  together or arrange them in couples. What 
possible hope was there that a method of that sort would be 
satisfactory, and not manifestly imperfect and ridiculous? I frankly 
and openly  admit that it was; for I care for truth more than for my 
own reputation.132 
 
Ray’s letter reveals the difference not only between natural ontology and Wilkins’s 
language, but also between the natural world and the particular, Ramist logic that is 
inscribed into Wilkins’s schema. That is, following Ramus, Wilkins applies a neat, 
dichotomous logic to nature, trying to divide it ino “equal,” pre-apportioned 
categories—categories which, according to Ray, Wilkins inappropriately imposes 
onto the empirical process that he supposedly supports. Moreover, Ray’s repeated 
reference to Wilkins’s “differences” suggest that Wilkins, in following this 
dichotomous logic—this thinking by means of distinguishing one thing from 
another—emphasizes neat, categorical distinctions which do not correspond with the 
complexities of the natural world—where, for example, plants that supposedly fall 
                                                
132 “John Ray to Lister, May 7, 1669,” Correspondence of J.R (London: The Ray 
Society, 1848), p. 41-2, qtd. in Charles E. Raven, D.D., John Ray Naturalist: His 
Life and Works (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1942), p. 182. 
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into different categories turn out to be as much like each other as they are distinct. 133 
Wilkins, perhaps following Ramus’s assumption that t e “order of nature” and the 
logical thinking he promotes correspond, requires Ray to submit the natural world to 
the dichotomous logic inscribed into his linguistic schema, at the expense of the 




 Ray’s objections are important for our understanding of how Paradise Lost 
engages with the idea of a perfect, universal languge, for Eve, like Wilkins, claims to 
embrace empiricism or the “assay,” yet privileges logic and categorical distinction 
                                                
133 Ray, according to Clauss, was “one of the most vociferous objectors” to Wilkins’s 
project (543). Nevertheless, as Charles Raven tells us, he undertook to produce 
said tables within a period of three weeks (Raven, 182). 
134 Walter Ong, Introduction to A Fuller Course in the Art of Logic, in Complete 
Prose Works of John Milton, v. 8, ed. Merritt Hughes (New Haven: Yale 
University press, 1962), p. 157. See also Erland Sellberg, “Petrus Ramus,” 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ramus/, in which Sellberg posits that Ramus, 
following the Stoic philosophers, took the universe to be “rationally organized in 
a way that was directly equivalent to human reason,” and “regarded logic as a part 
of philosophy and defined it as an art that truly gives us knowledge of being.” 
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over that experience. Moreover, whereas John Ray observes that the plants will not 
conform to Wilkins’s linguistic taxonomies, and whereas Wilkins’s lack of empirical 
responsiveness leads to a public excoriation of his project,135 in Paradise Lost, Milton 
gives sublime voice to the difference between Eve’s dialectic, linguistically-bounded 
reading of the world around her and her true experience of it.  
 Eve’s mistake leads not only to her fall, but also to God’s correction of her 
epistemology: 
 O Sons, like one of us Man is become  
 To know both Good and Evil, since his taste  
Of that defended Fruit; but let him boast  
His knowledge of Good lost, and Evil got,  
Happier, had it suffic'd him to have known  
Good by it self, and Evil not at all.  
(11.84-89) 
 
                                                
135 See Raven on Ray’s follow-up to the tables he produce  for Wilkins’s Essay, and 
on Robert Morison’s accusation that Ray did not do en ugh “field-work” in 
producing the tables (186-67). According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale, 
Ramus’s logic also lost ground to the prominence of mpiricism, which came to 
divide observation from logic. Descartes and Hobbes, for example, relegated logic 
to “only the manipulation of signs” (312). See Kneale, William and Kneale, 




Contra Eve’s claims that she knows good by knowing evil as well, God asserts that 
the knowledge of goodness is not bound in dialectic, a  least not until the fall. If Eve 
had embraced the experience of having and knowing “Good by it self,” if she had 
rejected the linguistic manacles offered to her by the serpent, she could have 
recognized that having good was sufficient to maintaining it, and that knowing good 
in dialectical opposition to evil was unnecessary. Indeed, she might have continued to 
experience good as she initially experienced herself in the world, outside of, and thus 
unmediated by, the dialectical logic of language. Instead, Eve precipitates the 
inscription of goodness into the comparative logic which defines good as the opposite 
of evil.136  
 Wilkins invective against the sublime aesthetic can be heard in Eve’s decision to 
eat the forbidden fruit. For even before she eats the forbidden fruit, Eve takes the 
logic of language to reveal what the prohibition wants to hide: “Thy praise hee also 
who forbids thy use, / Conceals not from us, naming thee the Tree / Of Knowledge, 
knowledge both of good and evil” (750-52). As Wilkins proposes that a perfect 
language “may express…[the] natural order, dependence, and relations” of things and 
may rewrite the world as it is in comprehensible and certain form, so Eve avers that 
the name of the tree has exposed the once-hidden interdependency of the knowledge 
                                                
136 My argument complements Angelica Duran and Catherine Gimelli Martin’s 
observations on Milton’s intellectual and philosophical allegiances to Baconian, 
empirical methods, for it suggests that Milton, like Ray, treats experience as a 
potential corrective to Wilkins’s attempt to establish and frame truth. 
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of good and the knowledge of evil. Spurning linguistic opacity, she takes the 
dialectical logic of language, especially as presented to her by the name of the tree, to 
tell her truths that she might not otherwise readily comprehend. By thusly 
ventriloquizing Wilkins and his peers in Eve’s seduction scene, Milton provides his 
Christian readers with a new way of understanding the Genesis story they have long 
known, and with which they have long contended. He av rs that the serpent’s 
seduction of Eve supplements the logical and linguistic temptation presented by the 
tree itself, the fact that its name posits the “Knowledge of Good and of Evil” to be 
bound together in a dialectical, comparative relation. 
 
*** 
If every action which is good, or evill in man at ripe years, were to be 
under pittance, and prescription, and compulsion, what were virtue 
but a name, what praise could be then due to well-doing, what 
grammercy to be sober, just or continent? Many there by that 
complain of divin (sic) Providence for suffering Adam to transgresse, 
foolish tongues! When God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to 
choose, for reason is but choosing; he had bin else a m er artificiall 
Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions.    
    (Areopagitica, 527) 
 
In Areopagitica, Milton famously defines reason as a process of “choosing,” thereby 
locating the exercise of right reason beyond the bounds of law and prescription.  
Reason, he argues, does not follow authoritative pronouncements of what can or 
cannot be done, including what can or cannot be read or believed. In Paradise Lost, 
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God makes a similar claim, arguing that free will is based in angels’ and mankind’s’ 
ability to choose either disobedience or “constant Fai h or Love” (3.104): 
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere 
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love, 
Where only what they needs must do, appear’d 
Not what they would? what praise could they receive? 
What pleasure I from such obedience paid 
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, or freedom both despoil’d 
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity, 
Not mee.    
(3.103-11) 
As if following up on Areopagitica, God places the expression of “Will and Reason” 
outside of the jurisdiction of law and “necessity.” For if the gift of right reason which 
“also is choice” were not exercised outside the bounds of deterministic directives, 
then God could not experience and enjoy the reward of having human beings and 
angels choose to love Him, and human beings could not receive “praise” for making 
the right choice. 
 If, as these quotations suggest, reason is exercised only when there is a choice to 
be made, when there is no necessary or definitive answer to the question of what is 
true, or of what should be done, then reason is also exercised when language’s 
“opacity” is revealed. The choosing that is the essential activity of reason only occurs 
when language (sometimes ostentatiously) does not capture truth, when, instead of 
telling us definitively what is, or what is to be done, language invites us to engage in 
the hermeneutic activity of interpreting and choosing both. With this in mind, we can 
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begin to understand the ethical and spiritual disaster implicit in Eve’s decision to eat 
the forbidden fruit, and how the effect of this decision follows from its cause. Eve 
decides to eat the forbidden fruit because she rejects the very notion that “good” and 
“evil” can be experienced, understood, or chosen outside of the dialectical logic that 
is inscribed into logic. Instead of embracing the hermeneutic opportunity to speculate 
and choose that is presented to her by the prohibition’s vague reference to things (i.e., 
to death and evil) she does not definitively know, she opts to grasp onto the logical 
certainty that is promised her by the name of the tre , and by the serpent’s seductive 
words. Eating the tree, she expects, will place goodness, evil, and perhaps even death, 
under her consideration, will subject it to the dominion of her logical mind. Thus, it 
will release her from the ethical obligation to take hermeneutic action, to make a 
choice that is not captured by language, to find truth beyond the logic of words. Eve’s 
decision to reject this obligation, this opportunity to exercise will and reason, results, 
not coincidentally, in the degradation of both. 
 This degradation, from Milton’s perspective, is what designers of the universal 
language schema threatened to effect in the souls and minds of the English people, as 
they seduced them into embracing the comforts of linguistic (and thus religious) 
certainty. Indeed, given this threat, and the fact tha Milton places it at the disastrous 
cusp of human history, we can conclude that late-sev nt enth-century universal 
language ideology was an important spur to Milton’s allegorical ethics. No wonder he 
repeatedly emphasizes the allegorical state of his poetic language and counts on it to 
give off the sublime effect. For allegory, it turns out, is not only the linguistic 
condition that aptly reflects human beings’ created ontology (our state of suspended 
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difference from the ns into which we will eventually be assimilated), it is also one of 
our primary opportunities to exercise right reason, t  assert our individual will and 
choose for ourselves the truth in which we believe, even against the grain of 
authoritative language. 
 When Christian readers are struck with “wonder,” when they acknowledge the 
difference between themselves and the sublime, and, concomitantly, between a word 
and the truth to which it refers, they are roused to exercise right reason, to choose the 
truth (or the action) whose aptness to the final truth cannot in this world be known. 
As Milton’s allegorical ethics recommend, and as Victoria Kahn’s analysis of 
Samson’s own hermeneutical and political activity suggests, readers who find in 
representation’s “opacity” an opportunity to make this kind of choice—i.e., readers 
who take note of the necessarily allegorical state of language and its difference from 
final, sublime truth—find in themselves the hermeneutic power to subvert, and even 
the iconoclastic power to break down, those verbal idols which conflate word and 
thing. They find themselves able to resist and even destroy those figures of authority 
who (sometimes by making verbal idols of themselves) obfuscate the revelation that 
is promised at the end of days, and who do so by claiming the intellectual and 
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